

תוכן העניינים

| | |
|---|-------------------|
| מעשה מוסרי מתוך חירות: קריאה לאקאניאנית בפרויד ובקאנט 1 | אפרת אבן צור |
| 'הזדהות' ו'קניבליזם' במשנתו של פרויד: מושגים הממחישים מחשבה ריזומטית מנקודת המבט של ז'יל דלז ופליקס גואטרי 17 | יהודה (דודי) אלון |
| 'מי בא אחרי?' על יחסי העברה אחאיים בפסיכותרפיה פסיכואנליטית 43 | ריבה אלטמן |
| לחלום באלכסנדריה: עיון פסיכואנליטי ביצירתו של לורנס דארל, 'רביעיית אלכסנדריה' 69 | רוני אלפנדרי |
| להרטיב בים של דמעות: המסע מן הסימפטום אל הזולת 99 | רות גת-דוברוב |
| תסביך האונס ותסביך האדיפוס הנשי 121 | דיצה חננאל |
| המיניות ותפקידה הייחודי בכינון הסובייקט הפסיכואנליטי במונחי אני-גוף ואני-אובייקט 137 | יוסי טריאסט |
| החלום הציוני הטרומ טראומטי: עיון פרוידיאני במדרשי השם 'ציון' במקרא 177 | רפאל יונתן לאוס |
| מסעודת הטוטם עד אפרסקי הנצח: סמלי מזון ב'מטבח הנפש' במבט יונגיאני 193 | רות נצר |
| הקווים מנגנים מעצמם: קריאה בסיפור 'התרנגולת בעלת שלוש הרגליים' מאת יהושע קנז לאור מושג ההיעשות של דלז וגואטרי 221 | שני סמאי |

| | |
|---|----------------------------|
| על שם-האב, על שיח האיזוי ועל חובות: פרשנות לאקאניאנית לסיפור מרים הנביאה 253 | ענבל רז ברקין |
| על קואליציה מעוותת בין אם ובנה היוצרת התארגנות נרקיסיסטית-פרוורטית 281 | מיכאל שושני ובתיה שושני |
| 309 | הוראות למחברים |
| 315 | המשתתפים |
| XI | תקצירים באנגלית |

מעשה מוסרי מתוך חירות קריאה לאקאיניאנית בפרויד ובקאנט

אפרת אבן צור*

במאמר אני עוסקת בתורת המוסר מנקודת מבט פסיכואנליטית, ומבקשת להצביע על אפשרותו של מעשה מוסרי מתוך חירות. תחילה אני טוענת כי מקריאה מסוימת בפרויד עולה אפיון של המעשה המוסרי ככניעה לעריצות העל-אני. בהמשך מוצגת העמדה האתית של לאקאן, שמצא בעקבות פרויד קווים מקבילים בין העמדה המוסר(נ)ית לעמדה הפרוורטית. לאקאן הצביע על הצדדים הדומים באתיקה של עמנואל קאנט ובגישה של המרקז דה סאד, והזהיר מפני עמדה אתית שבה הציווי המוסרי הופך לתירוץ שאפשר להסתתר מאחוריו וכך להשיל מעצמנו אחריות. לבסוף נעשה ניסיון להיעזר במושגים של לאקאן כדי לתאר את אפשרותו של מעשה מוסרי מתוך חירות, המבוסס על עמדה אתית שאינה בגדר כניעה לעריצות פנימית. לאקאן מתאר כמה עמדות סובייקט אפשריות כלפי המועקה (anxiety), ורעיונותיו משמשים אותי להבחנה בין שתי עמדות אתיות: הניסיון הפרוורטי להחזיק בידע מוחלט על תוכן החובה המוסרית, ומנגד – ויתור על הפנטזיה על אחר המדומיין כבעל ידע מוחלט על המעשה הראוי מבחינה מוסרית, וקבלת אחריות לבחירה האישית. הקריאה של לאקאן באנטיגונה מסייעת לי להדגים את הפער בין שתי העמדות האתיות, ולתאר את תהליך הבחירה במעשה המוסרי כתהליך של סובלימציה המתרחש בתווך שבין הסינגולרי לציבורי.

מה בין בחירה חופשית של סובייקט לעקוב אחר צו מצפוני, לבין פעולה של ציות עיוור לחוק? הרושם מקריאה מסוימת בפסיכואנליזה הפרוידיאנית, שתוצג להלן, הוא כי התנהגות מוסרית נובעת מנטייה לציית – עקב תחושת אשמה ופחד מעונש, ועקב כניעה לעריצות העל-אני (superego).¹ הבעיה המרכזית בתפיסה זו היא

* ברצוני להודות לפרופ' אורי דרר, שהמאמר מבוסס על עבודה שנכתבה בהנחייתו. תודה גם לגל כץ על העזרה בפיתוח הרעיונות.

¹ 'על-אני' הוא תרגום למושג הגרמני Über-Ich של פרויד, אשר תורגם בתרגום האנגלי הנפוץ ל־superego ובתרגומים קודמים לעברית כאני עליון.

'הזדהות' ו'קניבליזם' במשנתו של פרויד מושגים הממחיישים מחשבה ריזומטית מנקודת המבט של ז'יל דלוז ופליקס גואטרי

דודי (יהודה) אלון*

במאמר זה אני מדגים כיצד התפתחה מחשבתו של פרויד באופן ריזומטי. את מושג הריזום אני שואל מעבודתם של ז'יל דלוז ופליקס גואטרי (Deleuze and Guattari) 1987 [1980]). מחשבה ריזומטית מציינת מחשבה של פני השטח, שאיננה אנכית, המנוגדת למבנה מחשבתי מדרגי הנשען על בסיס ומקור. הטעם לעיסוק במבנה הצורני של התפתחות מושגיו של פרויד הוא שכל מי שנחשף לכתביו של פרויד בצורה רחבה אינו יכול שלא להציב סימן שאלה על העקיבות בתאוריות של פרויד. התייחסות למושגיו של פרויד כאל מושגים ריזומטיים יכולה להאיר את עבודתו באור שונה היוצק עקיבות ושלמות שאינן נראות בסקירה ביקורתית ואנליטית. אני עוקב אחר התפתחות שני מושגים השזורים בעבודתו של פרויד: 'קניבליזם' ו'הזדהות'. מתוך בחינת ההקשרים שבהם המושגים מופיעים, ניתוח ההגדרה בכל מופע וחשיפת ההבדל במשמעות, מואר האופן שבו מתפתחת מחשבתו של פרויד. טענתי היא שהתפתחות זו היא התפתחות ריזומטית, כלומר שמשמעות המושגים 'נעה' על פני השטח תוך ריבוי משמעויות והכפלתן, הוספת משמעויות חדשות והתאחדות עם היבטים נוספים. זאת בניגוד למחשבה מסועפת כעץ (Arborescent), בעלת בסיס מוצק ופיתוח אנליטי, לוגי ודיכוטומי במאפייניו.

מבוא

במאמר זה אני עוקב אחר שני מושגים המופיעים פעמים רבות בכתביו של פרויד. מטרתי היא לבחון כיצד להגדיר את ההתפתחות המושגית של פרויד לאור התפתחות מושגים אלה. בהתפתחות המושגים אינני מכוון להתפתחות תאוריות

* תודתי לד"ר ערן רולניק שלימד אותי 'לקרוא' בכתבי פרויד.

'מי בא אחרי?'

