

תוכן העניינים

האם יכול 'החורג' מגבולות 'הדיבור' לדבר?: הסמלי, הממשי והדמיוני אצל לאקאן, דָּלֶז וּגוֹאֹטְרִי וּבֵאֵטְלֶר 1	אפרת אבן צור
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האם יכול 'החורג מגבולות הדיבור' לדבר? הסמלי, הממשי והדמיוני אצל לאקאן, דלוז וגואטרי ופאטלר

אפרת אבן צור

הסמלי, הדמיוני והממשי הם מושגים הלקוחים מתורתו של לאקאן. במאמר זה הם מוצגים בזיקה לתפיסות סטרוקטורליסטיות בהגותו המוקדמת ומתוארים כמישורים שונים של היחס בין מערכת ייצוג למה שעליו היא מצביעה. כך נחשף פרדוקס הרה חשיבות: מערכת ייצוג, מטבעה, מבקשת לייצג דבר מה חיצוני לה, אך ביכולתה לסמנו רק במושגים פנימיים לה. אל מול התפיסה הלאקאניאנית של שלושת המושגים מוצגת פרשנותם הביקורתית הקיצונית של ז'ל דלוז ופליקס גואטרי, שדחו את המכלול הסטרוקטורלי של הייצוג הכורך יחדיו את הסמלי עם הדמיוני, ופועל לטענתם לדיכוי הייצור והתשוקה החופשיים ולהדחתם. תחת זאת הם העלו על נס את היצירתיות הממשית נטולת הרסן ו'שוברת הכלים' של ה'סכיון'. דלוז וגואטרי טענו כי חרף ההיבטים הביקורתיים דקונסטרוקטיביים בהגותם של פרויד ולאקאן, הפסיכואנליזה שלהם תורמת להמשך הדיכוי ורמיסת החירות בקדמה אשליית דמיוניות וריסון משעבד. במאמר מוצג ומובהר הקשר בין ההיבט הבלשני של ביקורתם לבין הוקעתם החריפה את ההתמקדות התאורטית של פרויד ולאקאן באב, המתבטאת בשם ספרם הידוע 'אנטי-אדיפוס'. בסיום המאמר מוצע כי אף שנחשפו בו מגבלות משמעותיות של הביקורת העולה מ'אנטי-אדיפוס' על הפסיכואנליזה כגורם שמרני, אין להקל בה ראש. כחלופה לתפיסתם הקיצונית של דלוז וגואטרי, שנטען כי אינה מספקת כלים הולמים לאלה הסובלות מדיכוי במציאות, מוצגת גישתה של ג'ודית באטלר. באטלר חלקה עם דלוז וגואטרי כמה היבטים מביקורתם, אך שלא כמותם היא לא הציעה להישאר בממשי ולנקוט התנגדות כמו-מטורפת לכללי המשחק של הסדר הסמלי. תחת זאת היא הראתה כיצד הסדר הסמלי גמיש יותר ממה שעולה מתיאוריהם של לאקאן ושל דלוז וגואטרי כאחד, שכן אין כל דרך לצפות מראש כיצד יועברו וישתכפלו כלליו. לפיכך היא כתבה בזכות הניסיון של מה שכינתה 'החורג מגבולות הדיבור' או 'החוץ הדחוי' להשמיע את דברו ולזכות לייצוג באמצעות שימוש יצירתי ומאתגר בכללים שהוא מתאמץ למתוח אותם מבפנים. עמדתה מוצגת כמזמינה עיון יצירתי בכללי המשחק של הפסיכואנליזה עצמה, על הסמלי, הממשי והדמיוני שבה.

כשהלקונה הטראומטית פוגשת שפה: מודוסים של עדות, מודוסים של החלמה

דנה אמיר

במאמר זה אעסוק בארבעה מודוסים ייחודיים של שפה טראומטית הנבדלים זה מזה במידת התנועה הנפשית שהם מייצרים מול הקיפאון הטראומטי: המודוס המטפורי, המודוס המטונימי, המודוס הפסיכוטי-מוזלמני והמודוס הפסיכוטי-אקסיבי. בעוד המודוס המטפורי מאופיין בהחזקה סימולטנית בעמדת הקורבן (האני החווה) ובעמדת העד (האני המתבונן) – כלומר בתנועה בלתי פוסקת בין הגוף הראשון והגוף השלישי של החוויה – שלושת המודוסים האחרים הולכים ופוחתים ביכולת התנועה שהם מייצרים בין העמדות השונות ולכן גם ביכולת לדקונסטרוקציה ולרקונסטרוקציה של הזיכרונות הטראומטיים. ארבעת המודוסים מודגמים באמצעות ניתוח של עדויות טראומטיות. הדיון עוסק במודוסים של זיכרון הנגזרים מארבעת המודוסים של העדות ובהשלכות הנוגעות לעבודה טיפולית עם טראומה.

החומרים הטראומטיים מפעילים בנפש תהליך של איון עצמי. חומציותם יוצרת בנפש הנושאת אותם שסע השואב לתוכו הן את התכנים הבלתי נסבלים והן את הסובייקט החווה אותם. במקום הזה סיכויו היחיד של הסובייקט להחלמה קשור באפשרות להעביר את החומרים הריקים תהליך עיכול בתוך סובייקט אחר שאי אפשר לאיינו. זה לבו של תהליך מתן העדות.

הספרות העוסקת בטראומה ובהתמודדות נפשית עם טראומה מתייחסת בהרחבה לתפקידו החיוני של האחר כנושא עדות לטראומה שפעמים רבות הקורבן עצמו לא היה עד לה, וגם לא יכול היה להיות. כותבים משדות תאורטיים שונים (Laub and Auerhahn 1993; Oliner 1996) תיארו טראומה כדבר מה המתרחש 'שם, הרחק', לא כמאורע השייך לסובייקט החווה, 'ל'אני'. הטראומה מדומה פעמים רבות

* המאמר מבוסס על מחקר שנערך בתמיכת האקדמיה הלאומית למדעים (מענק מס' 679/13).

עיבודו של סיום טיפול באמצעות חלומות

צבי גיל

במאמר אני מביא סדרת חלומות של מטופלת בפסיכותרפיה פסיכודינמית, ומנסה להראות באמצעותה את הדרך שבה היא עיבדה את סיום הטיפול. הגישות הפוסט-פרוידיאניות לפירוש חלומות מביאות בחשבון לא רק את גישתו של פרויד – פירוש סימבולי של חומר לא-מודע באמצעות האסוציאציות של המטופלת – אלא גם גישות מודרניות יותר. אלה כוללות התייחסות לחלום לא רק כביטוי של משאלה לא-מודעת, אלא גם כביטוי לטווח רחב יותר של תכנים מנטליים, ובעיקר לקונפליקט, ובמקרה המתואר – למצבים מנטליים המתעוררים במטופלת בתגובה על סיום הטיפול. החלום מפורש לא רק באמצעות האסוציאציות של המטופלת אלא גם בעזרת אלה של המטפל וכן אינטואיציה, אמפטיה למטופלת, ובמיוחד למצבה הספציפי בזמן החלום והישענות על תוכנו הגלוי. החלומות מובנים כאן כאקט בין-אישי לא פחות מאשר כפעולה תוך-נפשית, כדרך של המטופלת לתקשר עם המטפל דברים שאינה מודעת להם או שאינה מרשה לעצמה לבטא אותם.

במאמר זה אני עוסק בהסתייעות בחלומות בעיבוד שלב הסיום והפרדה בטיפול. המטופלת אילנה תוצג בקצרה, בהתאמה למגבלות המקום, אך גם בצורה אותנטית, כך שיתאפשר חיבור בין תוכני החלומות למרכיבי חייה. עם זאת, שמה ופרטים מזהים שוננו. המטופלת נתנה את הסכמתה לפרסום המאמר לאחר שקראה אותו.

* אני מודה לקוראים האלמונים על הערותיהם המועילות. במיוחד לקורא אשר הסב את תשומת לבי לכתיבתו של בלצ'נר, ולקורא השני, אשר בין שאר הערותיו הסב את תשומת לבי למוטיב של סיום טיפול אשר נקבע בידי המטפל. אני מודה לעורך הראשי על גישתו האוהדת והמעודדת.

פחות אבל כואב'

עיון פסיכרמית באהבה זוגית, בנפתוליה ובמשבריה

שי גיל

אני מבקש להתבונן מנקודת מבט פסיכודינמית בויקה הרגשית-יצרית הקיימת במערכת יחסים זוגית, זו המכונה ארוס או אהבה. לצורך כך אני עוקב אחר ביטויים של היסוד הארוטי בתרבות המערבית – במיתוס, בדת, בספרות ובאגדה, שעיצבו את התפיסות, האידיאלים והפנטזיות המודעות והלא-מודעות על תשוקה ואהבה זוגית רומנטית. התפתחות היסוד הארוטי מתוארת מנקודת מבט דינמית דחפית והתייחסותית, כפי שהיא מוצגת בפסיכואנליזה הפרוידיאנית והפוסט-פרוידיאנית, וכהד למתח הקיים בין תשוקה כביטוי לדחף המחפש פורקן, לבין אהבה המתפתחת במסגרת קשר בין-אישי. כמו כן נבחן מקומה של תוקפנות בהתפתחות היכולת לאהוב ונעשה ניסיון להתמודד עם השאלה אם תשוקה ואהבה יכולות להתקיים יחד לאורך זמן במערכת יחסים. לצורך כך נסקרים רעיונות מרכזיים מבתי מדרשם של מלני קליין, דונלד ויניקוט, ג'סיקה בנג'מין, סטיבן מיטשל, מייקל אייגן ואחרים. מובאים סיפוריהם של אוהבים, שחיו בתוך שדה רגשי יצרי סוער ורב התפוכות, כשהם נעים בין מצבים של התפרקות וכלות הנפש לבין יצרניות והתכללות נפשית, כהד לזיקה המיתית עתיקת היומין שבין ארוס לכאוס וכביטוי ליחסי הגומלין המורכבים, אליבא דפרויד, בין דחף החיים, ארוס, לדחף המוות, תנטוס. לאחר מכן מוצגת פרדיגמה התפתחותית לאהבה זוגית בהשראת הפסיכולוגיה האנליטית מבית מדרשו של קרל גוסטב יונג, וכן גישתו של צמנואל לוינס להבנת הפנומנולוגיה של ארוס והוגים נוספים, תוך הגדרת תהליך תלת-שלבי להתפתחות יחסים זוגיים: (א) המשיכה של הדומה לדומה; (ב) יקיצה והחזרת השלכות; (ג) המרחב הדיאלוגי.

האהבה הומה בדמי כמעין חשאי

מתי יבוא? מתי אקטוף שושנים לבנות לפאר את חדרו [...]

לנשמתו האפלה, לידיו הקשות, אושיט את עצמי כענף פורח (זלדה 2014: 14–15).

רק פעם בחשכת הנצה אפרח. קטוף את ליבי

היש קרבן יקר לאלוהים מאהבת בן-המוות (שם: 15).

אפתלל בלי מילים: בבוא היום הגדול אל תרמסני האהבה. יהיה

בי האומץ לשאת את השמחה ואת סבל הפריחה... (שם: שם).

משק כנפי העצמי: התמודדות עם ריבוי גישות בפסיכואנליזה בת־זמננו

שמואל גרזי

הפסיכואנליזה בת־זמננו מאופיינת בריבוי גישות. בתוך הריבוי הזה בולטות שתי מגמות: להדגיש את המבנה מכאן ואת התהליך וההתמרה מכאן. במאמר אני מנסה לשלב בין שתי מגמות אלה באמצעות תפיסת העצמי כתהליך זורם בהתמדה, אשר אפשר להמחישו בעזרת דימוי העצמי כנהר זורם שאפשר להיכנס אליו בכל רגע ולחוותו כשונה, וגם כמבנה קבוע שאפשר לראותו ממבט־על. אני מדגיש את חשיבות הרגשות בתהליך הזה, תוך התייחסות לרגשות כאל משק כנפי העצמי, לאמור כמוסיקה המלווה ומספרת את משמעות התמונות הנעות בסרט, שללא פס הקול קשה מאוד להבין את משמעות התהליך המתרחש. לשם ההמחשה של תפיסת תהליך הטיפול הפסיכואנליטי כתהליך זורם מובאת הצגת מקרה של התמודדות עם עצמיות 'תקועה' והניסיון המשותף של המטפל והמטופל להביא את העצמי לידי תנועה. הצגת המקרה מתמקדת בהתערבות המטפל. התערבות זו משמשת דוגמה לרגע של התנעת תהליך שאפשר להבינו מנקודות מבט רבות ושונות, אשר גישות פסיכואנליטיות מגוונות מפרות אותה. ריבוי המשמעויות של התערבות המטפל ותגובת המטופל, יחד עם ריבוי ההבנות של הגורמים אשר תרמו לטרנספורמציה של העצמי, עולות בקנה אחד עם תפיסת העצמי והפסיכואנליזה כתהליך רב פנים, שאולי בעצמו משמש גורם משמעותי בעזרה להביא את העצמי לידי תנועה חיונית. ריבוי הגישות המאפשרות להסביר את החייאת תנועת החיוניות, יכול להתקיים בו זמנית. ריבוי זה נענה לדרכה של תורת הקוונטים, אשר ממנה אפשר להסיק כי איננו יכולים להבין אף אדם הבנה שלמה, ואז נראה כי האפשרויות הרבות של ההסבר יכולות לחיות יחד כתיאורים סותרים המשלימים זה את זה. זרימת העצמי יכולה להיתרם מדיאלוג בין גישות טיפוליות שונות, המתבוננות בו זמנית באותם תהליכים מנקודות מבט שונות בלי לוותר על הנחות היסוד של כל זרם.