יחסי העברה אחאיים בפסיכותרפיה פסיכואנליטית

ריבה אלטמן

מאמר זה עוסק במקומם של יחסי אחים בתאוריות פסיכואנליטיות וביחסי העברה אחאיים הנרקמים בין המטופל למטפל במהלך הטיפול הפסיכותרפטי. תאוריות פסיכואנליטיות מפרויד ועד ימינו הדגישו את חשיבות הקשר האנכי – הקשר בין הורים לילדים – כקשר מכוון ומשמעותי בתהליך ההתפתחות הנפשית. בצל הקשרים האנכיים נמצאים כנוכחים נפקדים היחסים האופקיים – יחסי האחים. יחסים אלה, חשיבותם והשפעתם, מפורטים בתיאורי מקרים רבים, אך עד לשני העשורים האחרונים לא נעשה ניסיון להמשיגם באופן תאורטי ולהגדיר את השפעתם המהותית על המבנה וההתפתחות הנפשית של הפרט, ולא ניתנה תשומת לב מיוחדת לביטויים ההעברתיים של יחסי האחות בתוך המפגש האנליטי. בסקירה תאורטית זו אני מבהירה את מקומו של הקשר האחאי כגורם המשפיע על ההתפתחות הנפשית ואת חשיבותם של היחסים האופקיים בשיח הפסיכואנליטי – לאור תאוריות פסיכואנליטיות מרכזיות ולאור התאוריה העכשווית של ג'ולייט מיטשל (Mitchell 2003). בהמשך אני ממשיגה שתי תצורות של העברה אחאית – העברה אחאית אנכית והעברה אחאית אופקית – ובחלק האחרון אני מתארת את השתרקות יחסי ההעברה האחאיים, האנכיים והאופקיים, אשר נקמו במהלך טיפול במתבגר בן 12.¹

¹ המאמר מבוסס על עבודת גמר שהוגשה לתכנית לפסיכותרפיה, הפקולטה לרפואה, אוניברסיטת תל-אביב, ביוני 2010, ועל הרצאה שם באוקטובר 2010. כמו כן הוא חלק מעבודת דוקטור שנכתבת במחלקה לפרשנות ותרבות באוניברסיטת בריאלין בהנחיית פרופ' אבי שגיא וד"ר דורית למברגר ועוסקת בקשר האחאי בספרות ובפסיכואנליזה. אני מבקשת להודות לאנשים שהדריכו, העירו, האירו, תמכו, עודדו וקראו גרסאות שונות של עבודה זו: ד"ר רינה לור, גב' ורדית ויס, גב' אמיליה פרוני, מר יוסי טמיר, ד"ר דורית למברגר וד"ר גידי לב.

לחלום באלכסנדריה עיון פסיכואנליטי ביצירתו של לורנס דארל, 'רביעיית אלכסנדריה'

רוני אלפנדרי

במאמר זה מוצגת פרשנות פסיכואנליטית למושג החלום ולעבודת החלימה ביצירתו של לורנס דארל, רביעיית אלכסנדריה (1960-1958).¹ מחבר היצירה, שהושפע מתובנות פסיכואנליטיות שרווחו בתקופתו, עשה שימוש במושגי החלום כדי להבנות את היצירה כולה כמושתת על המבנה מודע/לא-מודע של התודעה על פי פרויד, ובחלומות פרטיקולריים כדי להנכיח תמות מרכזיות ביצירתו. המאמר מראה כיצד שימוש זה בחלום היה עבור מחבר היצירה ציר מרכזי בכינון היצירה כמרחב בדיוני שבו הוא התמודד עם נסיבות קיומו כסופר גולה.

אתה רק תשנא אותי על שאני מספר לך דברים שהיית מעדיף לא לדעתם כגבר ואולי היית מעדיף להתעלם מהם כאמן [...] העובדות הקטנות האלה, המנושלות והעקשניות, הילדים המוחלפים של קיומנו האנושי שאנו יכולים להכניס אותם כמו מפתח למנעול – או סכין לצדפה: האם תהיה פנינה בפנים? מי חכם וידע? אך אישם ודאי הם קיימים בזכות עצמם, גרגרים אלה של אמת, ש'פשוט החליקו החוצה'. האמת איננה מה שמשמיעים בהכרה מלאה. תמיד היא מה ש'סתם מחליק החוצה' – שגיאת הדפוס שמסגירה את הכול (דארל 1988: 105, ההדגשה במקור).²

¹ יצירה זו כמעט ואינה מוכרת לקורא בעברית. בעת פרסומה בשנות השישים היא זכתה להצלחה מסחרית וביקורתית רבה ודארל היה אף מועמד לפרס נובל לספרות בזכותה. שמו של דארל הוזכר בימים ההם בנשימה אחת עם שמותיהם של פרוסט וגויס. בשנים אלה זוכה היצירה לעדנה ומהדורות בשפות שונות ראו אור בשנים האחרונות. לדאבוני, רק שני הכרכים הראשונים תורגמו לעברית בידי אהרן אמיר בשנות השמונים. ציטטות הלקוחות משני הכרכים שטרם תורגמו לעברית, תרגמתי אני. מאמר זה הוא עיבוד של פרק בעבודת הדוקטור שלי העוסקת בהרחבה ביצירה כולה. כתבתי את העבודה בהנחייתו של פרופ' אבי שגיא במסגרת המסלול לפסיכואנליזה ופרשנות בחוג לפרשנות ותרבות באוניברסיטת בראילן.

² 'You will only hate me for telling you things you would prefer not to know as a man'

להרטיב בים של דמעות המסע מן הסימפטום אל הזולת

רות גת־דוברוב

במאמר אני עוסקת באופן שבו הסימפטום מבטא את צורכי העצמי שלא קיבלו מענה מותאם של זולתעצמי אנושי. בהמשגה זו, הסימפטום אינו רק מבטא צרכים ראשוניים שנותרו ללא מענה אנושי, או כתב סתרים של חומרי לא מודע מודחקים, אלא גם מעניק לסובייקט מענה לצורכי העצמי שלא קיבלו היענות מותאמת של זולתעצמי אנושי. הסימפטום הוא בין־לוויה זמני וחלקי המשמר את הלכידות של העצמי ומגן עליו מפני התפרקות עד שתיכון ההתייצבות הזולתית המותאמת והנענית לצורכי העצמי. במאמר מתוארים ההיבטים הרבים והמנוגדים של פעולת הסימפטום על העצמי ועל סביבתו האנושית. דרך דוגמה קלינית מתואר המסע הטיפולי המשותף של ילדה בת תשע הסובלת מהרטבת יום ארוכת שנים ועיקשת, עם המטפלת שלה, מסע אשר במהלכו מעזה המטופלת, אט־אט ובהיסוס רב, להיפרד מן האחווה הלופתת שלה בסימפטום ושל הסימפטום בה, ולהאמין ולהתמסר להחזקה אנושית. התפוגגותו ההדרגתית של הסימפטום מוסברת ככרוכה בהתחזקותו ובהרחבת יכולתו ואמונו של העצמי בקבלת המענה המותאם מסביבת הזולתעצמי. מיכולות חדשות אלה נבעה הרשות הפנימית של המטופלת לותר על ההישענות על הסימפטום. אני נשענת על ההמשגות ועל התובנות האתיות־פילוסופיות של פסיכולוגיית העצמי (היינץ קוהוט וממשיכיו) ומדגימה במאמר בעזרת דוגמאות קליניות מושגי בסיס של התאוריה (נוכחות זולתעצמי, צורכי העצמי, פיצול אנכי, התמרה).

המחשבה על כתיבת המאמר הזו עלתה בי בעקבות טיפול בילדה בת תשע שסבלה מסימפטום רב שנים של הרטבת יום.¹ האחווה הלופתת של הילדה בסימפטום ושל הסימפטום בה עוררו את סקרנותי וניסיתי להבין את משמעותו בעולמה. בהדרגה

¹ תודה עמוקה לאריה גרין על הליווי המסור והמיטיב. המאמר מבוסס על הרצאה שנתתי ב־25 במרס 2012 במסגרת 'ערבי בצוותא', סדרת הרצאות מטעם האיגוד הישראלי לפסיכולוגית העצמי ולחקר הסובייקטיביות, תל־אביב.

תסביך האונס ותסביך אדיפוס הנשי

דיצה חננאל

המאמר דן בתרומה של המושג 'תסביך האונס' לתאוריה על תסביך אדיפוס הנשי. בתאוריות מוקדמות קרוי המושג 'חרדת אונס' ומיוחס לחרדה מפני חדירה עקב משאלה של הבת לגילוי עריות. תאוריות מאוחרות יותר טוענות שהבת האדיפלית רואה באיסור על תשוקתה לאב פיתוי לוותר על תשוקתה. היא מוותרת על תשוקתה כדי לרצות את האב, והקשר בין המינים קורס לקשר של סובייקט-אובייקט ונחווה ככפייה. אני מציעה לשלב את התאוריות. כשהבת מגלה את ההבדל האנטומי, היא מגלה את הדמיון שלה לאם. טענתי היא שהחוויה של הבת שהאם היא סובייקט של תשוקה קובעת את התגובה על איסור האב. כאשר האם היא סובייקט של תשוקה, הבת שמזדהה אתה מגיבה על הפיתוי בחרדה ומסרבת לוותר על תשוקתה. במצב זה חרדת האונס סימטרית לחרדת הסירוס. כאשר האם איננה סובייקט של תשוקה, הבת מוותרת על תשוקתה כדי לרצות את האב. במאמר מוצגת דוגמה קלינית, ודיון בעקבות מאמר של אוגדן. אוגדן סבר כי לשינוי האובייקט קודם שלב שבו האם משמשת אובייקט אהבה מעברי גברי. השלישי מתגלה בדיאדה. שלב זה קודם לשלב המתואר במאמר, ובו הבת מזדהה עם תשוקת האם או עם היעדרה והאב הוא שלישי ממשי וחיצוני. גם לפי אוגדן אם שהיא סובייקט של תשוקה היא תנאי למהלך תקין של התסביך האדיפלי הנשי. הדוגמה הקלינית תומכת הן באוגדן הן בתאוריה שהוצעה במאמר והתאוריות משלימות זו את זו.