לא לדעת בדיוק
באיזה עולם חיים
(שימבורסקה 1996: 34)

לחקור ארץ חדשה שאך זה התגלתה¹ קריאה בספר הזיכרונות של 'איש הזאבים'

ענת צור מהלאל

גיבור תיאור המקרה הקנוני של פרויד, 'איש הזאבים' מתולדותיה של נזירות ילדות' (פרויד 1999 [1918]), סרגיי פנקייב, אשר זכה לכינוי 'איש הזאבים', כתב בערוב ימיו את זיכרונותיו ובהם המפגש שלו עם פרויד. טקסט זה התפרסם בכרך בשם 'איש הזאבים וזיגמונד פרויד' החתום בשמה של עורכת הספר (Gardiner 1971a). במאמר אני מציעה לראות בספר הזיכרונות של סרגיי פנקייב תרגום של חוויית המפגש שלו עם פרויד ותיאור של תחושתו בעקבות קריאתו את תיאור המקרה אודותיו. הדימוי של הפסיכואנליזה כפעולת תרגום של הלא-מודע למודע הוצע לראשונה בידי פרויד, והתפתח לחשיבה על תרגום חוויות לא מילוליות בשיח האנליטי ועל תרגום השיח האנליטי לטקסט בכתובה הפסיכואנליטית. אחת העובדות המפתיעות ביותר שמזמנת הקריאה בזיכרונותיו של פנקייב היא שהחיבור של פרויד עליו כמעט ואינו מוזכר בו. במאמר מוצעת קריאה משווה בשני הטקסטים מתוך גישה המעמידה במרכז התהליך הפסיכואנליטי את המפגש בין מטפל למטופל, אשר מקבל במקרה זה ביטוי נוסף במפגשים שבין כותב לקורא ובין טקסט לקורא. בתוך כך יידונו הנרטיבים הנפשיים השונים המוצעים בשני הטקסטים לדמותו של המטופל ולשאלת הריפוי הנפשי וכן סוגיות הקשורות ליחסים האנליטיים בין השניים.

'איש הזאבים' מתולדותיה של נזירות ילדות' (פרויד [1918] 1999) הוא תיאור המקרה האחרון שכתב פרויד (1856–1939) ואחד מהמפורטים שבהם. הונחו בו היסודות לרבים מהעקרונות התאורטיים של הפסיכואנליזה, במיוחד על המיניות

¹ הציטוט לקוח מתוך זיכרונותיו של 'איש הזאבים' מהמפגש שלו עם פרויד (Pankejeff 1971b: 138). המאמר מבוסס על פרק מתוך עבודת דוקטור שנכתבה בחוג לספרות עברית והשוואתית באוניברסיטת חיפה בהנחייתם של ד"ר ורד לב כנען ופרופ' עמנואל ברמן, להם שלוחה תודתי העמוקה.

סיפוריו של ברוננו שולץ וקרבת מוטיבים לעולמו של יונג

רות נצר

המאמר עוסק בהשוואה בין יצירותיהם ועולמם הרוחני של ברוננו שולץ, הסופר הפולני-יהודי, ושל קרל גוסטב יונג, במחצית הראשונה של המאה העשרים. ההשוואה היא בין 'הספר האדום', ספר חזיונות וציורים וספר זיכרונותיו של יונג, לבין 'חנניות קינמון, בית-המרפא בסימן שעון החול', שני קובצי סיפוריו של שולץ. מאמר זה בוחן את המוטיבים המרכזיים בסיפורי ברוננו שולץ, הסופר היהודי-פולני שנרצח בשואה: את התפוררות המשפחה, התפוררות נפש האב, והתפוררות 'הספר הקדוש' כתהליכים שמקבילים להתפוררות העולם המוסרי של אירופה במחצית הראשונה של המאה העשרים. התפוררות הנרטיב הלוגי בסיפורים תבחן בהקבלה להתפוררות נפש הגיבור. המוטיבים של 'העידן הגאולי'¹, הדימויים של המקק והקונדור, יובנו כביטוי לתהליכים של אישיות דו-קוטבית. יידונו המיתוציה של המציאות, ההזדהות עם יוסף המקראי, ההשפעות של ניטשה וקפקא, והבעייתיות של היחס אל האישה ואל האנימה. על כל אלה ייתוסף מבט אלגורי-פוליטי של יחסי היהודים והנוצרים באירופה לקראת השואה. במאמר נבחנים הקרבה והשוני בין יונג לשולץ ביחסם לחוויות התשתית של הילדות, לדמות האב, לגנוסטיקה, לאל הבורא, לרליגיוזיות, לספר, למוטיב הנבחרות והייעוד ולמוטיב המשיח. הדמיון ביניהם הוא בעיקר בהתמודדותם באמצעות כתיבה וציור עם הלא-מודע הקולקטיבי, החזיונות, סכנת השיגעון והמשיכה למיתוס ולתעתועיו. אפשר לסכם שהקרבה ביניהם היא בעולמם הרוחני ובתכנים ארכיטיפיים ייחודיים, והשוני ביניהם הוא באופן ההתמודדות, במודעות ובכוחות האגו. שניהם תרמו להרחבת מרחב הביניים של דמדומי המציאות ההווה והחזיונית כמרחב העשרה חיוני לנפש האדם.

אלי! זר ומסתכל הצידה אתה עומד שם וכאילו מקשיב אי-שם למעמקים,
ממתין לאיזו מילה, אך משם, ממעמקי הזכוכית, אתה מציית למישהו אחר,
ממתין לפקודות ממקום אחר (שולץ 1979: 246).

¹ שם סיפור של שולץ, וראו להלן.

מות העד בעידן העדות פרימו לוי וז'ורז' פֶּרְק

יוחאי עתריה

במאמר זה נבחן את תפקיד העד כמספר, כסופר וכהיסטוריון תוך השוואה בין פרימו לוי לבין ז'ורז' פֶּרְק. לטענתי, משום שהעד הוא גם ההיסטוריון של עצמו, אין הוא עד תמים. עם זאת הן לוי והן פֶּרְק, כל איש בדרכו, מציעים מודל אותנטי של עדות. לוי מסר עדות מתוך תחושת אלביתי וכתבתו חרדה מהאין ומהשתיקה, ואילו פֶּרְק התמודד עם החרדה הזו וכתב את (ולא רק על) השתיקה ומתוכה. מהלך זה של פֶּרְק מאפשר לנו לדמיין מודל פסיכואנליטי חדש לפריצת חומות המילים.

עיוור בלב ים מי אותו יציל ('ערב ב' כסלו', ערן צור,
מתוך האלבום 'עיוור בלב ים', להקת כרמלה גרוס וגנר)

השוואה ושאלת העדות¹

דורי לאוב סיפר על עדותה של ניצולת שואה ובה תיארה ארבע ארובות עולות באש בעת המרד באושוויץ, באוקטובר 1944. אירוע זה לא התרחש, אין על כך ויכוח. בעדותה גם לא זכרה אותה ניצולה שהייתה בפלוגת 'קנדה', שמיינה ואספה את חפצי הנרצחים באושוויץ. די היה בכך כדי לבטל את עדותה כולה – העדות לא הייתה מדויקת ואין להסתמך עליה כעל תעודה היסטורית. אולם דורי לאוב, פרופסור לפסיכיאטריה

¹ מאמר זה נכתב בעקבות שיחה עם יובל נריה וחברים בשבעה לאביו ומוקדש לאלה שידועים משהו ובוחרים לא לספר מתוך אהבה וחמלה, גם במחיר אישי כבד. אני מבקש להודות לפרופ' מנואלה קונסוני על שיח פורה על פרימו לוי ועל ההזמנה המרגשת לכנס באוניברסיטת אינסברוק שבאוסטריה שעסק בפרימו לוי. כמעט כרגיל אני מבקש להודות גם לד"ר עמוס גולדברג – על האומץ שלו להיות מפעים. לתובנותיו אין תחליף.

'יופיה אינו ידוע' האובייקט האסתטי: היבטים פסיכואנליטיים במשנתו של דונלד מלצר

אירית קליין

נושאו של מאמר זה הוא האובייקט האסתטי כפי שראה אותו דונלד מלצר. תחילה אסקור את המושג 'אסתטי' ואת תרומתו של עמנואל קאנט להתפתחותו, ואראה כיצד התייחסה הפסיכואנליזה אל האסתטי ואל היפה. מימיה הראשונים עסקה הפסיכואנליזה בשני המושגים הללו ובקשר שביניהם לבין האמנות, הספרות והתרבות. לאחר מכן אסקור תחנות חשובות בדיאלוג הפורה שהתפתח בין הפסיכואנליזה לבין האמנויות היפות, מפרויד דרך מלני קליין, חנה סגל, מריון מילר, וילפרד ביון, מלצר ועד לדונלד ויניקוט. הדיאלוג שימש מקור השראה להתפתחות החשיבה הפסיכואנליטית בהקשר זה. במיוחד אתעכב על מלצר: כיצד הוא ראה והמשיג את האובייקט האסתטי על מורכבותו ועל התהליכים הנפשיים שנארגים מתוכו. מתוך המשגתו את האובייקט האסתטי סבר מלצר שהקונפליקט האסתטי הוא חלק מתהליך התפתחותי המתרחש בשלבים המאוחרים של הטיפול הפסיכואנליטי, על סף העמדה הפרסיבית. על פי משנתו, גדילה מנטלית היא פונקציה אסתטית פנימית המתבססת על הדדיות בין נפשו הפנימית של המטופל לבין האובייקטים הפנימיים שלו, ומתחילה בתגובתו הממשית לאם כעולם וביחסי הגומלין המתפתחים ביניהם. הופעתו של האובייקט האסתטי בטיפול מעלה חרדות המלוות את הקונפליקט האסתטי וקשורות לאופיו האניגמטי של האובייקט. חרדות הפרסיביות מתעוררות מוקדם מאוד בשל העובדה שמן ההתחלה נחוה האובייקט כאובייקט מורכב, יפה ובה בעת מעורפל. פיצול והגנות אחרות יכולות להתרחש מאוחר יותר כדרך להימנע מהקונפליקט האסתטי. בהתבסס על הבנה זו אנסה להראות איך ההתרחשויות הללו באות לידי ביטוי בקליניקה, במרקם העדין שנוצר ביחסים הטיפוליים בכל הקשור לגילוי של האובייקט האסתטי, כשיופי ואמת שזורים אחד בשני. במאמר אראה את

* כותרת המאמר, 'יופיה אינו ידוע', משר של נתן זך מתוך מחזור השירים 'כל החלב והדבש' (זך 2013: 278), ניתנה בידי חנה ווקשטיין, שקראה את עבודת הגמר שהוגשה לבית הספר לפסיכותרפיה, אוניברסיטת בראיילן 2014. תודתי נתונה לה.

מבט פסיכואנליטי על העד הפנימי הניצב לפני שער החוק של הטראומה ועל כוחה המתמיר של קריאת ספרות

מירב רוט

בעוד האדם חווה את חייו, חוויותיו נרשמות בזיכרונותיו כעדויות פנימיות. עדויות אלה מופיעות ברמות ובצורות שונות, מן העדות הצרובה בגוף ועד לעד הפנימי ה'רושם' את סיפורו של הסובייקט במישור הנרטיבי והסימבולי. אני מבקשת להראות כיצד התפתחות נפשית מובילה לשינוי בצורות העדות הפנימית, וכיצד קריאת ספרות תורמת לכינונה של פונקציית העד המטפורי בנפש, זה שיכול להתבונן, לשאת מורכבות, להתאבל וליצור סיפור, ועמו תיקון מעט. במקרה של אוטו דב קולקה התפתחות זו אף הביאה אותו לכתוב את עדותו האישית על חוויותיו כנער באושוויץ. באמצעות ספרו (עדותו), 'נופים ממטרופוליין המוות' (קולקה 2013), אני מדגימה כיצד חוויות שונות של קריאת ספרות, ששיאן מתרחש בקריאת הסיפור 'לפני שער החוק' מאת קפקא, תומכות בשינוי באופני העדות הפנימיים ובכינונו של העד הפנימי הרפלקטיבי, המטפורי. התבוננות זו מבקשת לסייע לנו כמטפלים, המאזינים למטופלינו המעידים על עולמם בכל פגישה מחדש באופנים מודעים ושאינם מודעים, ולפתוח את ההקשבה לשאלות הקשורות לאופן עדותם על עצמם ולתפקידנו כעדים לעדותם.

הקדמה

במאמרה 'כשהלקונה הטראומטית פוגשת שפה: מודוסים של עדות, מודוסים של החלמה'¹, מציגה הפסיכואנליטיקאית דנה אמיר ארבעה מודוסים של עדות על

¹ המאמר מתפרסם בכרך הנוכחי של כתב העת וקריאתו תעשיר את קריאת המאמר הנוכחי.

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**CAN THE “UNSPEAKABLE” SPEAK?
THE SYMBOLIC, REAL AND IMAGINARY ACCORDING TO
LACAN, DELEUE AND GUATTARI, AND BUTLER**

EFRAT EVEN TZUR

This paper focuses upon the harsh criticism originally proposed by Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), French existential and linguistic-social philosopher, and Félix Guattari (1930-1992), a radical psychiatrist, in their famous 1972 book *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. The title of their controversial essay—radical in its content, in its time, as it was in the very peculiar mode of joint composition by, or dialogue between, the two authors (Deleuze eventually considered this work a failure)—is taken from their opposition to what the two authors viewed as the suffocating influence of the doctrine of the ‘normal triangular oedipal’ family structure. In their view, Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis had become too conservative in its theory and practice, to the point where it had ironically come to serve as a significant component of the regnant institutions or systems of psychic and social repression; the oedipal myth in their view actually blocks the way to understanding the unconscious, and stands in the way of achieving productivity and desire. I seek to examine their original critique from a somewhat unique angle, with heightened attention to their view of language and to the ties between their specifically *linguistic* claims and their wider claims regarding psychology, social oppression and resistance. Specifically, I will examine their use and reuse of the *triadic conceptual array* that had been adapted from the teachings of Jacques Lacan (1901-1981), comprised of the orders of the Symbolic, Imaginary and Real.

The three orders of the Symbolic, Imaginary and Real will be presented in this essay in relation to the structuralist aspects of Lacan’s early writings (i.e., the stage that followed his earliest writings on mirroring and the psychoses). Namely, I will refer to texts which were composed between 1953 and 1963, the decade in which Lacan’s interpretations of Freud texts—the so-called ‘return to Freud’—focused on issues of speech and language. Linguistic aspects of the Symbolic order, the Imaginary order and the order of the Real, and the relations between them, will be depicted as different features of the relationship between signifiers and the signified, or the relationship between a representation-system and that to

which the System refers in order to create meaning. My approach will expose the crucial paradox related to Lacan's neologism of the extimate, and "extimacy;" it will be claimed that while a representation-system, by definition, strives to represent something that is inherently external to itself, it can only achieve such representation by using *internal* means of indication. I will then tie this idea to the equally paradoxical, or at least deeply troublesome claim that the validity of the Symbolic Law cannot be anchored in anything external to it.

These structuralist ideas, with their inherent paradoxes, will be linked to the extra-linguistic Lacanian interpretations of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real, and specifically to Lacan's reading of Freud's Oedipal Theory. This reading stresses the symbolic function of the Father and the inherent lack that characterizes both the father (*qua* castrated or "dead," symbolically murdered father) and the structure of the paternal. The function I have in mind is expressed within the Lacanian School in terms of Lacan's famous axiom according to which "There is no Other of the Other." I shall interpret this axiom in light of the terms presented above. According to my reading, the Father is a master-signifier, descendant *of* the treasury of signifiers (and ascendant *to* it) which strives to grant a measure of stability to this treasury. At the same time, it is noted that the Father is a signifier of an empty place, of the impossibility to find an *ultimate* external guarantee to the validity of the Law.

As stated previously, in contraposition to the classical Lacanian understanding of the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary, I will turn to re-introduce the radical critique by Deleuze and Guattari, though originally directed against Freud—and ultimately directed against Lacan as well, though Guattari tried very hard to suppress this dimension (or, to at least keep it from Lacan's attention!)—both of whom rejected the idea of representation and meaning-making as the crucial function of language. Their original concepts, including "the Body without organs," "Machines" (sites of desire, as opposed to what they viewed as the overly abstract notion of representation) and "Territorialization," will be presented in relation to the Lacanian Real, Symbolic and Imaginary. Deleuze and Guattari come up against the effect of a structure which binds together the symbolic and imaginary, and view the structuralist idea on representation as oppressing free creativity of the Real—via both psychic repression and social repression. They valorized instead ideas such as *production* and *desire*, which they see as potentially unruly but existentially authentic, and consider them capable of identifying the processes that lead to conflict or the "schizo" state.

My overall approach is as follows: Deleuze and Guattari claim that despite the initially deconstructive and subversive aspects in Freud's and Lacan's work,

the vision of psychoanalysis that developed from their work in essence supports the oppression and subjugation of desire. The link between the linguistic aspect of Deleuze's and Guattari's criticism and their harsh condemnation of Freud's and certainly Lacan's focus on the Father (criticism which is expressed in the title of their book) is clarified. Following that, I present the claim that Deleuze's and Guattari's ideas imply such a drastic rejection of all structure, representation and meaning as to be, in the end, insufficiently helpful, and impracticable for those who are truly subjugated, those living in the shadow of an actual oppressive order.

In the final part of the paper, I suggest that despite the significant limitations of the French authors' criticism in *Anti-Oedipus* against psychoanalysis as a conservative factor, there is a germinal point in their claims that ought not to be completely dismissed. As a promising alternative to their unsatisfactory view, I offer a synopsis of the approach of the American philosopher and gender theorist Judith Butler (1956-). Butler shares some of Deleuze's and Guattari's anti-structuralist, oedipally-normativizing assertions against Lacan and Freud—she accepts that gender is a performance, or production, and neither inherently nor certainly linguistically dictated—yet unlike them, she does not suggest to act merely from the Real or to practice some kind of “mad” resistance to the Symbolic rules of the game. She acknowledges that gender is not entirely voluntary, and that the effect of internalized modes or discourses of gender performances does play a crucial role in social and individualized order. Instead of *Anti-Oedipus*, Butler, through her discussion of the tragic heroine Antigone, seeks to prove that the Symbolic order exists, unlike Deleuze's and Guattari's thesis, *but is more flexible* than what is portrayed in Freud's or Lacan's outlines. According to Butler, there is no way to fully foresee how gender identity and performance rules will be transmitted and duplicated *once actually performed*. Without denying the force of patterns, and consistency, for many people, in their gender role, Butler argues that individuals must struggle with iterability (repetition) in order to exit from overpowering, unthought gender performance in the effort to determine, and re-determine themselves. She thus writes in favor of the repeated attempts of the Real, as the “unspeakable” or the “object outside,” to gain a voice and to be represented politically and personally. Yet she does not support a mayhem approach to social or gender freedom; the definition of resistance she offers is possible or ‘doable’ through a playful and subversive application of symbolic codes, in an attempt to stretch them from within, rather than breaking them or merely accepting them with their inhevent dimesion of lack unexplored or represented.

I conclude with an attempt to portray Butler's success, in my view, in creating, or enabling, a better integrated discussion of both linguistic philosophy and concrete oppression, in the effort to ground a kind of discussion that tends all too often to be quite abstract and far removed from experience... or from what a psychoanalyst would call clinical reality. I claim that Butler's "queer approach" and her focus on issues of gender and sexuality help to make this occasionally all-too-theoretical discussion more relevant to the living reality of people who are subjugated to excessive gender or sexuality-related oppression in their daily life—a hidden (if not always intended) form of oppression that has been too many times supported within some psychoanalytic circles. Finally, Butler's view is portrayed as inviting a creative examination of the rules of the game of psychoanalysis itself in general (i.e., not limited to gender or oedipal theory), including its Symbolic, Imaginary and Real aspects.

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**WHEN LANGUAGE MEETS TRAUMATIC LACUNA:
MODES OF WITNESSING, MODES OF HEALING**

DANA AMIR

In the present work I wish to outline four modes of traumatic witnessing¹ which I attempt to distinguish from one another by virtue of the degree of *psychic motility* (or representational mobility) each of the four succeeds in forming, or enabling, with regard to the relationship between narration, or articulated psychic experience, and traumatic memory. The most highly developed mode, which can be considered the “metaphoric” mode of testimony, imitates the analogous movement that metaphors create in written and spoken language in general, holding (containing) simultaneously two frames of reference: that of the victim (the experiencing I) and that of the witness (the narrating I). The other three modes, which I refer to as the “metonymic,” “excessive” and the “Muselmann” modes, represent respectively a gradual decline in the psychic capacity to hold traumatic memories in mind in a way that allows for transformation and healing. I will further show that the core of psychoanalytic therapy for trauma lies in the attempt to enable the crucial shift from the so-called primitive or limited metonymic and psychotic modes of testimony, to the metaphoric mode. Only the latter has sufficient psychic force to turn traumatic lacunae or void into a crucible with creative core.

The term “metaphoric testimonial mode” refers to those areas in the testimonial narrative where one (importantly: *both* narrator *and* listener/reader [this is important for the understanding of shifts in this quality of such experience that are often initially detected via countertransference]) experiences a nearly constant and fluid movement between “first person” and “third person” mode of experience, between the *experiencing I* and the *reflective I*, which further enables the shift between the “position of the victim” and the “position of the witness.” The specifically *metaphoric* quality lies in the fact that unlike the metonymic and the psychotic testimonial modes, this first mode involves an act of representation

¹ Note that I refer to the process of “bearing witness” rather than to the procedure of “giving testimony” simply because this paper does not focus on the formal testimonial procedure but rather on the inner processes of deconstruction and reconstruction as reflected in the content and form of the subject’s inner narrative.

and the creation of new meaning, producing an integrated narrative within which the traumatic events are not merely repeated but also undergo transformation.

Against the metaphoric testimonial mode, the metonymic testimonial mode remains primarily a “first person” mode of report. It produces a text that preserves and *enacts*, as opposed to fully representationalizes, the traumatic memories and the traumatic features, and is thus characterized by much of the same sense of isolation, fragmentation, disorientation and lack of coherence that typified the traumatic experience itself. In that sense, the metonymic testimonial mode illustrates the very materials to which it testifies. Thus, while the metaphoric testimonial mode enables the shift between the first person and the third person of experience, the metonymic testimonial mode tends to be *located in* the first person existential situation. This does not mean that it is literally limited to the first person only, nor does it mean that it is characterized by an excessive use of “I,” yet the predominant experience in the metonymic testimonial mode is a severe depletion of any reflective attitude. Rather, the metonymic mode of testimony uses minimal distancing, maintaining a living continuum with the traumatic memories, and through this also tends to maintain the traumatized sense of selfhood. It *enacts* the traumatic experience without being able to turn it into an integrated narrative, *incorporating* it without being fully capable of *transcending* it. Within the metonymic testimonial mode, such transcendence as might occur, initially, tends to be experienced as a split between the person, semi-concretely perceived, and his or her identity.

To these two modes, I add an experience that I refer to as “the psychotic testimonial mode.” This mode of testimony is *active*, in a sense, in that it attacks every possible psychic link with the trauma, actually separating between the person and his or her memories as well as between the person and his or her own sense of selfhood. This modality can be further divided into two subcategories or modalities: the “Muselmann-psychotic subcategory” or mode and “the excessive-psychotic subcategory.”

The term Muselmann is adapted from German concentration camp slang to describe inmates that had become apathetic, hopeless or fatalistic, characterized by an utterly alien, estranged sense of nonbeing, and proneness to death. The Muselmann-psychotic mode is a form of testimony that only rarely yields actually narrative manifestations since it essentially attacks both the ability to narrate and language itself. Diverse manifestations of this mode appear in the post-Holocaust literature in particular forms of survivors’ accounts (written or even graphic media) that are characterized by a semi-psychotic type of discourse, both at the intrapsychic and intersubjective level; a discourse that annihilates

any contact with ‘psychic reality’ (such as it might be) and the pain it evokes and sustains. This type of testimonial mode tends to take hold when there exists an inability to shift between the first and the third person of experience (as in the metaphoric mode) and little or no capacity to remain comfortably, and at least functionally, in the first person of experience (as in the metonymic mode). Instead, this peculiar psychotic mode destroys both the first as well as the third person sense of experience, and thereby the very possibility of an experiencing subject. Put in other terms, this testimonial sub-mode actually joins the traumatic “Real” without being able to distance itself from it, on the one hand, or create a vital representational link with it, on the other hand. When the dominant mode of testimony is the Muselmann-psychotic mode, we may say, trauma turns into a “negative possession:” a psychic condition which annihilates both the capacity to represent the traumatic events as well as the ability to preserve vital emotional contact with them.

The excessive-psychotic mode, on the other hand, is a much more illusory one; that is to say, there is a specifically perverse form to the dismal psychic experience it signifies. In this mode, the traumatic object has become an addictive and gratifying object in its own right, an object whose totality actually replaces a functional sense of being. In this testimonial mode, traumatic excessiveness—oftentimes, the sheer subjective “amount,” as it were, of stimuli, memory bits, or data, even if not, by some odd standard, objectively “quantitatively more than ordinary”—cannot be assimilated into consciousness, neither by way of an elaborated link (as in the metaphoric mode) nor by way of repetition (as in the metonymic mode). “Testimony” in this case, quite differently than any conventional sense of the term, involves the traumatic memory becoming a saturated object, one that refuses transformation, and to which obstinate adherence, or a kind of relentless pointing, becomes chronic and malignant. Adherence to the excessiveness of suffering, and the traumatic object’s imperviousness to new meanings or any other processes of change, turn traumatic repetition into “a thing in itself,” one that belongs to the territory of the Real.