המאמר מתמקד בהיבט אחד של תסביך האדיפוס הנשי, הוא תסביך האונס. המושג תסביך האונס הופיע בשחר הפסיכואנליזה. אז הוא התייחס לחרדה מפני אונס. החרדה מופיעה בהקשר של משאלה אדיפלית של הבת ביחס לאב, והיא חרדה נשית אופיינית מפני אובדן המיניות. תאוריות מאוחרות יותר גרסו שבמהלך תסביך האדיפוס הבת מוותרת על תשוקתה כדי לרצות את האב. הקשר בין המינים קורס לקשר סובייקט-אובייקט ונחווה ככפייה. אני מציעה שילוב של שני ההיבטים הללו של תסביך האונס, חרדה ותשוקה, באמצעות התייחסות לצלע הנוספת של תסביך האדיפוס, האם כסובייקט של תשוקה. כמו כן אני מציעה דוגמה קלינית. הרקע לדיון בדוגמה הוא מאמר של אוגדן על היחסים האדיפליים המעבריים בהתפתחות

המיניות ותפקידה הייחודי בכינון הסובייקט הפסיכואנליטי במונחי אני-גוף ואני-אובייקט

יוסי טריאסט

במאמר אני בוחן את מושג המיניות אצל פרויד ומתחקה אחר תפקידו המכונן בהתפתחות תפיסת הסובייקט והאובייקט בפסיכואנליזה. ייחודה של המיניות בכך שהיא מעגנת את הסובייקט בגוף (האני-גוף) מחד גיסא, כשם שהיא דוחפת אותו אל עבר האובייקט (האני-אובייקט) מאידך גיסא במסגרת מערך משולש שקודקודיו הם 'אני-גוף'-סובייקט-אובייקט וצלעותיו המיניות. פרשנות זו מתבססת על הגדרתו הדיאלקטית הראשונית של הסובייקט האנליטי כמי שזהותו מכוננת על ידי מיניותו הלא-מודעת. בהיותו לא-מודע לעצמו הריהו נזקק בהכרח לאובייקט כמראה, אך מעצם טבעו כסובייקט הוא מנוע מלקבל כל הגדרה שאינה נובעת מ'בפנים' בלבד, ולפיכך יהא עליו לשלול במקדם או במאוחר את הגדרתו החיצונית של האובייקט, וחזור חלילה. כתוצאה מכך מתנהל תהליך התגבשות הזהות במתכונת מחזורית של תנועת מטוטלת, המעבירה את מרכז הכובד של ההשקעה הליבידינלית הלך ושוב, בין קוטב הסובייקט לקוטב האובייקט, כאשר המיניות היא הכוח המניע את התהליך. אפשר לטעון, בהשראת הגל, כי פעולת חילוץ המשמעויות הדחוסות הגלומות במושג המיניות היא גם זו המחוללת ברובד מקביל את 'המפץ הגדול' המשגר את הפסיכואנליזה לדרכה כתאוריה מרובת מודלים, שכל אחד מהם מציב את 'האובייקט' בפוזיציה ייחודית לו ביחס ל'סובייקט'. התנועה הדיאלקטית של התהוות המודלים הופכת בהדרגה את ייצוגי הסובייקט והאובייקט (המטופל/ת והמטפלת/ת, בהתאמה) ברפלקסיה התאורטית לרב ממדיים, למורכבים ולשלמים יותר. הדיון המסכם סוקר מקצת מגלגולי מושג המיניות במודלים הפוסט-פרוידיאניים ועוקב אחר השלכותיהם, הקונטרוברסליות בחלקן, על תפיסת האדם העכשווית.

Has sexuality anything to do with psychoanalysis? (Green 1995)

מבוא

מטרת העיקרית במאמר הנוכחי היא לבחון את מעמדה המרכזי של המיניות אצל פרויד ולעמוד על אופיה כמושג דיאלקטי דחוס המכונן את תהליך התפתחות

החלום הציוני הטרומ טראומטי

עיון פרוידיאני במדרשי השם 'ציון' במקרא

רפאל יונתן לאוס

במאמר זה אני משווה, אחרי תיאור וסקירה של חשיבות חקר המילה הבודדת ומקורה בכתבי פרויד, בינה לבין הסוג הספרותי של מדרשי השם במקרא. אני מוצא בעייתיות במונח 'מדרש שם סמוי' ומציע כי מדרשי השם הסמויים יכולים להיות מדרשי שם אסוציאטיביים לא'מודעים שדרכם אפשר להתחקות אחר רובד מודחק של משמעות השם. בשל חשיבותו של המונח 'ציון' לדוברי השפה העברית, בחרתי להשתמש בכלים אלה כדי לנתח ולחשוף את הרבדים הסמויים הגלומים בשימוש בו במקרא. אני מבקש לטעון כי הקשר האסוציאטיבי בין ציון לעולם הסמנטי של חורבן, מדבר וציה, מבטא משאלת מוות וחורבן מודחקת ביחס לירושלים – משאלה שבאמצעותה אפשר להסביר את תחושת האשם העוזה על החורבן, המלווה את התרבות העברית כבר למעלה מאלפיים שנה. אני מאמין כי בשל התפקיד הייחודי של ציון וירושלים כחלום בה"א הידיעה, אפשר להרחיב את הדיון בתופעה האוניברסלית של דו־ערכיות ביחס לחלום טרם התגשמותו ובתחושה 'אלביתית' עם התממשותו ואחריה. כמו כן אני מציע במאמר התבוננות בהיבטים נוספים של החלום תוך שימוש במושג האיווי של לאקאן.

הפסיכואנליזה כתרבות היא בעלת שפה משלה והדיבור הוא האמצעי העיקרי שבאמתחתה ולכן היא מייחדת לשפה ולמילה מקום של כבוד וחשיבות. פרויד (1910 [1968]) זיהה את המשמעות הפסיכולוגית של השפה וראה בעיון שיטתי בה אפיק מבטיח של החקירה הפסיכואנליטית. המילה הבודדת היא אחת מיחידות הבסיס של השפה ומילות השם (שם תואר, שם עצם) הן אב־הטיפוס שלה. הסמליות, כמאפיין המרכזי והייחודי של השפה, מתבטאת בשם כמסמל המצביע על המסומל. לא מפתיע, אם כן, לראות כי בין ענפי המחקר הלשוני הרבים יחס פרויד חשיבות לעיסוק במילה הבודדת. כדוגמה אחת מני רבות לשימוש בניתוח המילה לצורך חקירה פסיכואנליטית של התרבות, אפשר להזכיר את פתיחתו למסה 'המאומים'

מסעודת הטוטם עד אפרסקי הנצח סמלי מזון ב'מטבח הנפש' במבט יונגיאני

רות נצר

במאמר זה אני סוקרת את הסימבוליקה שקשורה במזון – אכילה, בליעה, עיבוד-עיכול המזון, הקאה והפרשה – יחד עם סימבוליקת השיניים והפה. הסמלים שקשורים באוכל מסמלים את מה שאני מכנה 'מטבח הנפש' – המקום הלא-מודע שהנפש 'מבשלת' בו את חומריה, והביטוי להם הוא בחלומות, בדתות, במיסטיקה, במיתוסים, באגדות, בטקסים, ביצירה וגם בהפרעות אכילה. אני בוחנת את משמעות המעבר הטרנספורמטיבי והסובלימטיבי מהאוכל הקונקרטי אל הסמלי, מהצורך הגופני אל מאוויים רוחניים, משליטת ארכיטיפ האם על האכילה אל שליטת ארכיטיפ האב, ומראה את שלבי התפתחות התודעה במטפורות אלכימיות שמבוטאות בסמלי אכילה. כמו כן אני מעיינת בהיבטים החיוביים והשליליים של המשמעות הסמלית של האוכל בתחומי חיים רבים וברמות תודעה שונות. הארכיטיפים המרכזיים שקשורים באוכל הם: אם, אב, טרנספורמציה, גוף, רוח.

ירפבהו עליבמותי ארץ ויאכל תנובת שדי,
ויניקהו דבש מסלע ושמן מחלמיש צור.
(דברים לב, 13)

אני שואל אותך:
את רוצה לאכול או להאכל? הנה השלחן
(סרמן 2007, 'אין לי נשק': 60)

הסמל בגישה היונגיאנית לעומת הפרוידיאנית

חוקר התרבות ארנסט קסירר ראה בסמל מפתח לטבע האדם, ובאדם הוא ראה יצור יוצר סמלים. לדעתו יכולתו של האדם להשליך סמלים על העולם כאשר הוא

הקווים מנגנים מעצמם

קריאה בסיפור 'התרנגולת בעלת שלוש הרגליים'

מאת יהושע קנו לאור מושג היעשות של דלו וגואטרי

שני סמאי

חלק ניכר מהספרות הישראלית נקרא באמצעות כלים פסיכואנליטיים קלסיים, שבהם האדם ומניעיו הפסיכולוגיים ניצבים במרכז. סוגת סיפורי החניכה מקבלת מקום של כבוד בספרות מפני שהיא מאפשרת הצצה לתהליך התבגרות שבו הגיבור הוא ילד או נער בשלבי כניסה לעולם הבוגרים ולסדר החברתי והסימבולי, תוך התמודדות עם יחסים אדיפליים משפחתיים. יהושע קנו, שהתקבל בתחילת דרכו ברגשות מעורבים, הוא כיום אחד היוצרים הקנוניים בספרות הישראלית. במאמר זה אני מראה כיצד מומנטים היעשותיים הנשענים על הגותם של ז'יל דלו ופליקס גואטרי מאפשרים קריאה שונה של הסיפור 'התרנגולת בעלת שלוש הרגליים'. סיפור זה התפרסם בקובץ הסיפורים מומנט מוסיקלי, שאותו נהוג לקרוא כסיפורי חניכה. הקריאה הנוכחית מציגה פן אחר של הטקסט, השונה מהקריאות הפסיכואנליטיות הדומיננטיות, תוך דגש על 'התחמקות' מהפרשנות האדיפלית או הסימבולית הנפוצה. תחת זאת מוצעת נקודת מבט אשר משמשת קו מילוט מפרשנות אדיפלית ומציאת זהות יציבה. ההתבוננות הזו מגלמת ביקורת על המושגים 'הזדהות' ו'סובייקט' אנושי, ומעודדת תנועה מינורית וסימביוזה עם המוחלש והלא-בהכרח-אנושי. הדגש המושם בקריאה הוא על פנים אחרים בטקסט מעבר לאלמנטים התוכניים-עלילתיים (כגון מצלול), תוך היעזרות במושג 'היעשות'¹ לשם הצגת נקודת מבט שונה על קריאת החוויות והתהליכים המתרחשים הן בחייו של גיבור הסיפור והן במסגרת הטקסט הספרותי.²

¹ במקור בצרפתית – devenir, ובאנגלית – becoming. תרגום נפוץ ומדויק יותר הוא 'התהוות', אך במאמר אשתמש במושג 'היעשות' כיוון שזהו המושג הרווח בכתביה בעברית.

² תודה לאייל דותן על הצלילות, על המחשבה ועל האומץ להודחל לנזקקים. תודה לאהד ז'הבי על ההתבוננות והגמגום הבלתי נדלה, לחברים ועוד שקראו והעירו, ולקוראים האנונימיים שביקרו והזמינו המשך חשיבה.

על שם-האב, על שיח האיווי ועל חובות פרשנות לאקאניאנית לסיפור מרים הנביאה

ענבל רו ברקין

במאמר זה אני דנה במקום הנרחב והדו־ערכי שתופסת דמותה של מרים המקראית בספרות חז"ל באמצעות שימוש במושג האב כפי שהוא עולה מתוך משנתו של הפסיכואנליטיקאי ז'אק לאקאן. טענתי העיקרית היא כי היחס הדו־ערכי של חז"ל למרים נובע מן התפקיד המיוחד המיוחס לה במסורת זו: להבהיר את מקומם של האב, של האיווי ושל החוב בתרבות היהודית. במאמר נבחנת דמותו של האב כפי שהיא מוצגת בסיפור המקראי של מרים ובספרות חז"ל שעוסקת בו ומוצעת פרשנות ברוח משנתו של לאקאן. ייחודה של פרשנות זו בהיותה תרה אחר אי־הבנה, קושי וחסר בסיפור המקראי שחז"ל מנסים להתמודד עמו במטרה להצביע עליהם כאזורים החושפים חסר מכון המגולם בשפה המקראית. קריאה כזו אינה מבקשת להחיל דגמים פסיכואנליטיים על הטקסטים המקראיים והחז"ליים אלא משתמשת בהם כמודל ללימוד תובנות פסיכואנליטיות. מרים היא דימוי של איווי, ובאמצעות השיח (Discourse) שלה נלמדת הבעייתיות הכרוכה במושג האב ביהדות וקשת המשמעויות של מושג האיווי בפסיכואנליזה: ההיסוס, הספק, החרדה והאמונה שהם שיח האיווי של האב הסמלי והיעדר אורך הרוח, הוודאות והתשוקה האסורה המטלטלים את האיווי לפתחה של ההתענגות של האב הממשי. דימוי זה של איווי יכול להסביר את מקור המשיכה והדחייה שמעוררת דמותה של מרים בעיני חז"ל.¹

הסיפור המקראי הוא תמציתי ומרומז. הדמויות במקרא מתוארות בקווים כלליים בלבד ורב הנסתר בהן על הנגלה. מראן לא מתואר על פי רוב ולא נמסר הרבה על אישיותן, על הלך רוחן ועל מעשיהן בחיי היום־יום. במקרה של דמויות נשיות רבה יותר ההסתרה: מראן, תכונותיהן ופעילותן מוצנעים, לידתן ומותן מטושטשים, ולעיתים הן אינן נזכרות כלל בשמן אלא בייחוס לדמות גברית משמעותית בחייהן

¹ אני מודה לד"ר רחל אלבק גדרון על שקראה את המאמר ועל הערותיה המועילות ולפרופ' משה הלוי ספירו על הדגשים החשובים שהעלה לפני.

על קואליציה מעוותת בין אם ובנה היוצרת התארגנות נרקיסיסטית-פרוורטית

מיכאל שושני ובתיה שושני

במאמר דנים המחברים בארבע שיחות שנערכו עם אבי, מטופל שקשה להגיע אליו (a difficult-to-reach patient), בעל מבנה נרקיסיסטי-פרוורטי. הפרוורסיה הומשגה כתוצר של סצנה ראשונית מעוותת שבה לא זכה ליחס שהיה צריך לקבל כילד: יצירת גבולות ברורים ובניית יכולת לדחות סיפוקים. מאידך גיסא התייחסו אליו כאל מבוגר: הוא הועצם מבחינה נרקיסיסטית וקיבל יחס מועדף כאילו הוא בן הזוג של האם. מצב זה יצר אצלו משוואה סימבולית (symbolic equation) כמרפסיכוטית, הגורסת שהילד הוא האב. הקואליציה המעוותת והמעוותת הזו בין האם לבן, שבה האב נדחק לשוליים, נוצרה מתוך האכזבה של האם מהאב והולידה יחס סדוקטיבי כלפי בנה, שהוביל לכשל בפתרון התסביך האדיפלי וגרר התארגנות נרקיסיסטית-פרוורטית.

אָנו לומדים להעריך היתרון שבהיות נאהבים ואנו מוכנים לוותר על יתרונות אחרים כדי להחזיק בו: (פריוד [1915] 2008, עמ' 56)

מטרתנו במאמר היא להשתמש בחומר קליני מפורט כדי להדגים ולבאר את ההתארגנות הנפשית הפרוורטית, כמו גם את הקשיים העומדים בפני המטפל בניסיונו לפרום את המארג הנפשי הפרוורטי הסבוך שלא אפשר לו לכונן את היכולת לחשוב ולהיות בעל a mind of one's own. המאמר מחולק לשני חלקים: ראשית נציג ארבע שעות טיפוליות ולאחר מכן נציע המשגה תאורטית של החומרים שעולים בטיפולים. החלטנו לפתוח בהצגת השעות כך שהקורא יוכל לנסח את הבנותיו והמשגותיו לעצמו במהלך הקריאה, בלי שייאלץ להתאים את מחשבותיו למודלים התאורטיים שלנו.