There is a certain deceptiveness to this testimonial mode that draws from the intensive linguistic qualities that often characterize the excessive-psychotic narrator. That is, while the register of the Real precedes language and in many ways also opposes it—the overt manifestation of the excessive-psychotic mode tends not to be *an absence of language*. On the contrary: such narration generally presents itself through apparently articulate and well-developed language, with a wealth of rhetorical features. Underneath the rhetorical cover or mask, however, is a language that attacks, rather than produces or promotes linking. One experiences

a saturated language, one that under the guise of full testimony presents what Cathy Caruth (1955-) calls “empty grammar:” a grammar that empties the event and does not allow for its subjects to undergo transformation. Thus, while the excessive-psychotic mode might well be replete with ‘metaphors,’ the mode as such is nonmetaphoric and the intent is not to convey meaning (at least, not until meaning can be constructed with great effort as happens during psychotherapy). In this mode, metaphors are minimalistic in content, and tend to operate harshly to recreate concrete experiences of splitting or unlinking.

In everyday life, true post-traumatic testimonial narrative constitutes a unique combination, in varieties of proportion, of all of the aforementioned testimonial modes, marking zones of psychic transformation *versus* zones of saturated thinking, zones of linking *versus* zones of compulsive repetition, zones in which testimony annihilates the witness *versus* zones in which it constitutes him or her as such (indeed, the combinations are so complex that the sense of clear demarcation between modes, as implied by my use of the word *versus*, might be a misleading way of putting things). The above ideas are illustrated through a close reading and analysis of several testimonial texts, as I identify and highlight different degrees of reflection and symbolization that enable, respectively, different degrees of healing.

WORKING THROUGH THE TERMINATION OF PSYCHODYNAMIC TREATMENT THROUGH DREAMS

TSVI E. GIL

The present article is based upon a series of dreams dreamed by a patient during the termination phase of her psychodynamic treatment. I intend to demonstrate how the patient was in many ways working through her emotional, unconscious reactions or responses to the act of termination through the *vehicle of dreaming*, and as represented by the *content* of her dreams.

I begin my presentation with a brief anamnesis which I deem necessary in order to enable the reader to make some acquaintance with the patient as a *dreaming patient*, and in order to facilitate the reader's comprehension of the dreams' content. The lengthy and perhaps somewhat tiresome series of dreams presented here is intended to show how the patient's inner reactions to the forthcoming termination developed. That is to say, at the commencement of the series of dreams I have selected, the patient expressed a protesting position, objecting to the idea of finishing the treatment, perceiving the image of the "therapist bent upon ending the treatment" as a brutal enemy intent upon killing her through the act of abandoning her. This inner reaction was initially not conscious to the patient; in her overt manner she was a polite and tender woman who had maintained a highly positive transference toward her male therapist. Therefore, her mental apparatus was compelled, so to speak, to express those undesirable feelings through means of disguise in dreams. A bit later on, the patient's persecutory projections gave way to a more directly angry affect, still directed toward the therapist. In subsequent dreams, the patient moved from a more unrelentingly paranoid position—perceiving the terminating therapist as a prosecuting one, feeling being cheated by him—to a "bargaining" position. During this new phase, the patient tried desperately to negotiate with the imagined therapist; for example, she spoke of her readiness to 'behave' herself or to find ways to 'compensate' the treatment in order that it be able to be extended and to endure.

Alternatively, the patient tried to convince herself that she would do quite well without the treatment, given that she would in any event, as she portrayed it, be 'forced' to give it up. In the dreams that characterized this period, the patient

actually expressed a dual, if somewhat split position toward the therapist: he was perceived positively as an advisor yet at the same time was experienced as maltreating her, deserting her but at the same time affectionate.

As the working-through of the termination continued, so did the patient's dreams. Gradually, the dreams began to point to a kind of rationalization of the necessity for termination; for example, that it was only *right* that she allow for the fact that other patients surely needed treatment, perhaps even more than she does. Eventually, the patient moved toward acquiescence with the inescapable termination, expressed in the form of seeking substitutes for the treatment. Evidently, this kind of wish did not yet express a full sense of completion with the process of the treatment, but rather a perhaps less angry manner of perpetuating it, in a different place and time, and with the emotional tie to the current therapist projected onto the image of some potentially future therapist. Former feelings of dread and anger that had been replaced by feelings of insult, led now to a quiet, sad sense of resignation; still focal, however, was an unresolved anxiety about how she would possibly get along by herself, without treatment.

Toward the deeper, perhaps more mature conclusion of the termination phase, the patient seemed to deathect the treatment, beginning to look for new objects (i.e., and not merely a new therapy and therapist) to which to become attached and emotionally invested, such as her male companion and her own family. Clearly, she was unhappy with the termination, even bereft, but she had now come closer to mourning this separation and more able to accept its inevitability and value.

This working-through of the termination act, of course, incorporated additional themes emanating from her treatment, mainly a revival of past significant figures in her history and their role in her mental life. Some authors (e.g., French and Fromm, 1964; Quinodoz, 2002) see the termination phase of as a second chance for the reactivation and integration of themes that had already been brought up during the treatment but which now were revitalized by the somewhat more concrete dimensions of loss and separation. Seen in this light, my patient was able to work through experiences of abandonment, with the opportunity to experience separation from those figures on a deeper level, including an opportunity for reparation. Authors such as French and Fromm (1964) represent the consensus view that healthy modifications in the representation of key figures in the patient's life—such as would be seen in the content and quality of a patient's dreams—is an important indication of successful therapy. Jean-Michel Quinodoz (1936-) (2002) deepens our understand of this commonly accepted view by suggesting that what is apparently seem as a regression to rather primitive

contents and object representations during near-to-end-of-treatment dreams may actually be an attempt at a deeper integration of formerly split, unintegrated and projected parts of the inner world of objects.

In my discussion, I consider post-Freudian approaches to the management of dreams in psycho dynamic treatment. Freud originally conceived of dreams (if to put it in simplified way) as a wish fulfillment, and recommended managing them through the harvesting and elaboration of the patient's associations. Later developments added new approaches to the ways dreams are managed in psychoanalytic psychotherapy. In more contemporary views, the deeper content of a dream is seen as not necessarily the portrayal of wish fulfillment and instead, or in addition, may include a wish for containment or the creation of a safe space for projections or otherwise not yet fully tolerable mentalized self-states, the evacuation of mental waste, a means for regaining mastery and, above all, a means for integration of parts of self. The dream is thus a "unique area of play, a space for new experiences, and a phenomenon to be experienced rather than understood" (Blass, 2002, p. 206).

A second major development in the approach to dreams has been to view them not only as intrapsychic occurrences but also as an interpersonal act of communication, most salient and perhaps specific to the therapeutic transference. In Mark J. Blechner's (1950-) (2013, p. 76) words, "The dream is told to communicate something to someone else that could not be said otherwise." In the treatment described above I view the series of dreams reported to have been a means of enabling the patient to communicate to her psychotherapist feelings regarding separation and aloneness that she was not aware of and had not been able at any earlier point in her therapy to deliver as plainly as she did while dreaming during the termination phase.

A third important dimension in my discussion concerns the way dreams are managed during psychotherapy in general, and during the termination phase in specific. It should be noted that some of the early post-Freudian approaches were willing to reckon with the meaningfulness of the manifest content of the dream (despite Freud's [1925] specific caution to the contrary). Erik H. Erikson (1902-1994) famously commented in 1954, "Unofficially we frequently interpret dreams, either wholly or partially, on the basis of their manifest content." As Spanjaard (1969[1993]) pointed out, this approach sometimes provided the only avenue possible, necessary, and often useful. Blechner (2013) later added the notion that not all dreams are heavily disguised, as Freud and many of his followers supposed, thereby legitimizing a more a hospitable approach toward the manifest content of the dream, especially as regards evidently termination-

oriented here-and-now dream themes. However, some authors had been cautious about this strategy in managing patient's dreams. For example, Fliess (1953) warned that a too-free use of the therapist's associations may allure the therapist to follow his or her subjective interpretation as the expense of the patient's authentic associations. Many psychoanalysts of this school still believe that the manifest content of a dream is always a ruse, always an embellishment created by the ego, which to one degree or another hides or modifies the unconscious. The questions that remain are best expressed as follows: is it *sometimes* worthwhile to allow the manifest content to be the major focus, under what conditions, and for what kinds of gains?

While the patient's freely verbalized associations during the protectively regressive atmosphere of the sessions are still preferable, especially for psychotherapists who espouse a non-questioning approach during the patient's monologue, many of these same psychotherapists feel a certain ease with inquiring about a patient's feelings, thoughts, and meanings when dreams are reported, as part of the process of clarifying the full details and meaning of the dream. During that pursuit—which I myself am not undertaking in this essay to judge as correct or not—therapists seem to feel more at peace with surrendering, if only for a time, the classical 'neutral and objective' stance and expressing a more openly empathic, intuitive and subjective attitude (Renik, 1998). Ludwig Haesler (1942-) (1994) suggested that during dreaming, more so than during any other state presented during psychoanalysis, the therapist is influenced by the fact that there really is no 'original' or 'objective' meaning of the dream that might be *restored* as such, and one is freer to follow the lead of what comes up as the 'dream discourse' unfolds. "Analysts would agree," suggests Blass (2002, p. 155) "that associations and discourse are necessary for the discovery of the dream's meaning, but it is suggested that the associations and discourse create, rather than discover, the dream's meaning." The therapist's own associations as well may serve in the advancement of the process of achieving a useful interpretation of the dream, an idea already suggested by classical psychoanalysts such as Ralph Greenson (1911-1979) (1970). Taken in sum, these approaches do not seek an objective or veridical or true meaning of the dream; instead, they seek the most satisfying and consistent contextual meaning, one that would be most productive for the treatment during the specific phase in which the dream occurs.

The dreams reported in this paper may represent what Jean-Michel Quinodoz (2002) called "dreams that turn over a page," by which he meant to refer to dreams that raise some anxiety within the dreaming patient as well as within the psychotherapist, since these kinds of dreams seem apparently regressive by

their nature considering their appearance at the ‘wrapping up’ stage of analytic work. However, according to Quinodoz, such dreams actually signify integration, progression, and completion of the therapeutic process. Through such dreams the patient may undertake the final working-through of former losses, and develop higher levels of mental cohesion. I believe that a process such as this is demonstrated through the dreams reported in this essay.

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**“LESS, BUT STILL PAINFUL:”
A PSYCHO-MYTHICAL STUDY IN CONJUGAL LOVE,
ITS VICISSITUDES AND CRISES**

SHAI GIL

This article offers a novel psychoanalytic perspective on the unique emotional affinity, the passion, that exists in couple relationships, familiarly known as Eros or love. For this purpose, my analysis surveys various expressions of the erotic dimension in Western culture—myth, religion, literature and legend—that shaped the perceptions, ideals and fantasies, conscious and unconscious, regarding romantic, passionate conjugal love. The sources from which I shall draw present a model of impersonal love in which Eros is seen as a force connecting man and God, or man and the forces of nature surrounding him, even as the dynamic force that connects man and his sense of narcissistic selfhood. This model widely informs the way in which we approach the treatment of tension or pathology within the couple relationship.

While the attempt to comprehend the experience of conjugal love by rational means (i.e., beyond physiological, neurological and evolutionary aspects), and the efforts to deal with the pathological aspects of love by means of purely psychological tools, leave us mostly perplexed and wondering, I wish to closely observe couples' relationships as an end in itself, as a dynamic union (or break in union) that takes place within a unique emotional interpersonal caesural space that connects and separates couples. I attempt to do so without diminishing the importance of sublimation as part of the psychic, spiritual and emotional development of the individual and society in general. Further, the evolution of the erotic element will be described from a dynamic and relational perspective, as presented in Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalysis, which tends to echo the tension that exists between passion as an expression of an urge seeking an outlet, and love that develops within the framework of an interpersonal relation. I add to my initial characterization those deeper insights of Freud (1856-1939), Klein (1882-1960), Winnicott (1896-1971), Benjamin (1946-) and Mitchell (1946-2000) that acknowledge the role of aggression in the development of the ability to love, all the while seeking to emphasize the dialectical affinity that can be found between Eros and Thanatos, between love and hate, and between

passion and aggression in the development of mature love relationships. My clinical experience has motivated me to adopt this more complex approach to the power of Eros. This affinity between love and destruction, order and disarray, is clinically illustrated in stories of couples that lived in an emotional, passionate and turbulent field including multiple upheavals, ranging from psychic dissolution to psychic integration—demonstrating that Eros thrives close to the ‘dragon,’ excitedly and painfully. That is to say, Eros, and hence passion, *requires* a close relationship with chaos, and hence the tendency of creative, complex, and perhaps even mature love to weave itself, as it were, around an intricate texture of relationship where passion, aggressiveness and death emerge out of each other as well as collapse into one another.

In addition, an attempt is made to address the question of whether love and passion can coexist for a long time within a relationship once we fully confront the fact that love and passion provide an answer to two fundamentally conflicting human needs. Love seeks control, stability, continuity and certainty, whereas passion seeks surrender, adventure, renovation and the unknown. Hence the paradox within dwells at the epicenter of the experience of romantic love. By nature, romantic love is neither sable nor predictable, and by trying to control and secure such love within a long term relationship, one generally finds oneself creating a mythic, illusional or even false sense of security. The net effect of this is that, ultimately, the passionate dimension of love is diminished, or suffocates.