חשיבותה של התמודדות כושלת עם הסצנה הראשונית היא קונפיגורציה התפתחותית-אישיותית מוכרת שפריוד היה הראשון שנתן את דעתו עליה (Freud

המשתתפים

אפרת אבן-צור

דוקטורנטית, בית הספר למדעי הפסיכולוגיה, אוניברסיטת תל-אביב. מתמחה בפסיכולוגיה קלינית בתחנה הפסיכולוגית על שם אמי הורוויץ, גבעת חיים איחוד.

רח' התמר 3/5

קרית אונו 5542529

efrat.ev@gmail.com

יהודה (דודי) אלון

סטודנט לתואר שני במכון להיסטוריה ופילוסופיה של המדעים והרעיונות ע"ש כהן באוניברסיטת תל-אביב.

רח' קהילת ריגא 9 ב'

תל-אביב 6940044

alondudi1@gmail.com

ריבה אלטמן

עו"ס קלינית M.S.W. ופסיכותרפיסטית; דוקטורנטית במסלול לפסיכואנליזה ופרשנות בחוג לפרשנות ותרבות, אוניברסיטת בראילן; בוגרת התכנית לפסיכותרפיה פסיכואנליטית בפקולטה לרפואה באוניברסיטת תל-אביב; מדריכה בתכנית להכשרת מטפלים בילדים ונוער ביחידה ללימודי המשך באוניברסיטת בראילן; מטפלת בפרקטיקה פרטית בתל-אביב ובקיבוץ בית גוברין.

קיבוץ בית גוברין

ד.ג. לכיש דרום 79730

rivalt@gmail.com

ד"ר רוני אלפנדרי
עובד סוציאלי קליני, המסלול לפסיכואנליזה ופרשנות בתכנית לתרבות ופרשנות,
התכנית לפסיכותרפיה פסיכואנליטית, בית הספר לעבודה סוציאלית, אוניברסיטת
בריאילן.

רח' הנשיא 18
כרכור 3706218
alfandary@gmail.com

רות גת־דוברוב
מ"א, חברת האיגוד הישראלי לפסיכולוגיית העצמי; פסיכותרפיסטית של ילדים
ונוער ומדריכת הורים בקליניקה פרטית, ובעבר בבית החולים "שלוותה", מדריכה
מוסמכת; מלמדת בתכנית להכשרת מטפלים של האיגוד הישראלי לפסיכולוגיית
העצמי.

רח' הגלעד 10
הוד השרון 45221
Dubrov_d@netvision.net.il

ד"ר דיצה חננאל
פסיכולוגית קלינית; פסיכואנליטיקאית ומדריכה, מכון תל־אביב לפסיכואנליזה
בת־זמנו.

רח' הרטגלס 22
תל־אביב 6997126
urihan@bezeqint.net

ד"ר יוסי טריאסט
פסיכולוג קליני מדריך; פסיכואנליטיקאי מנחה ומורה במכון הפסיכואנליטי הישראלי;
בעלים במשותף של מכון "טריאסט שריג" לפסיכותרפיה; מרצה באוניברסיטת תל־אביב;
חבר הנהלת התכנית הבינלאומית להכשרת יועצים ארגוניים בגישה פסיכואנליטית
מערכתית (P.O.C.D.); חבר ב"אפק" – האגודה לחקר תהליכים חברתיים ומערכתיים
גלויים וסמויים.

רח' מבצע קדש 23א'
תל־אביב 69983
joseft@inter.net.il

CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----|
| MORAL ACTION BY WAY OF FREE WILL FROM A PSYCHOANALYTIC VIEWPOINT: A LACANIAN READING OF FREUD AND KANT Efrat Even-Tzur | 1 |
| “IDENTIFICATION” AND “CANNIBALISM” IN FREUD’S THOUGHT: CONCEPTS THAT ILLUSTRATE DELEUZE’S AND GUATTARI’S NOTION OF RHIZOMATIC THINKING Dudi (Yehudah) Alon | 17 |
| “WHO IS COMING AFTER ME?” TWO MODES OF SIBLING TRANSFERENCE IN PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY Rivah Altman | 43 |
| DREAMING IN ALEXANDRIA: A PSYCHOANALYTICAL STUDY OF LAWRENCE DURRELL’S <i>THE ALEXANDRIA QUARTET</i> Rony Alfandary | 69 |
| ‘WETTING’ IN A SEA OF TEARS: THE JOURNEY FROM SYMPTOM TO THE OTHER Ruth Gat-Dubrov | 99 |
| THE RAPE COMPLEX AND THE FEMININE OEDIPUS COMPLEX Ditza Hananel | 121 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| SEXUALITY AND ITS UNIQUE ROLE IN CONSTITUTING THE PSYCHOANALYTIC SUBJECT IN TERMS OF BODY-EGO AND OBJECT-EGO | |
| Joseph Triest | 137 |
| THE PRE-TRAUMATIC ZIONIST DREAM: A FREUDIAN STUDY OF BIBLICAL ETYMOLOGICAL INTERPERTATIONS OF THE NAME ‘ZION’ | |
| Refael Yonatan Leus | 177 |
| FROM THE “TOTEMIC FEAST” TO THE “PEACHES OF ETERNITY:” FOOD SYMBOLISM FROM THE KITCHEN OF THE SOUL FROM A JUNGIAN PERSPECTIVE | |
| Ruth Netzer | 193 |
| THE LINES PLAY THEMSELVES: READING ‘THE THREE-LEGGED CHICKEN’ BY Y. KENAZ IN THE LIGHT OF DELEUZE’S AND GUATTARI’S CONCEPT OF ‘BECOMING’ | |
| Shani Samai | 221 |
| REGARDING THE NAME-OF-THE-FATHER, THE DISCOURSE OF DESIRE, AND DEBT: A LACANIAN INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLICAL STORY OF MIRIAM THE PROPHETESS | |
| Inbal Raz Brakin | 253 |
| A TWISTED MOTHER-SON COALITION LEADING TO PERVERSE NARCISSISTIC SELF-CONFIGURATION | |
| Michael Shoshani and Batya Shoshani | 281 |

**MORAL ACTION BY WAY OF FREE WILL
FROM A PSYCHOANALYTIC VIEWPOINT:
A LACANIAN READING OF FREUD AND KANT**

EFRAT EVEN-TZUR

This paper offers a discussion of moral theory from a psychoanalytic perspective, and aims to offer a psychoanalytic account of the possibility of predicating and performing moral action on free will rather than on compliance. The psychoanalytic reading I have in mind employs Lacanian concepts, particularly those worked out in Lacan's famous seventh seminar, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*.

The paper begins with an examination of Freud's ideas on morality, and I claim that an orthodox reading of his writings on the topic might lead one to construe moral acts as mere submission to the tyranny of an inner authority, the superego. According to Freud, a main role of the superego is to serve as moral conscience; pangs of conscience, in Freud's view, express guilt aroused by the strict demands of the superego, self-punishment, and even "moral masochism." However, if mere compliance is what one finds at the heart of the moral act, this might actually reinforce the view that for psychoanalysis free will is irrelevant to ethics.

In order to deal with this question more deeply, I turn to a reading of Lacan, whose understanding of Freud's writings offers an alternative approach to the preceding dilemma in the relationship between psychoanalysis, free will, and ethics. Following Freud strictly at first, Lacan points to similarities between the moral(istic) position and the perverse position. Lacan was able to perceive a potential line from Kant to Sade, whereby the cold or formal ethics championed by Kant could be perceived as leading to the perverse violence and cruelty of the Holocaust, formulated and executed with all manner of seemingly rational formalism. Specifically, Lacan proposes a re-reading of Kantian ethics, in which he highlights what he views as structural parallels between Kant and the approach of the Marquis de Sade. For Kant, ethics is based on a universal imperative, a Moral Law that is in the final analysis self-authorized, yet Kant misses, according to Lacan, the way that Moral Law stems precisely from internalization of parental prohibitions, from a sadistic inner authority – the superego – that the individual obeys slavishly. For Lacan, both Kant's ethics and the perverse ethics of Sade conceal a common fantasy of a rule-setting tyrant whose rules can and must be fully known by the subject—even if Kant calls us to *obey* these rules whereas

Sade insists upon systematic *transgression*. Due to this dual or mirror possibility, argues Lacan, there does exist a danger that the moral imperative could serve to disavow ethical responsibility, as one can appeal to rules as an excuse, something to hide behind—instead of leaning upon one’s own judgment.

This odd sort of morality—morality as a perverse position—is only one possibility that Lacan warns against. In the last part of the paper, I turn to Lacan’s alternative view on ethics that gradually comes together following an entirely different reading of Kant. Developing other aspects of Freud’s ideas, especially Freud’s thoughts about the death drive and the pleasure principle, Lacan offers new concepts through which we can conceive of an ethical position that does not function as compliance with inner tyranny, but instead follows the law of desire—an “ethics of the Real.” Using the Lacanian concepts of alienation and separation, the paper describes two ethical positions that relate to different possible reactions in the face of anxiety (*Angst*), which according to Lacan is always, at bottom, associated with the demands of the Other. On the one hand, as described above, we might witness a perverse attempt to hold on to an all-encompassing knowledge regarding the moral imperative, related to the conception of “the Other as language.” On the other hand, we often witness an attempt to take responsibility for one’s acts and to make do *without* an imagined Other alleged to possess full and exhaustive knowledge of what is the proper moral act, a risky state of affairs; in Lacan’s words, moral action with “no Other of the Other.” Lacan’s reading of *Antigone* demonstrates the gap between these two ethical positions.

The paper illustrates how a discussion of a moral act by way of free will in Lacanian terms does not, in fact, reduce the notion of freedom to some kind of “abandonment to *jouissance*,” or a similar psychotic process that would entail a total foreclosure of societal conventions. Rather, Lacan seeks an ethics that is removed from pathological motives, among which, more often than not, are superego-type moralism and self-nullification. The process of formulating and executing free ethical choice is depicted, instead, as involving a personal process of acknowledging the tension between demand and desire, and traversing the fantasy, and as occurring in the space between the singular and the public, with the potential of giving rise to an act of sublimation—and finding new meanings within the Symbolic order.

**”IDENTIFICATION” AND “CANNIBALISM”
IN FREUD’S THOUGHT:
CONCEPTS THAT ILLUSTRATE DELEUZE’S AND GUATTARI’S
NOTION OF RHIZOMATIC THINKING**

DUDI (YEHUDAH) ALON

In this paper I will examine two concepts used extensively by Freud, in many different places and at different points of his career. The purpose of this examination is an attempt to define Freud’s conceptual development in light of the development of these two terms.

The first of these two concepts—cannibalism—is used in three different ways in three disparate contexts: It is used to describe a formational act in human history, to denote a primary developmental stage in childhood, and as a metaphor for the second concept. Freud’s second concept—identification—serves at once as a descriptor of an emotional process and as the result of one, and these two meanings are attached to a plethora of additional meanings. These two major concepts most commonly appear independently of each other, but at times they appear in conjunction—such as when they are linked either as cause and effect or when Freud uses one to serve as a metaphor for the other.

These two concepts provide an excellent opportunity to examine Freud’s larger modes of conceptual development for several reasons. Both concepts appear and reappear in Freud’s work throughout the years. ‘Identification’ first appeared as a concept in a letter Freud penned to Fliess in 1897, becoming increasingly central in his work over time. The concept of ‘cannibalism’ first appeared in 1905, and Freud continued to employ both concepts from their first appearances until his very final works. In addition, the two concepts maintain reciprocal relations with each other. The nature of their reciprocal interaction changed and took on different characteristics at various points in Freud’s career. Thus, not only is the development of each concept individually illuminating of the development of Freud’s thought, but so is the changing nature of the relationship between the two. Another reason to focus on these two concepts is the difference one can identify between the ways each developed, a phenomenon that becomes most striking as I review the various appearances of the two concepts over the years.

The driving force behind this novel approach to the structural aspects of Freud’s conceptual development, whether arborescent or rhizomatic (explained below),

is the fact that the more one is exposed to Freud's writings, the more persistently one finds oneself questioning the nature of his conceptual consistency—for he is neither absolutely consistent and certainly not unthinkingly inconsistent. Philosophers and theoreticians who are fortunate enough to work over the course of many years continuously develop and refine their theories, at times to the point of discarding earlier theories in favor of later ones. However, they are usually aware of this phenomenon and explain such shifts, thereby rendering their readers aware of the rationale of such changes. In parallel, subsequent researchers or exegetes of such theorists will divide their analyses into discrete periods of production, each characterized by a distinct theoretical basis that is believed to have guided the original writer's theories.

This is not the case with Freud. Freud's psychological doctrine collected additional meanings and facets without ever abandoning previous theoretical developments. Freud's reader cannot stick with the last model or explanation in any particular field, since Freud will, on occasion, return to an earlier mode of interpretation, or appeal to an original theoretical position long thought eclipsed, leaving the reader unsure as to whether the original, the new, or some combined version of theory truly reflects Freud's final view on a given matter. However, by treating Freud's concepts as rhizomatic, it becomes possible and reasonable to illuminate concepts that have collected additional or hybrid meanings in a different light. The entirety of Freud's work, viewed through this lens, becomes more complete and consistent than it might have appeared to be at first glance, and most certainly than it has been perceived in conservative analytical analysis.

Returning to the specific two concepts that occupy this paper, careful tracking of the concept of *cannibalism* shows that Freud used it in three different ways throughout the decades he engaged in psychoanalysis. At its inception, the concept was the central idea in Freud's social theory, as laid out in numerous works spanning the period of 1913 to 1939. The concept also described a specific aspect phase of child development, whereas the third usage of 'cannibalism,' also spanning many years of writing, was as a metaphor for a wider and deeper concept, to be called *identification*. Yet despite this triple set of uses by Freud himself, later psychoanalysts more narrowly applied the concept solely to its meaning as a developmental stage.

The development of the meanings of *identification* as a concept is even more complex and can be divided into three stages. Until 1915 the term appears in Freud's writings dozens of times, used very broadly and including several characteristics:

1. Subjects usually identify with a beloved person, although it is also possible to identify with a dominant figure or even a symbol.

2. Identification is expressed through unconscious mimicking of attributes and behaviors of the object of identification, whether these are physical actions, even to the extent of adopting movement handicaps, or linguistic characteristics and behavioral patterns.
3. Identification means assimilating the object of identification into the ego—i.e., the subjugation of a part of the ego so that it might become a different ‘ego’ element within the wider ego. In the case of paranoia the ego can split into a number of such parts as the result of a multiplicity of identifications.
4. Identification is a source of emotional disturbances, but it also takes place regularly in the course of natural daily life, beginning with the earliest stages of childhood development.

In the years 1915-1921, the term appears both in its old meanings as well as in more mature form, as Freud’s model of the psyche became more complex. This was due especially to the newer ideas Freud had regarding the relation between melancholy and narcissism, adding to the importance of identification as a process, and as a product of the ego ideal. From 1921 onward, identification had become an instrumental part of the development of social ties, yet also played a central role in the very inception of ego development. By now, identification was no longer exclusively linked to psychopathological situations, but rather to wider, more natural contexts.

Hence one is not surprised to find that Freudian researchers who have studied the notion of identification in depth are unsparing in their criticism on the question of consistency. Meissner claimed that Freud’s notion of identification touches on almost all aspects of psychoanalysis, and he was able to list 5 types of identification in the areas of dreams, hysteria, primary object attachment, narcissism, and of identification based on the perception of a common quality. Despite this ubiquity, Meissner claimed that the term itself was “one of the most poorly defined and inadequately understood concepts in the analytic armamentarium.” Compton perceived somewhat more consistency in Freud’s use of the term, but also pointed to lack of clarity in its definition. More recently, MacMillan claimed that there was widespread agreement amongst psychoanalysts that the core of the notion of identification was a simple one, and that the concept was a central intersection in psychoanalytic thinking, even though it is hard to find agreement regarding “the definition of identification or additional concepts related to it.”

My central claim is that Freud’s thought, as viewed through the lens of the development of these two concepts, develops in *rhizomatic* fashion. The *rhizome* notion is a philosophical concept developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in order to create new tools for philosophical thought, developing gradually in the late 1970’s and being formally described in detail in their joint work, *A*

Thousand Plateaus (1980). ‘Rhizome’ is originally a botanical term, signifying a plant stem which connects the stalk of certain non-bulbous flowers to the ground in a horizontal, rather than vertical, fashion. Rhizome-type vegetation send out additional roots and shoots in order to create a *network* lacking any specific center. This term is used to differentiate this model of growth from the arborescent or ‘tree’ model, characterized by the vertical relationship between the trunk and the branches that derive from this root. Most analytical, rational, logical thought structures view reality from the top down, using generalizations and all-encompassing perspectives, whereas rhizomatic thought posits a novel metaphor according to which the different levels of thought are always interconnected.