In the light of this hypothetical conclusion, I then ask if it is not the case that the destiny of romance is doomed. I reply that this is not necessarily the sole outcome, yet the dialectic between spontaneous, even lawless passion, on the one hand, and ‘stable’ relations with commitment, on the other hand, requires that we develop a sense of commitment that is not so rigid as to prevent spontaneity and a sense of ‘contained spontaneity’ that is not so labile as to prevent commitment.

In view of the complexity and difficulties discussed above, I suggest a tripartite or three-stage developmental path for couple relations. My idea is inspired by Analytical Psychology as expounded by Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) and his research on the meaning of alchemical symbols, and the seemingly unrelated views of Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) and his approach to understanding the phenomenology of Eros. I refer to the insights of other psychoanalysts and thinkers as well. According to the model that I propose, couples relationship begins in an initial phase that I will refer to as *Attraction between Similar to Similar*. This phase is based on the understanding that the erotic (as opposed to the ‘merely sexual,’ though Eros and sexuality cannot be ever completely separated) attraction between man and woman is the result of a tension between

fundamentally *polar* forces taking place within the psyche of each partner, projected upon each other unconsciously. According to this understanding, the individuation process, during which a man and a woman become whole (that is, with an integrated selfhood as their center), is made possible through the development of an increasing awareness (or “owning”) of the inner states we project upon the other, returning them to oneself, and accepting the difficult task of working out a better pathway of connection between the inner elements of one’s own psyche and, as a result, a more fluid connection to the other or partner in the interpersonal field.

In a subsequent dimension of this first stage, the pairing between man and woman, and in parallel, the pairing of the intrapsychic masculine and feminine elements with each of them, becomes a realization or deep reflection of the “sacred marriage archetype,” referred to as the *Coniunctio* (literally: conjunction, or *coitus*, the union of spirit and soul, body and mind) in the language of the alchemists, which was adopted for its chiefly psychological meaning by Jung. This archetype establishes the psychic foundation for romantic love and attraction, and its representational drive is projected unconsciously on the desired mate in the quest for a total symbiotic psychic and physical connection.

As the fire of passion that characterizes the first phase of falling in love gradually fades (or seems to), the couple is motivated to move toward the second stage that I refer to as *Waking-up and Returning Projections*. At this point the experience of being expelled from any semblance of naïve “couple’s paradise” can be looked at in light of the *Mortificatio*, or Death in the alchemical *ouvre*—not as in a passive or waning process, but rather as an integral part of the process of *nigredo* or putrefaction that leads to a release of powerful emotional forces. In the psychological sense, it refers to returning mutual projections from one another, as forces and impulses draw each individual toward opposite and complementary poles. The unfulfilled expectations, as well as the emerging of conflicting emotions and needs of each individual in the marital dyad, invite each to further develop within this new stage, in which they will need to learn to negotiate and channel their feelings and needs without surrendering, controlling or destroying one another. The formation of a “couple container,” as it were, that can endure the oscillation of contradictions, may enable the couple to develop a more mature partnership, based on the creation of a live, authentic and intimate interpersonal space.

The nearness to the formation of what I referred to as a couple container comprises the third phase I discuss: *Relationship in Dialogical Space*. The connection in dialogical space is based upon the ability of both partners to see

each other as they are, while they maintain intimacy based on separateness and reciprocity, all the time preserving the autonomy and uniqueness of each individual. At this stage in the relationship, the desire to love and be loved is experienced less as a need for merging with each other, and more as an evolving ability to respect and bear otherness through rapport and intimate relationship. The latter includes the ability to bear the sense of otherness that exists in one's own the psyche.

At this point, my essay comes to its conclusion, having touched as deeply as I am able upon the reality and essence of Eros, defined by the wise philosopher Socrates as “the best Divine Madness,” and having illuminated the characters and expressions of the erotic element in couple relationships. I believe that I have shown the sense in which the power of Eros is that it can carry the soul upward toward heaven, back down to the underworld, and up again. Out of the turmoil and anguish of the longing soul, mourning or yearning, human subjectivity comes into being: perhaps wounded, torn but reconciled and integrated in light of its desires, privations and pains in its relationship to others and to itself.

**THE SWISH OF THE SELF'S WINGS:
GRAPPLING WITH THE PLETHORA OF CONTEMPORARY
PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORIES**

SHMUEL GERZI

Contemporary psychoanalysis struggles mightily to accommodate the diversity of theoretical approaches in the field. This diversity is not a matter of untidiness or sheer excess that one might propose to simply “clean up,” or ignore. The diversity is a challenge: how do we rise to meet it? At one end of the spectrum stands Freud’s structural model, from which devolves a discourse related to structural changes such as flexing the superego, improving the movement from one oedipally-oriented structure to another, and also the concepts of Self Psychology, as initially proposed, focused upon building new compensatory structures that might enable a restoration of the self. At the other end of the theoretical spectrum, *existential process* is deemed the salient concept. There the discourse of psychoanalysis focuses on a process of becoming, compatible with the concept of the self as a dynamic stream of consciousness developing along a fluid, progressive continuum.

I tend toward the view that the Self is best described as both structure and process. In order to further clarify this complex conceptualization, I propose the metaphor of a river. From within itself the movement of the river may be described as an eternal flow. From a bird’s eye view, however, the river may seem to be an unchanging structure with fixed contours. From the internal perspective of the river, the flow may be attributed to a lack (in latitude, for example), which corresponds to the concept of *need* as it is used in Self Psychology (i.e., need is lack). This would echo J.-P. Sartre’s (1905-1980) view of lack as a motivating force. Continuing with my metaphor, a river is often defined, or given character, by virtue of the many tributaries that converge into it, supplying it, shaping it, much as selfobjects merge with the self and play a role in shaping and enabling the quality and direction of the vital flow of the self.

Almost paradoxically, in order for the selfobject to melt into the self, a sufficient lack, a need has to be maintained. In fact, a balance of sorts must be maintained. On one hand, a mature expression of the self’s needs marks one of the achievements of therapy. A mature self would be able to elicit the vitality it

needs, thanks to its *ability to need*, its freedom to experience need, to evoke or stimulate movement within the resources of the selfobjects that are found in its vicinity. On the other hand, the lack—need as such—exposes the individual's weak spots, his areas or dimensions of vulnerability.

For this reason, many kinds of contemporary patients, despite the “invitation” to express needs that psychoanalytic psychotherapy offers them, find it hard to connect to lack or to express their needs. Such individuals experience need as inherently diminishing, a narcissistic blow, and they prefer to revert to ineffective, superficial, non-sustaining forms of self-sufficiency rather than struggle to understand and address need, which becomes a rigid resistance to progress. Identifying and ensuring a responsive selfobject environment becomes a hurdle that proves difficult for patient or psychotherapist to overcome. In such a situation, need undergoes what Heinz Kohut (1913-1981) classically termed a vertical split, as patients disclaim the area of want or deficit as not their own. For example, patients who are characterized by this dilemma retain childhood memories of *not having been able or 'allowed' to need* the selfobjects that might have been available to them. Left with few options for psychical survival, such patients often turn themselves into their own selfobjects, as though saying: “I will serve as a better parent to myself than my mother.” In this sense one of the achievements of psychoanalytic treatment could be for the patient to come to accept this true dimension of his or her selfhood, the needy and lacking one.

The philosophical or metapsychological dilemma, of course, is that self as such cannot be known. It is the sphere we psychoanalysts attempt to approach by relating to its motion, to the evidence garnered from texts, behavior and speech that enables us to *infer* its existence. The motion cannot have structure as such, though it can turn its gaze upon itself as well as gravitate outside itself toward the other, toward all that is not itself (not-self). This other is that into which selfhood melts and from which selfhood receives the sense of merging togetherness. Into this ungraspable motion we as professionals also try to melt through diverse psychoanalytic approaches all of which attempt to promulgate and share an emotional voice, the voice of selfhood.

In the therapeutic context, which focuses upon the relationship between the self of the patient and to some degree that of the psychotherapist, the question thus becomes: to which flow should the therapist attend? This paper suggests that the expressed emotive voice that emerges from shared experience (without ignoring the importance of transference and countertransference), much like the gurgle of a flowing river, is that which has to be listened to, that which allows the most authentic connection to the flow of the self.

Emotions are themselves a never-ending motion, and constitute a point of reference to the internal state of the individual, as well as to the quality, or “success,” of his or her situation when approaching sought-after ideals. On the concrete or practical level, relating to emotions may be compared to relating to the soundtrack accompanying the varying pictures, events or segments of a movie, which has not much meaning without the pictures or events yet without which the pictures or event unfolding is difficult to follow, or loses a crucial amount of meaning.

In order to illustrate the psychoanalytic therapeutic endeavor as a flowing process, I offer case material in which patient and psychotherapist needed to endeavor jointly to grapple with an impasse in order to restore the self’s motion. The case discussion focuses on the junction between the intervention of the therapist and the needs of the patient that exemplifies a moment of re-igniting a blocked or stalemated process. What actually transpired can be interpreted from a multitude of diverse perspectives, informed by the diversity of psychoanalytic theories. The plethora of possible meanings of the therapist’s intervention and the patient’s reaction, coupled with the diverse insights pertaining to the factors that contributed to the transformation of the self, are compatible with the conception of the self and of psychoanalysis as a multi-faceted process that in itself, by virtue of its own particular kind of motility, is functional in stimulating the rigid self toward vital motion.

The multitude of theories, each of which explain in its own terms the revitalizing of the self, can co-exist. I attempt to explain this possibility in terms of some concepts from Quantum Theory. Quantum Theory has shown us that most of the electrons and other sub-atomic particles are neither absolutely particles nor absolutely waves, but rather a composition of both. The quality of this composition is in itself measurable, at least potentially, but depends upon the angle of analysis and focus, which play a major role in the definition of the meaningfulness or significance of the measurement one achieves. For example, we can measure both the particle and the wave characteristics of a ray of light—but the precise quality of the duality or co-existence of these two major dimensions defies any measurement we try to impose on it. All we may hope to ascertain with regard to a given wave or particle entity is a hazy reading of its position and an equally hazy reading of its momentum.

By the complementary principle anything may be explained by what might seem like contradictory descriptions; moreover, the seeming contradictions may actually complement each other and allow us a better grasp of the whole.

By the same token, we as psychoanalysts can never absolutely know any individual. At best, we glimpse only the shadows or the haze that envelopes human relationships. All else remains an area of mysterious potentiality, including many characteristics and processes that are not mutually exclusive; thus, a “self electron” can fall into the category of a particle or a wave. Neither dimension is expendable.

I contend that this theory is applicable to the uniquely psychoanalytic attempt to aid another human being. The flow of the self can be enriched by a dialogue between diverse therapeutic approaches that view the same processes through different prisms at once—such as the “Two” or the dyad of Self Psychology that are in essence a component of the One (the self) and the classical One of the intrapsychic or intra-subjective psychology which is an essential participant in the diadem—without compromising the fundamental tenets of either approach.

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**“DISCOVERING AN UNEXPLORED REGION
OF THE HUMAN SOUL”:¹
READING THE WOLF MAN’S MEMOIRS**

ANAT TZUR MAHALEL

The protagonist of Sigmund Freud’s (1856-1939) canonical case study *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis* (Freud, 1918) is the patient known as the Wolf-Man (*Wolfsmann*). This essentially literary figure—for it [‘The Wolf-Man’] is a creation contained and conveyed by text—that has famously come to be thought of as a psychoanalytic construct, refers in fact, as is by now well-known, to an individual named Sergei [Sergius] Constantinovich Pankejeff (1886-1979): insurance agent, academic painter, and life-long psychoanalytic patient. Decades after Freud’s famous case study was published, in 1971, Pankejeff himself wrote a memoir about his life and his encounter with Freud. The memoir appeared as part of a volume titled *The Wolf Man and Sigmund Freud*, published under the name of its editor, American heiress and psychoanalyst Muriel Gardiner, who had financially supported Pankejeff as well as his analysis with Ruth Mack-Brunswick, her own analyst, promoted his art, and protected his additional analyses and welfare. In addition to Pankejeff’s actual memoir, the volume includes Freud’s case study about him, another case study from a short analysis of Pankejeff conducted by Freud’s pupil, Ruth Mack Brunswick, written by herself, and a chapter written by Gardiner herself based on her long acquaintance with Pankejeff. Creating a complex intertextual network, these texts reflect, among other things, the complex relations among the various authors.

In the present essay, I consider Pankejeff’s ‘memoir’ as a translation of his psychoanalytic experience with Freud; as his own reading of the case study written about him by Freud, and to some degree, about his treatment by his subsequent analysts. Freud himself had used the metaphor of *translation* (*übersetzen, übertragen*) to refer to the transference (*übertragung*) of unconscious material to consciousness, as the mode by which an intrapsychic representation gradually becomes an intersubjective phenomenon (Priel, 2003). Subsequent developments

¹ Pankejeff, S. C. (1971a). My recollections of Sigmund Freud. Trans. Muriel Gardiner. In Gardiner, M. (ed.), *The Wolf-Man and Sigmund Freud*. New York: Basic Books, pp. 135-152, p. 138.

of Freud's metaphor suggested that we think of unmentalized experience as being translated into verbal communication in the analytic discourse, and of the verbal and nonverbal communication of the analytic discourse being translated into psychoanalytic writing, such as case studies, theoretical writing and verbatim reports (Ogden, 2005).

The main question I wish to take up here concerns the precise nature of the translation Pankejeff offers in his writing about the psychoanalytic relationship he experienced with Freud and his subsequent engagement with Freud's writings. Given that this would seem to have been the main intention of his memoir, it is indeed striking that Pankejeff's own text hardly mentions the actual case study Freud wrote about him! While in Freud's own narration of the case the role of infantile sexuality and castration in the development of the human psyche is central, Pankejeff's text offers a personal narrative of *intersubjective loss*. Pankejeff's life story, as he presents it, opens with his sister's suicide when he was a young adolescent and closes with his wife's suicide three decades later. Thus the writer presents his own adult life as having been lived above all under the painful shadow of grief and loss, rather than sexual trauma—though “rather” does not need to be taken by the reader as necessarily exclusively so, for this is, after all, Pankejeff's narrative.

Pankejeff describes the analytic relationship, about six decades after it took place, as nevertheless having had some crucial transformative quality from its very start. He uses the image of a journey in which he was “the younger comrade of an experienced explorer setting out to study a new, recently discovered land” (1971a, p. 140). The memoir's central characterization of the relationship with Freud is “a feeling of ‘working together’” (p. 140), and Pankejeff mentions joint discovery and mutuality alongside a sense of being protected and guided. These characteristics of the therapeutic relationship can be traced in Freud's essay on the ‘Wolf Man’ as well. Pankejeff's account of his relationship with Freud comes to its completion with a unique rendering of the extraordinary way the analysis ended. In Freud's essay, the termination of the analysis was forced on the patient as a unilateral therapeutic decision made by the analyst. Pankejeff recounts the matter differently: he never mentions the imposed termination. Instead, his text presents a metonymic relationship between the separation from Freud and the funeral of the Austrian crown prince and his wife that took place in Vienna that same time. The violent deaths of the royal couple, and the devastating consequences of this incident on later events, shed a tragic light on the impression the separation from Freud made upon his patient.

Throughout his life, Pankejeff remained closely yet ambivalently involved

with psychoanalysis. The psychoanalytic community, and people outside it as well, were obviously curious about the man and Pankejeff collaborated with this in a variety of ways. In a late interview, he admitted he felt alienated by the prevalent psychoanalytic narrative about him and he expressed bitterness at having become what he termed “a showpiece” for psychoanalysis (Obholzer, 1982 [1980], pp. 35-36, 231-232). Pankejeff’s later stance towards psychoanalysis suggests that one ought to read his memoir as his independent creation of a personal voice. According to Ogden (1998), “Creating a voice with which to speak or to write might be thought of as a way, perhaps the principal way, in which individuals bring themselves into being, come to life, through their use of language” (pp. 426-427). Pankejeff’s voice, as the memoir gives rise to it, expresses how he experienced and wished to present his life story and his encounter with Freud. Since he lived a significant portion of his adult life as a legendary figure in psychoanalysis, Pankejeff’s voice, in the above sense, is a profoundly significant one.

Alongside the rich material it offers to the history of psychoanalysis, Pankejeff’s memoir offers a unique insight into the processes of artistic experience and expression. The memoir speaks of the author’s transformative discoveries in the domain of art, from the love of music and literature in his childhood, through the love of painting as a young man, and the unique discovery of autobiographic writing in his late years. Indeed, the memoir opens with a statement that brings together the moment the writer starts writing the text and the moment the reader starts reading it. This draws a parallel between the experience of psychoanalysis and that of writing and reading, which can be portrayed as a joint, intimate journey, a relationship with a therapeutic dimension, as well as a co-produced work of art.

THE STORIES OF BRUNO SCHULZ AND THEIR CLOSE CORRELATION TO JUNGIAN MOTIFS

RUTH NETZER

In this essay I undertake to compare some of the written works and the psychological-spiritual inner worlds of Bruno Schulz (1892-1942), the Polish Jewish artist and author, and Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961), Swiss Christian psychoanalyst, both of whom lived and wrote in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. Specifically, I compare two of Schulz's books—the collection of essays known as *The Cinnamon Shops* (*Sklepy Cynamonowe* [1934]), often referred to in English as 'The Street of Crocodiles,' the title of one of the short stories in the collection, and *Sanatorium Under the Sign of the Hourglass* (*Sanatorium Pod Klepsydra* [1937])—with Jung's posthumous and mysterious *Red Book* (2009), a collection of esoteric visions and drawings that he began to create around the year 1913. *The Red Book* is comprised of highly imaginative if not hallucinatory experiences, and was retained by his heirs in a vault until 1984, and eventually released by his grandson for publication in 2009. I will also compare Schulz's work with Jung's more well-known memoirs, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (1961).

Schulz worked for years as an art teacher at the local high school in Drohobycz, Galicia, where he was born. His father became ill, and his business declined until it ultimately failed. When Schulz was 23 years-old his father died, and his childhood world, which he would later revisit in his stories, came to an end. Schulz was murdered by the Nazis in 1942 in his home town while returning with a loaf of bread. His return home, through the Aryan Quarter, after working on a mural on the home of one Nazi officer, Felix Landau, ought to have been assured by his 'protected' status, yet he was shot as part of an internecine struggle among Nazi officers over their rivalry concerning the privilege of sustaining "personal Jews." Another German officer, Karl Günther, shot Schulz in revenge for Landau's having earlier murdered Günther's "personal Jew."

Schulz is considered by many to be the most significant Polish author to have written between the two world wars. He is characterized by a rare ability to describe deep spiritual experiences, possessed by a splendid, Baroque, poetic, literarily fantastical style, "laced" with the vague quality of

either insanity or super-sanity, even a bizarre, nightmarish quality. His stories describe alienation and loneliness of great intensity and depth, seemingly connected with the father's mental deterioration. The father's fluctuation between fantasy and madness gradually transformed into the fluctuations of the author himself.

The source of Jung's and Shulz's sensitivity to visionary revelation inheres in their introversive tendencies that, in each case, were evident since childhood, bearing the conflictual tendency toward inner loneliness alongside a wondrous connection to subtle elements of the inner and external universe. I attempt to describe the many motifs that these two geniuses share: both were haunted by a powerful and spectacular inner world, and both acknowledged its transcendental source. One can identify in the writings and illustrations of both the influence of myths as well as the mythologization of reality; they were both influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and each found succor in the Dionysian abyss that the great philosopher-writer attempted to outline.

At the same time, I investigate the similarities and differences between Jung and Shulz regarding the infrastructural experiences of childhood, the father figure, the figure of divinity, Gnosticism, religiosity, the motif of destiny, chosenness and the motif of The Messiah (the name of a manuscript Schulz is known to have been writing before he was murdered, though no trace of it has ever been found). Both authors are generally viewed as having straddled the boundary between creative vision and madness.

Shulz was acquainted with some of the concepts of Jung's analytic theory; moreover, Jung's concept of the archetypal psyche seems most suitable as an interpretive framework for Shulz's richly symbolic work. For example, Shulz's story 'The Book' describes a book that is considered to be *the* book, an iconic book, which exists for every culture, and which upon encountering results in an ecstatic experience, yielding a sense of having discovered a hidden, divine truth. "The" book embodies the universal, absolute truth guiding mankind across the centuries, such as the Bible, the Zohar, the Talmud and perhaps even Jung's *Red Book*. It symbolizes what Jung defined as the "collective unconscious" and also what Jung called the "self", the "totality of psyche."

In the story called 'The Age of Genius,' Shulz describes a grandiose, manic, experience of himself as a genius, and as having partaken of a luminous, Gnostic experience redolent with the power of redemption from the psychic prison. In this work, Shulz identifies with the Biblical Joseph who dreams and interprets great dreams. When reading stories such as 'The Book' and 'The Age of Genius,' one is overtaken by a powerful sense of similarity between Shulz's delusional

existential personal experience and Jung's period of revelatory experiences, as well as by the resemblance between the two of them in the essential experience of writing and descriptive drawings of their delusional inner world.

Shulz was influenced by Franz Kafka (1883-1924) and the regressive processes that are central to his work, including alienation, existential angst, and even the absurd. The majority of Shulz's stories deal with the image of his father during the stages of the approach of his father's death. During this period, his father himself swung between the boundless, grandiose, surrealistic experience of genius and madness; between identifying himself with an eagle, an enormous condor, and identifying with a despicable cockroach who is ultimately killed. The continual swing between the images of the condor and the cockroach, the aggressor and the victim, can be understood as the expression of the processes of a bipolar personality. On a deeper level, it is also possible to see in the contrast of mania and depression, the contrast between the sense of superiority of the Jewish People's chosenness, on the one hand, and the persecution and self-hatred of Jews who internalize the Christians' hatred for them, on the other hand.

The father's mental disintegration and the disintegration of *the archetypical book* are analogous to the deterioration of the essential image of the father in the individual as well as the collective psyche in Europe, and as an expression of the collapse of the Jewish father-God figure's authority and belief in God among Europeans in general. Jung and Shulz lose their own fathers and the figure of paternal authority as well as their faith in the traditional image of the authority of God. Each writer experiences an intense, near-psychotic crisis as a result, and each is saved, so to speak, by an immersion within a rich religious world within themselves. The compensation for the process of disintegration that Shulz describes is a return to childhood in which he sought to find the promise of splendid experiences and an era of happiness, whereas Jung, from within this critical, determinative experience, creates the Theory of Personality.

I do not neglect the significance of crucial female figures—the housekeeper and the mother—who denigrate the father and disparage him and his submissiveness. Schulz admires Adela, the housekeeper, and yearns for Bianca, an enigmatic young lady. The feminine-motherly domination of his psyche parallels the domination by the collective unconscious, and the archetype of the great terrible destructive Mother. At this point in my work, I investigate the problematic quality of the dialogue and conflict between Shultz's masculinity and his relationship to women and to the *anima*, from a Jungian point of view. Throughout his work, one finds evidence for a radical archetypal attitude to the feminine which lacks the ability for a real connection with woman and people in

general. The alienated family, whose emotional processes have gone awry, is a partial representation of the narrator's own psyche. From a symbolic standpoint, the significance of the father as a figure of law and order and the significance of the compassionate mother (and woman) seem to have gone awry and even disintegrated in Shulz's world, and this is paralleled in Europe in general.

From an allegorical standpoint, the sadomasochistic relationship between man and woman depicted in Shulz's stories parallels Christian Europe as the demonic, seductive feminine entity and the admiring Jew as the self-humiliating, debilitated entity who crawls on all fours, under her gaze, in order to receive permission to live in her presence. In the end, the female demon cooks him in her furnaces and sweeps him out like a cockroach. It may be said in summary that the similarity between Jung's *Red Book* and Shulz's stories lies in the quality of psychic processes from which these have emerged and in the unique archetypal content they reveal, in dealing with the collective unconscious and the personal unconscious strata of the psyche through writing and drawing. The difference between them is in the manner in which each deals with these dimensions, their particularistic style, their overall worldview—such as the “robust” sense of self-display and ego-strength in Jung's ego and work, and the relative lack of same depicted by Shulz's narrators. As well, in terms of the connection between artist and theorist, Jung refused to relate to his work as ‘art,’ preferring to see himself essentially as a scientific theoretician, while Shulz was essentially a surrealist artist and literary author. Both contributed to the broadening of the cultural transitional space, that special twilight zone of delusional and visionary reality, serving as the enriching space that is essential for the human psyche.

**THE DEATH OF THE WITNESS IN THE ERA OF TESTIMONY:
PRIMO LEVI AND GEORGE PEREC**

YOCHAI ATARIA

I wish to explore the role of witness as narrator, writer and historian by comparing the writings and testimony of two authors strongly associated with the Holocaust and its aftermath, the Italian chemist and writer Primo Levi (1919-1987), who himself survived the Holocaust, and French novelist and filmmaker Georges Perec (1936-1982), whose father, a soldier, was killed during the war and whose mother perished in Auschwitz, and was raised by his aunt and uncle. Despite significant differences in personal history that cannot be ignored—Levi was an actual survivor of the concentration camps—both Levi and Perec focus upon the witness; specifically, the role and the ability of the witness to provide authentic testimony. While Levi and Perec also differed in style and form of expression, they both offer deep-rooted insights regarding the role of the witness as storyteller, writer and historian.

Based upon the comparison I offer between Levi's approach to testimony and that of Perec, I suggest that the very fact that we live in an era of testimony, and era that essentially *demand*s testimony, we find that the witness is also his own historian. This means, I further argue, that there can be no innocent, objective or "uncontaminated" witnesses. Moreover, I attempt to show that Levi and Perec, each in his own way, proposes an authentic model for bearing witness. Thereafter it will be suggested that while Levi, whose model remained linked to the power and limitations of language, fails in breaking the walls of silence, Perec, who worked with images as well as words, experienced greater success in modifying the walls of silence, and by so doing allows us to create a new model for dealing with *silence* within psychoanalytic discourse and treatment.