Metaphorically speaking, a complexly-structured or ‘arborescent’ (as in the roots of a tree) model operates in a vertical pattern, with a center, a stable base, from which the ‘trunk’ of the theory derives, branching off in different directions in accordance with its theoretical development in various fields. The thinker developing a theory according to this model will use consistent definitions of his foundational concepts and develop them in different directions. *Rhizomatic* thought, on the other hand, has no single stable base; it is structured from the initial moment as a network rather than a linear ‘tree’ of thought, thus developing horizontally rather than vertically. The same concept may have different aspects and emphases at different intersectional points in the network. A rhizomatically-conceived concept will have a number of interconnected anchors of meaning, and its pattern of spread will be similar to the spreading of grass, sprouting in several locations and from each onward, in harmony with, and not simply “on top of,” previous loci of development.

By treating these significant Freudian concepts as rhizomatic terms—i.e., as surface ones rather than ‘deep’ ones, as concepts which receive fluid content and definition according to the context in which they appear, while maintaining their general outlines—we resolve much of the confusion that could be attributed to all previous attempts to identify and arrange meanings for these terms according to a deep, sophisticated and clearly delineated arborescent structure. Thus, in the case of ‘cannibalism’ we would now say that the connecting thread between the various aspects Freud portrayed over the years represented the unfolding of a circular network of meanings. Similarly, in the case of ‘identification’ as a concept with a rhizomatic structure, we might say that a theory of *being* was unfolding horizontally, branching out, along and within, literally and figuratively, into every pertinent aspect of the development of the mind that Freud could imagine, with the idea of ‘being’ sometimes appearing as ‘becoming like’ and, at times, as the result of ‘being like.’

The approach revealed in this analysis of Freud's work is one of "a careful mapping out of concepts over the surface" of exploration, including the expansion of places only lightly traced out earlier on, the maintaining of maximum flexibility, and a professional willingness to re-examine terms and concepts again and again in light of the facts and context of each case, discarding dogmatic and strict adherence to prior definitions. I make plain that I do not attribute rhizomatic thought to Freud himself, and I most certainly do not claim that he anticipated the rhizomatic schema. My claim is that the process by which Freud developed the two concepts I have selected, including what seem to be the glaring and irreconcilable inconsistencies in the way these ideas co-exist, tend to become resolved when viewed as rhizomatic in nature. The rhizomatic nature of these terms, as I portray them, would mean that, after Freud created them, their meanings continued to move over space, rather than being simply "replaced," gathering new and variant meanings, reconnecting to previous meanings even as they opened up into new fields of exploration. At the same time, the graphic image that this description tends to conjure up ought not to be taken too concretely. A certain vagueness of definition and the lack of clear boundaries and margins is an inextricable part of the rhizomatic schema. Cannibalism and identification, rhizomatically-conceived, appear to be a collection of different perspectives, each chosen at a particular time and in a particular context, coexisting harmoniously and enriching one another.

Finally, it is possible to apply the rhizomatic structure to other concepts. For example, the concept of object-choice, as Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) are at pains to explain, can be attributed, at different times in Freud's work, to a description of a specific identification taken in by an individual, to a particular kind of gender orientation, and to a larger existential mode (anaclitic or narcissistic). More justice can be done for this multifaceted concept, however, if it is approached as having a rhizomatic structure.

**“WHO IS COMING AFTER ME?”
TWO MODES OF SIBLING TRANSFERENCE IN
PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY**

RIVA ALTMAN

This paper explores the role of sibling relationships as portrayed in various psychoanalytic theories and focuses upon complex kinds of sibling transference relationships that are woven between patients and psychotherapists during psychoanalytically-oriented psychotherapy.

Classic psychoanalytic theories, since Freud and well into the early 1980s, enhanced the importance of the directly vertical relationship, namely, the one between parents and their children, as the most significant and fundamental relationship in the mental developmental process. Dwarfed by this emphasis upon the vertical relationship, the horizontal relationships between and among siblings has been all but invisible in the literature. This range of relationships was fundamental in some of the classical case studies, such as Freud’s extensive reports on “The Wolfman” and “Dora,” in Winnicott’s report on “Piggle,” and several others since. References to siblings’ role in mental development started appearing gradually in the psychoanalytic literature after the 1980s. This inclination gained momentum with the publication of Juliet Mitchell’s book (2003), a widely-influential study that became a major milestone as the first attempt to introduce the sibling aspect as a fundamental element in mental structure and development. Yet, despite the increase in writings about sibling influences on mental development, very few psychoanalytic papers actually described or theorized about the unique transference aspects of the sibling relationship within analytic sessions.

In this paper I theorize two kinds of sibling transference relationships, based on Mitchell’s proposed axes or divisions.

The first I view as a *vertical sibling transference* – transference in which the prominent components of the treatment relationship are vertical, however, the transference dynamics are focused upon themes bearing upon the relations among siblings. In this kind of transference the patient tends to be preoccupied with his or her place in the therapist’s life. The patient expresses to the therapist the need to feel unique, visible, distinguished, favored and appreciated, in comparison to the therapist’s other patients, siblings, friends, or children. While in the presence of the therapist, the patients may demonstrate different approaches to these

‘siblings.’ They may compare themselves to these ‘siblings,’ compete with them, and express jealousy, hostility, and also guilty feelings towards them. Ultimately, these ‘siblings’ are seen as threatening the patient’s place in the therapist’s life.

One should note that this rivalry is different than oedipal jealousy. The pain of this kind of emotion is not so much due to the displacement of oedipal rivalry with the father or a response to castration anxiety, but seems to be an entirely separate phenomenon, dependant on the patient’s experience of his or her parents’ responses to his or her real or imagined sibling rivalry.

The second mode I have discerned I refer to as the *horizontal sibling transference*. In this kind of transference patients project upon the therapist patterns of relationships, needs, and wishes that are based on considerations of equity, or maintaining equal status, as opposed to considerations of hierarchy or maternal/paternal dependence. The relationship woven, and reconstructed, between patients and therapists caught in this kind of transference modality would seem to originate in the patients’ horizontal relationship within the particular context of their attachment patterns and their family dynamics. When a horizontal transference comes to the fore, patients treat the therapist as a sibling, not as a parental figure. Relationships reconstructed within this kind of transference tend to deal with the wide range of dimensions that characterize sibling relationships: jealousy of the therapist, rivalry, hate, blaming, and competitiveness, as well as other aspects such as caring, friendship, solidarity, loyalty, compatibility, and identification. In the case of this second mode of transference as well, the main dynamic is not an oedipal sort of rivalry, but tends to revolve around emotions related to sibling relationships, as relationships formed on the horizontal axis.

In the last section of the paper, the author presents a psychodynamic course of treatment she followed with an adolescent patient, interweaving an emphasis on what she believes to be the uniquely sibling transference phenomena within the clinical process. ‘Uri’ was 12 years-old when he started treatment. He is the oldest sibling in his family and had a tough relationship filled with anger and jealousy toward his younger brother, two years his junior. In the first few months of therapy, Uri tended to play a symbolic game in the sandbox which pointedly left the therapist out of the game to watch him. The contents of the games dealt with battles and wars among the character figures he played with. About six months from the beginning of therapy, Uri came for one of his sessions and discovered that the sand in the sandbox was wet. This discovery disturbed him very much. On the sensory level, the feel of the wet sand disgusted him and he became preoccupied with a need to clean up and get rid of the sand that stuck to his hands. On the emotional level, the incident of the wet sand symbolized the

intrusion of someone else into his private play space, someone unwanted who intruded into his therapy as well as an unidentified ‘presence’ that spoils, dirties and steals.

This incident aroused a powerful transference reaction, bringing to the fore a significant proportion of the conflict-bound feelings Uri had struggled with and tried to repress following the birth of his brother. At this stage of the therapy, the incident of the ‘wet sand’ shattered (diluted?) his pleasant illusion of being the sole user of the sandbox and of being the therapist’s only patient. The intrusion of the ‘other’ into his therapeutic space evoked Uri’s anger, made him question his place, importance, and value for his therapist, and also aroused fantasies about other patients with whom he was sharing the therapist.

Once this anger had gotten expressed, the manner in which Uri played in the room changed as well. He no longer played his symbolic games in the sandbox and started to play competitive games with the therapist through which he marked her as his rival and competitor. In his competition with the therapist, different aspects of rivalry were noticeable. At some point, a shift occurred when the therapist was no longer experienced as an enemy whom Uri needed to destroy. At this stage, the therapist became a “worthy rival” with whom competition could generate creative challenges and achievements, enabling Uri to improve his developmental skills, enjoy competition, and feel proud of his achievements together with another subject.