According to Shoshana Felman (1942-), we can define the current era as the age of testimony. Testimony, by definition, derives from and is based upon human memory, as humans struggle to testify, record, reveal that which would otherwise remain hidden, unknown, inexpressible, ranging from specific secrets to, in the extreme—but always essentially, on some level—madness itself. Therefore, one of the main questions in current historical discourse is how one ought to regard oral testimony, how does one *treat* testimony? This question becomes

even more difficult, and delicate, when considering the testimonies given by posttraumatic survivors. I have chosen to take up this dilemma of testimony by carefully comparing and contrasting Primo Levi's book *The Drowned and the Saved* (1986) and Georges Perec's book *W, or the Memory of Childhood* (1975).

Levi's work—unlike his well-known autobiographical account *If This is a Man?* (1947), which offers the hope of change if only we remember—is a probing, even pessimistic analytic work, written months before his mysterious death. In it, Levi studies the fallibility of memory, the techniques of repression, and the use of language to deny the most relevant dimensions of experience, and the often inextricable subjective links between victim and victimizer which complicates if not confounds the meaning of single-dimensional testimony. I also include the various interviews given by Levi during which he openly discussed the general and specific problems he had to tackle in seeking to bear witness. Moreover, Levi revealed his interests and his background. By so doing, Levi transformed himself into a witness who hides nothing. This increased his reliability and credibility dramatically; as he exposed more of his weaknesses, he became more reliable. Just like a good scientist. In addition, Levi adopted the approach of the historian who is well aware of the impossibility of creating a meta-narrative without risking inaccuracy or becoming somewhat demagogic. At the same time, it is impossible to turn subjective human history into pure scientific research. Levi shaped his testimony according to these principles while acknowledging its limitations. Among other things, Levi fully understood that eventually even the historian cannot avoid “telling a story.” Indeed, if in his book *If This Is a Man* Levi wished to testify, he was also always fully aware that the final product is in fact a story. This is clearly not a testimony in the classic sense. Obviously, Levi is not merely a witness describing what happened; he is also a *writer*. Levi recognized this step as unavoidable, and for this reason, Levi chose to focus on the *mini*-narrative without pretensions of providing a historical description and without attempting to produce a meta-narrative. By focusing on the mini-narrative, on the one hand, and acknowledging its unavoidable limitations, on the other hand, Levi became the “ultimate witness,” the Galileo of his era. In turn, Levi's role was to relate what happened as best he could while maintaining fidelity to what he in fact saw and experienced.

In his semi-autobiographical fiction *W*, Perec describes his separation from his mother when he was evacuated during World War II, and uses certain and uncertain memories, photos, and a great deal of word play (the title *W* is a pun on the French *double ve/vie*, referring to two parallel lives or two identities). In this work, we might say, Perec took the exposure of the limitations of testimony to the

extreme. Essentially, even though we are *meant to understand* that we cannot rely upon Perec's story, as readers we cannot help but identify with him and accept his story as some kind of "truth." Perec's testimony creates the paradox of the liar: a liar who openly admits to lying. Thus, quite early on in this work, after having told us that "I have no childhood memories!" when there is not a shadow of doubt regarding the need for skepticism, Perec proceeds to describe the Island of 'W,' said to lie near Tierra del Feugo. Amazingly, even though the description of the Island of W contains not one single fact that can tie it to the death camps, one cannot avoid seeing a Nazi death camp in the island. Furthermore, in his description of the Island of W, Perec succeeds in capturing the essence of the concentration and death camps. Perec appears to present a different model of the witness—the *witness who does not remember*, yet who thereby creates one crucial aspect that is most germane to the horror of the Holocaust experience: the *not remembering*, the uncertainty regarding what was, what is, what was told, what has been embellished. Perhaps he really did forget, perhaps he repressed his memories or perhaps he does not wish to remember. More than anything else, Perec is the witness who describes the forgetting and the extinction of the childhood traumatic memories.

Clearly, Perec is the opposite of the witness who has turned himself into a historian (Levi's model). In a sense, Perec represents the other side of the coin: Perec is the most reliable witness, the one trapped in the paradox of the liar. He traps us along with himself within this paradoxical state of limbo. Perec is the witness who testifies to the disintegration of memory. Through this disintegration he captures the very essence of being a witness of the concentration camp. This, I wish to emphasize, is an authentic model for bearing witness: the witness who *does not* attempt to describe what he saw from a historical perspective, the witness who adopts the experiences of other people and openly admits it. Perec is the model of the broken witness, the posttraumatic witness who is his own enemy, who without hiding anything exposes his authentic inability to testify. In sum, Perec is the witness who is totally aware of the paradox of the liar and the significance of his testimony stems from that fact. Thus, paradoxically, this turns him into an authentic witness. As an added element to the fullest forms of testimony possible—for we are not discounting all efforts to obtain historically objective data and narratives—this kind of witness in a certain sense rescues the uniquely human dimension of lived experience.

Levi and Perec represent two contradictory models of the witness. They are situated at two ends of the spectrum. Levi already took on the role of the historian while he was in the camps and became an obsessive documenter, writing on

scraps of paper or cloth, in his attempt to be the Galileo of the concentration camps. Time has proven his success in this. Perec, in contrast, represents the authentic witness who gave up on the historical perspective. The book *W, or the Memory of Childhood* (not “and the Memory of Childhood”!) is not an actual story. Based on this book, it is not clear who Perec really was. Thus, Perec is a witness who is an anti-storyteller, anti-writer, anti-historian. He is what he is: a posttraumatic witness, disintegrated and completely broken. He is a witness who wants to forget but is unable to, who wants to remember but has lost contact with childhood memories which are paradoxically chasing him in their absence.

Perec allow us to envision a new psychoanalytic model that might deal more effectively with the dreadful *silence* of the posttraumatic survivor in general. Perec creates a new language that is readily adaptable to the state of mind of the posttraumatic survivor: he (*qua* clinician) encourages the posttraumatic survivor to talk, with the knowledge that he is allowed to talk in such a way that also does not break the silence. In that sense Perec allows us to break the walls of silence without losing the ability to use words. Levi drives himself, as his model would probably drive his “patient,” by the *fear of being silenced* and, hence, although his witnessing is authentic, it nevertheless does not allow us to break the walls of the deep existential silence. Perec, on the other hand, not only feels comfortable within silence, but his drive is to represent, articulate, and “speak-out” this silence in the deepest possible way. To that end Perec, and his imaginable “patient,” create a new kind of language that is generated from the silence.

**“HER BEAUTY IS UNKNOWN:”
PSYCHOANALYTIC EXPLORATIONS OF DONALD MELTZER’S
CONCEPT OF THE AESTHETIC OBJECT**

IRIT KLEIN

This essay delves into the meaning of the *aesthetic object* as conceptualized by Donald Meltzer and as used throughout a great deal of his clinical work. Meltzer defined the aesthetic object, and its related components, the “aesthetic conflict” and “aesthetic reciprocity,” as developmental processes or configurations that take place at the beginning of life. During the course of psychoanalytic treatment, according to Meltzer, these elements can be expected to reappear in a later stage of the analytic process, on the threshold of the depressive position. These processes are exquisite, dynamic, and painful and require special attention from both therapist and patient. The manner in which these elements come alive during the analytical process is the main topic of this essay, which I will describe and discuss theoretically and then illustrate with a clinical example.

The term aesthetics, as we refer to it today—as a discipline and area of analysis of a specific dimension of human experience—can be traced back to 18th century philosophy. As such, it has much evolved since it first appeared in the ancient Greek period. From the early days of psychoanalysis, a prolific dialogue between psychoanalysis, aesthetics and beauty has led to a broader discourse on literature, art, and culture. In order to accurately define and ‘use’ the term aesthetics, I will first explore the historical meaning of the term, especially the contribution of the philosopher Emanuel Kant (1724-1804), to the understanding of the aesthetic experience. Kant was especially interested in the *consciousness of beauty* and, upon close examination, argued that our ability to judge ‘beauty’ comes purely from the quality of the feeling of pleasure it enables, and must be unrelated to functionality or purpose (for that no longer concerns aesthetics as such, though they can be related). The purposeless essence of an object which confers or evokes the pleasure of beauty, is the proper subject of the science of Aesthetics.

In psychoanalytic thinking, the meaning of aesthetics can be related to a value that does not fulfill the object’s needs. Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) claimed on this matter that ‘aesthetic behavior’ is unconditionally free of any expectation of

the object, especially that of fulfilling our needs. Many years were to pass before the topic of aesthetic experience was taken up in depth by psychoanalytic writers. A special contribution to the development of a psychoanalytic model of aesthetics is attributed to the art (and music) researcher Anton Ehrenzweig (1908-1966). In his works *The Psychoanalysis of Artistic Vision and Hearing* (1953), *The Hidden Order of Art* (1967), and numerous essays, Ehrenzweig studied the unconscious cognitive processes of creativity and noticed that creativity and aesthetics are similar. From his perspective, creativity is the capacity to transform the chaotic aspects of the “undifferentiated” into a hidden order that fuses primary and secondary mental processes, and becomes definitive of and inseparable from the experience of aesthetics. According to Ehrenzweig, creative or deep perception is the source of authenticity, and it is the same kind of creative perception that characterizes the spectator’s aesthetic experience.

Complementary to Ehrenzweig’s perspective, Donald W. Winnicott (1896-1971) and Marion Milner (1900-1998) regarded the creative and aesthetic experience in psychoanalysis as the development and growth of psychic space, especially transitional psychological space, for both the therapist and the patient. From the outset, in the initial acts of creativity, the newborn must create its own power in order to distinguish what is inside from what is outside. In order for this to happen, according to Winnicott and Milner, an experience of illusion must take place, and this illusion is the underpinning of all art, and even psychotherapy, and is sustained by these vehicles.

Newer research on aesthetic experience and creativity claims that creativity involves a return to the magical world of childhood in order to reclaim the specific experiences of spontaneity, freshness and awe. From this perspective we can see that all truly aesthetic experience is defined by, and conveys, wonder, fusion and illusion, leading to the generation of something completely new.

In this essay I emphasize along with others who deal with Meltzer’s conception of the *aesthetic object*, that his most important statement on the subject is the idea that from the beginning of life, the *presence* of the loving mother, and not her absence (as in Freud’s model), is the first experience that can lead to conflict, to which he refers as the aesthetic conflict. The unknown and un-nameable beauty of the mother at the beginning of life, and the sublimity of her beauty, stimulate the infant’s aesthetic senses and expose the newborn to the mystery of her beauty. This very experience of mysterious beauty generates a certain form of anxiety, causes uncertainty and *at the same time* stimulates creative imagination and kindles the epistemophilic instinct. According to Meltzer, *tolerating*, and ultimately learning to contain, the enigmatic mother and the uncertainty of her

beauty is a sign of maturation and growth, and this constitutes the dramatic and the painful aspect of the aesthetic conflict. When the patient encounters these feelings in therapy, it can very often lead to an impasse. Overcoming this impasse leads to the recovery of the aesthetic object and to the development of the capacity to perceive the beauty of the object and thus to see beauty of the world.

In addition to discussing the aesthetic object and the aesthetic experience, I also reflect upon the special contribution of Meg Harris-Williams (1951-), Meltzer's stepdaughter, to the understating of these phenomena. Her familiarity with the history of art, literature, English poetry, and psychoanalysis broaden our apprehension of the beauty and of the ambiguity and pain that are a part of what Keats (1795-1821) famously referred to as "negative capability." Meltzer's own love of poetry, especially English Romanticism, provided him with a poetic 'bed' for expressing his ideas about the aesthetic phenomenon. Meltzer and Harris-Williams claim that, art, literature and psychoanalysis are the embodiment of the influence of the aesthetic conflict throughout life. These elements are the origin of the aesthetic and imaginative processes that art and psychoanalysis share; they both deal with emotions and can be considered different approaches to exploring the inner world of the mind.

In order to demonstrate the significance of Meltzer's notion, particularly the importance of the parental capacity to experience their newborn child as an aesthetic object, I describe the case of 'Claudia.' Meltzer proclaims that just as the mother, with her inherently aesthetic interior qualities (bodily rhythms, etc), has an aesthetic impact on the baby, the baby has a similar impact on his parents. Using the details of the psychotherapy of Claudia, I describe what transpired when the developmental processes under discussion unfolded in a less than satisfactory manner and the baby experiences its mother as unable or unwilling to love the baby's inner qualities or to envision and reflect back the baby's beauty. In this case, the primary emotional relationship had become disturbed and the child developed severe pathology. In Claudia's case, the aesthetic reciprocity between child and mother lacked the capacity for "love-at-first-sight," and so the ability to love and see the world as beautiful did not quite develop within the baby. The avoidance of the 'aesthetic conflict' is the result of failure in the primal mother-child relationship, the failure of aesthetic reciprocity.

Still, we must ask: how exactly do these processes come to life in the psychoanalytic setting? In order to better respond to this question, I describe a long and painful journey that Claudia underwent during her sixth year of therapy. At that period in her therapy, the patient been complaining about her life, expressed a feeling of decay and difficult emotions that brought out a lot of

pain. In the meantime, and despite the length of time she had already experienced within my clinical rooms, she began to *study* the room and notice things that she had never noticed before. This we came to understand as the dawn of her ability and willingness to see the beauty of things outside herself. Around the same time, Claudia remembered a significant childhood memory—when she was very young she was playing with her mother’s jewelry box and accidentally broke one of the jewels contained within. As she recounted her childhood memory, the manner in which Claudia envisioned her mother—like a closed box of secret beauty that would never be opened again—was conveyed powerfully through the transference. Moreover, she felt she would have been punished for her curiosity and feminine desires. During that time, Claudia’s dreams described a struggle between forces: light and dark, life and death, shadow and daylight, love and fear. Despite these germs of growth, she at first tried very hard to remain in the lifeless position. Increasingly, however, she would bring in metaphors from the world of nature that provided a creative source through which she could express her emotional internal world, as this was now coming into view throughout her therapy, and she was soon able to imagine herself as a growing plant that requires an inner container in order to grow. The interior of my office was now especially significant in this regard. During those months in psychotherapy, she and I enjoyed the beauty of her images and metaphors. Soon Claudia expressed her longing for something that would not have any practical use, a creative force that I alone could see and whose beauty I could appreciate; gradually, Claudia was able to do as well. She experienced aesthetic emotions of wonder, excitement and awe, and exposed herself to the beauty of the nature around us.

In the discussion, I claim that the appearance of the aesthetic conflict in the relationship between the patient and the therapist is not a onetime event, but an ongoing process, which occurs more frequently than we are accustomed to thinking. In the period of therapeutic work I describe here, we are able to see the conflict as it fully comes to life in therapy. I also emphasize that the more the patient came to know her internal world the more she was open to comfortably imagine, and sometimes sense quite accurately, my own internal life. The patient longed for something that would arouse both anxiety and mystery within her simultaneously, so that her capacity to appreciate the beauty of the natural world developed simultaneity with her ability to see, and gauge less defensively and self-destructively, the dangers in dismantling,¹ and the experience of acidity and

¹ Meltzer’s concept of “dismantled object” has been accurately translated into Hebrew as *obyekt mefurak* (inf: *le-fa’rek*, to dismantle, take part). However, Hebrew is a very explicit language and this translation does not convey some of the less literal uses that an English-

toxicity. These changes would not have happened, I believe, without suffering, fear, excitement and curiosity on my part. Ultimately, with suitable work on my own experience, the ideas that were interpretively, and ‘aesthetically’ conveyed to Cladua encouraged Claudia’s ability to see the beauty she had once claimed I was the only one who could see.

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speaker would legitimately sense in the word ‘dismantled,’ which, of course, include the word *mantle*, or cloak—such as un-cloaking, left exposed, un-swathing, and not being enveloped. It was important to address this secondary meaning of the term in addition to its first meaning as this latest meaning describes more accurately the emotional state of the patient.

**THE INTERNAL WITNESS
AND THE TRANSFORMATIONAL POWER
OF READING LITERATURE**

MERA V ROTH

This article describes the transformative potential imbedded in reading literature, and demonstrates a specific curative factor that I believe it offers: a positive, creative development in the internal capacity to witness one's own traumatic personal history and experience. I will seek to demonstrate through clinical material how after reading the essay "Before the Law" (1925) by Franz Kafka (1833-1924), and other writings, a profound transformation occurred in the subject's internal witnessing mode, enabling him to bear his personal testimony about his traumatic history following many years of prolonged, almost static silence.

In my analysis, I refer to a classification proposed by contemporary Israeli psychoanalyst Dana Amir (1966-) [outlined in an essay by Amir published in this volume of *Ma'arag* and summarized above in these synopses—MHS]. Amir classifies four major modes of witnessing trauma that can take place in an individual's internal experience. I shall describe them briefly: (1) The *metaphoric mode* of witnessing enables the subject to internally play both the part of the observer and that of the experiencing subject who is being observed. This mode of witnessing thus involves a *symbolizing-and-reflective* capacity and enables the subject to maintain a metaphoric quality of testimony that holds both internal perspectives (the observer and the one being observed) in a vital and meaningful way. (2) The *metonymic mode* of witnessing tends to cling to, if not be locked within the experiential level. In this mode, traumatic experience is not described metaphorically by the internal observer, but rather is *demonstrated* through the linguistic form (such as heavy reliance upon concrete metonyms, repetitive associations) that *actually* reenacts compulsively the elements of trauma without an effective or stable ability to represent and reconstruct them.

The third and fourth modes of traumatic witnessing are deemed by Amir to be essentially psychotic modes of witnessing since they both attack any real connection to the trauma and, in effect, they delegitimize or disenfranchise the capacity to maintain real knowledge of the related internal or external reality.

Hence, Amir describes: (3) the *Muzelman*-psychotic mode, which rarely appears to be a narrative at all, since its core involves a brutal attack upon the linguistic capacity to tell a story. In time, this mode leads to a kind of psychotic-autistic manner of speech that all but annihilates the experiencing subject. Finally, Amir describes (4) the *excessive*-psychotic mode, which is quite deceiving, for it offers a traumatic (hi)story in very eloquent, fluent language, while the ‘story’ being told is actually frozen, resistant to transformation or to accruing any new meaning. In this mode, the ‘traumatic object’ seems to have become a satisfying object in its own right that blocks real psychological work.

As the essay unfolds, I describe how psychological development ought to lead to a transformation in the internal witnessing modes, and to the constitution of the metaphoric witnessing function of the mind. I will add to Amir’s outline by describing what I consider to be a crucial factor in the consolidation of these different witnessing modes—the dialectical movement between two modes of psychic existence: that of ‘emergent being’ and ‘continuous doing’ (extending upon the work of S. Erlich [2003]). The *emergent-being* psychic mode of existence is rooted in an initially un-integrated psychological situation, where one is totally open to experience the moment, to be carried by influential forces and to identify and create new shapes of experience and existence. This special and very creative mode of being is open to transform, invent and create itself in new ways, but at the same time must contend with the deep threat of dis-integration, the surrender of the holding contribution of identity, knowledge, doing, shaping, defining, forming, etc. Emergent being, therefore, liberates the forming-mind from what was earlier undefined, but also opens up the threat of losing all that was gained and had held the self together. Hence the importance of the *continuous-doing* counterpart: *doing* anchors the individual in a well-defined and structured life, including his identity and identifications, habits, actions and accomplishments, and his knowledge about himself and the world. This psychic mode is essential to any sane psychological state of mind and prevents chaos and disintegration.

Usually one does not encounter either of the two modes or dimensions in pure form; each individual is characterized by a unique dialectical balance between the *emergent being* and *continuous doing* vectors of the mind. I suggest that each of Amir’s four modes of witnessing can be further defined by the specific dialectical balance and integration that it allows or evokes between the two psychic modes of being and doing. If the mind feels too fragile and prone to breakdown, it will not lend itself to the emergent being psychic mode, and if the mind must defend itself by withdrawing from any shape and form of knowledge, it will avoid utilizing its capacities for continuous doing.

For example, only the metaphoric witnessing mode makes use of dynamic movement and interaction between the *ability to be* and the *capacity to do*; between the experiential openness to change and the symbolic order's ability to lend shape and tools to this kind of change, together enabling recognition, the process of mourning, the creation of new meaning, and the possibility of reparation. The metonymic mode of witnessing suffers from a repetitive, claustal-like form of emergent-being, and the excessive psychotic mode seems to be controlled by the continuous-doing tendency of the mind, negating the possibility of emerging from enslavement *to* this mode, and creating new things or ideas. Finally, the Muzelmann mode attacks both the ability to be and the capacity to do.

One cannot witness and observe oneself openly without both acknowledging the continuous flow of internal data and being open to emerge from it in some way that will mean a slightly different state of experience after such observation. Too much anxiety about losing shape under the burden of trauma will prevent change in the internal witnessing mode (i.e., leaning too heavily on the continuous-doing vector); too much anxiety about facing traumatic reality will prevent detecting and shaping new internal discoveries into meaningful creations and vital knowledge (i.e., leaning too heavily on the emergent-being vector). Only good integration and flexible movement between these two psychic tendencies serve the ability to grow psychologically and to develop a transformative experience of internal witnessing.

I demonstrate the theory I have suggested by examining Israeli historian Otto Dov (Deutalbaum) Kulka's (1933-) book *Landscapes of the Metropolis of Death*, in which he tells his personal traumatic story as a boy in Auschwitz. Kulka was born in the Czech Republic in 1933, and spent the ages of ten and eleven as a boy in Auschwitz where his mother was killed. Surviving the war, he moved with his father to Czechoslovakia and immigrated to Israel in 1949. Kulka became a professor of history in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, investigating modern anti-Semitism since the early modern period up to The Final Solution. For many years, he chose to neglect the possibility of telling his personal, subjective story, bearing witness to the traumatic memories of the child who survived Theresienstadt and later Auschwitz concentration camps. I will show how after several reading experiences that led to a significant transformation in his internal witnessing mode, Kulka was gradually able to enliven his own internal child's role as metaphoric witness, which culminated in his willingness to publish his story in a book named after the secret name he had invented for the concentration camp, *the metropolis of death*.

I will show how reading literature promotes better integration between the emergent-being and the continuous-doing tendencies of the mind, thus enabling transformation in the internal modes of witnessing and supporting the formation of the reflective, metaphoric internal witness, who can observe, integrate, mourn, tell a story and thus offer some reparation. This development will be illustrated through three personal reading experiences described by Kulka, particularly his experiences upon reading two stories by Von Kleist (1777-1811), “Michael Kohlhaas” (1810) and “The Earthquake in Chile” (1807). In both stories, the Law, represented by the church, the justice system and the aristocracy, acts in brutal and indifferent ways towards the common people. Through Kulka’s identification with the tragic heroes of these stories—all of whom are trying hopelessly to rebel against the monstrosly distorted laws governing them—he begins to acknowledge his long-lasting compulsive urge to repetitively visit, mainly in his dreams, the distorted, arbitrary laws of death which governed his childhood years in two concentration camps.

This realization deepens when Kulka reads Kafka’s book *In the Penal Colony* (1919). In Kafka’s story, a traveling researcher arrives at a penal colony and discovers that according to the legal system there, which had been determined by the “former commander,” criminals are informed of the verdict in their cases through a weird machine that engraves the verdict onto the criminal’s body, and following six hours of torture the written words are revealed to him and he realizes his fate. There is no room in this bizarre world for trials since guilt is a foregone conclusion. It is a jurisprudence that accepts no appeal, and from which there is no escape. As Kulka reads *In the Penal Colony* and reaches the story of punishment by flogging to death, similar punishments carried out in the concentration camp resurface in his mind after years of amnesia. Beyond the painful relief of recollection and its own transformative power, Kulka began to realize that there and then, in the camps, and quite against his will, Kulka the child had himself become a “researcher-traveler,” observing from both within and from without this horrible form of absolute jurisprudence. Gradually, Kulka became vulnerable and increasingly aware of the lethal alienation that had been perpetuated by his former internal witnessing mode.

Kulka’s therapeutic reading-journey reaches its peak after reading Kafka’s short story or parable “Before the Law” (1925). Throughout the years Kulka had entirely refrained from any kind of subjective or artistic Holocaust witnessing. He felt completely alienated from other Holocaust narrators and their stories, and believed that his own story would be perceived similarly by others. The experience of reading Kafka, however, evoked the paradox that sits at the core

of the miracle of reading: the story of the other reveals the private story of the reader. All of a sudden the reader feels a sense of the familiar, touched, and treated by the text and its characters and writer. After reading and being touched by Kafka's "Before the law," Kulka realized that if the very private gate of Mr. K., the protagonist of Kafka's story, is of such interest and relevance to Kulka the reader, then perhaps Kulka's very personal story might be of interest and relevance to other readers as well.

The accumulative reading experiences led Kulka to move from the former two major modes of witnessing which had characterized him throughout his life after Auschwitz—the metonymic (shown in his repetitive dreams) and the excessive (expressed in part in his writing about the Holocaust as professor of history)—to the more mature, reflective, metaphoric witnessing mode. This latter mode is grounded in the depressive position and is characterized by flexible movement and enhanced integration between the part of the personality that is focused on continuous doing and the part that is open to the self's emergent being. This movement involves a creative mode of mourning and nourishes the symbolic mode of thinking. This transformation ultimately results in Kulka's decision to write his personal account of his experiences as a boy in Auschwitz.

This description is also aimed at aiding the psychotherapist as we listen to our patients bearing witness to their traumatic history. It opens our listening to unconscious signifiers, hidden behind and beyond the scope of content. These signifiers are expressed in any of the various modes described above, including compulsive repetitions that are refractory to change, over-determined narratives, detailed stories lacking spirit and emotion, and more. They are related to the particular (im)balance between the capacity of the mind to openly *be*, on the one hand, and its willingness to continuously *do*, on the other hand. These modes in turn shape internal object relations and tend to be enacted in the transference. Working-through of these elements might lead to better integration between these psychic modes and enable the beginning of vital processes of reflection, mourning and reparation. They are therefore related both to the complex ways in which our patients bear witness to themselves and to our sensitive and demanding role as witnesses to them.