I believe that my being able to understand the two different sibling transferences in therapy enabled Uri to process the complex feelings that had been sequestered inside of him since the birth of his brother – feelings of theft, invasion, being dethroned, jealousy and rivalry. During therapy, Uri managed to regain the feeling of his being unique and worthy of love in his own right, and not because of his value *relative to* being the only, or the first or elder sibling.

**DREAMING IN ALEXANDRIA:
A PSYCHOANALYTICAL STUDY OF
LAWRENCE DURRELL'S *THE ALEXANDRIA QUARTET***

RONY ALFANDARY

This interdisciplinary essay studies Lawrence Durrell's (1912-1990) classic *The Alexandria Quartet* (1958-1960), specifically demonstrating the ways in which Durrell was inspired by Freudian notions of the dream and dream-work, and used these ideas, as he understood them, in this literary work and others.

Lawrence Durrell was an avid reader of Freud and his fictional work is virtually saturated with explicit and implicit references to Freudian ideas. In this tetralogy, Durrell used the concept of the dream as a topographical construct to demonstrate his claim that the human psyche is governed by transcendental forces. Durrell uses various narrative techniques to echo his claim of the multilayered voice of the author-protagonist, thus introducing and reverberating some rather complex notions regarding the cohesiveness of the human self and its questionable authority.

The Alexandria Quartet was Durrell's claim to fame. When published in the early 1960s, it brought him worldwide critical and financial acclaim, including a nomination for the Nobel Prize in Literature. The success of the tetralogy soon required translations into numerous languages (sadly, only the first two volumes have been translated to Hebrew thus far). Despite its declining popularity, *The Alexandria Quartet* is still a shining example of the way Freudian thought informed and inspired creative writing during mid-20th century, above and beyond the work's more general commitment to the earlier traditions, and more general psychological perspectives, of the *Bildungsroman*.

The inception of *The Alexandria Quartet* was more than "just" an act of sitting down to tell a complex, multi-layered story. Having suffered traumatic separation from his own family and homeland at the age of 12 years-old, Durrell establishes the field of writing as the place where he can find, create, and recreate a sense of belonging absent from his personal life. In this sense, *The Quartet* is Durrell's attempt to reestablish himself as an autonomous and discreet subject, while at the same time trying to acknowledge that being a subject implies the process of being related to, and even controlled by, forces beyond his conscious grasp. Thus, dreams and dream-work seemed to be the perfect media for the

author to try and exercise his attempt to come to terms with a sense of existential bewilderment and estrangement that had been a driving force in his life. Through the act of writing, Durrell, and perhaps the literary artist in general, attempts to transform his personal injury into art.

I try to depict how Durrell uses different readings of the same textual circumstances in order to show that the notion of Truth is deeply reliant upon the perspective from which it is viewed and told. The structure of the novel is based upon the idea—indeed, it textually-graphically *presents* the idea—that Truth is a construct based upon unconscious notions.

In addition to demonstrating the way concepts of dream and dream-work construct the novel, this study also shows how Durrell uses particular dreams to bring forth the prominent themes of the novel. In the analysis of two major dreams, I am able to show the way in which certain ideas about sexuality play a major role in the formation of the novel. But Durrell is not content to adopt the Freudian notion of the centrality of sexuality in explaining human motivation. Based upon his own experience as an employee of the British Foreign Office during the Forties and Fifties, Durrell constructs a narrative that uses historical ('real') political events in Egypt and Palestine during that period, in order to portray the individual as a pawn in a game whose rules seem to be arbitrary.

The interpretation of the two dreams illustrates the intricate relation between the form and the content of the dreams, but also addresses the issue of the 'true' or deepest level of authorship of the work. Both dreams serve to communicate to the reader a complex set of motivational forces that the 'author figure' is himself supposedly unaware of. Thus, through the dreams in *The Quartet*, Durrell offers an important response to the question "Who is the author of a text?" Which of the many author-figures appearing in the work is truly "responsible" for the text and its veracity? Can anyone make such a claim? Durrell states his position quite subtly. Due to his own ambivalence towards Freud, which in turn can be interpreted as ambivalence towards his own father, Durrell veers away from simplistic and reductive conclusions. In the end, the question of the authorship, as well as the question of the status or identity of Truth, remain unresolved on purpose. It is up to the reader to make up his or her own mind as to what might have been the "real" story underlying the labyrinthine plots and sub-plots that Durrell describes in his beautiful if biased view of pre-World War II Alexandria.

Beyond the question of Truth, *The Alexandria Quartet*, through the abundance of references to the workings of the unconscious—be it through actual dreams or through rich, dream-like metaphoric prose—deals with the protagonist's quest for meaning in a world which seems to be traumatized both by political upheavals as well as individual human suffering. The dream-work that is offered through

the tetralogy repeatedly points towards a remedy—words, language, writing. Language wields the power to injure but also to heal. The function of writing, Durrell claims, is to transform personal pain into art. The particular pain that Durrell sought to relieve through the transformative force of sublimative writing can be described as relating to his severed sense of belonging. Owing to not being a citizen of any particular nation, as was the case for Durrell himself, his protagonist-hero finds that he must become a citizen of his own consciousness. Through his existential efforts to make sense of himself, and his world, he is an example of modern man. No longer able to put his trust in the Old World security, shattered by two World Wars, he turns inwards, seeking to define himself through the new concepts that Freudian thought had provided. Psychoanalysis would seem to have helped Durrell in his courageous and painful attempt to chart these new fields in the hope of locating potential new terrain or geography wherein one might dwell, with ambivalence and doubt, recognition and estrangement, marking every step, balancing the sense of real and dream until some medium, temporary or longer-term, can be achieved.

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**‘WETTING’ IN A SEA OF TEARS:
THE JOURNEY FROM SYMPTOM TO THE OTHER**

RUTH GAT-DUBROV

In the developmental course of psychoanalytic thought, physical and mental symptoms have been understood and conceptualized in different ways. This paper is an attempt to add a novel perspective to the existing set of knowledge and concepts regarding the *symptom*, one that views the symptom as responding in a specific kind of way to thwarted needs of the Self and also providing a temporary response to them.

The view of the symptom derived from the perspective I utilize portrays it as a substitute, a partial and temporary replacement for a primary human environment that failed to respond adequately to the subject’s needs. The symptom, in turn, is viewed as clutching the subject in a state that we might refer to as “being held for the time being” until an empathic human Other appears who can take the place of the symptom.

The symptom is viewed as preserving the cohesiveness of the Self, maintaining its vitality, protecting it from disintegration. In this context, the therapeutic process is depicted as a journey that begins with the symptom as the patient’s main companion. Later on, slowly and gradually, an emotional capacity to forego the symptom and release it develops. This capacity grows due to the presence of an attuned and responding selfobject who provides the patient’s Self its adequate and vital needs. Consequently, the subject’s psychological ability to let himself be held and contained by a human selfobject improves and expands. The paper deals with the vital psychic necessity of the symptom, both as a preserver of Self cohesiveness as well as dynamic mode for keeping alive the patient’s hidden yearnings and hopes for the presence of an adequate human selfobject that will be attuned to the subject’s self needs and help provide for them.

This process is illustrated with a clinical case study, the treatment of a 9 year-old girl suffering from long-standing and persistent enuresis (hence the term “wetting” in the title). The study details the symptom-dissolving psychic processes that both liberated the patient and, in the sense I am propounding, helped to move the symptom from a pathological form of mutual holding and clutching on to each other, pulling her out of her unhealthy immersion in the waters of her own emotions. The various functions that the symptom originally provided for the patient and her parents are described, emphasizing the archaic merger needs that had for a long time been expressed through the constant wet

environment that surrounded her. During the therapeutic process, those primary and archaic merger needs unfolded through the selfobject transference. The continuous and consistent provision of an adequate and attuned response to the patient's self needs, contributed to the gradual building of a cohesive, coherent Self in its structured state as well as in its transformed state.

The study also offers an observation of the ways in which the symptom temporarily supplies the selfobject's primary and vital functions and provisions to the Self (merging, idealizing, mirroring, twinship needs).

In the context of the selfobject's presence, the concepts of transformation and *transforming* are carefully discussed, comparing and contrasting the varied contributions to this topic by Christopher Bollas, Heinz Kohut, and Israeli psychoanalyst Raanan Kulka. In the last clinical vignette, we see an example of the transformative shift in the patient's self which is demonstrated when she herself finally becomes a generous giving selfobject. In this vignette, the patient, instead of exhibiting her usual grandiose, whining attitude towards me, suddenly took one small disc from her own disc-tower and silently gave it to me. I conceived of this gesture as an expression of the transformative change that occurred within her psyche: the transformation of archaic narcissism to empathy (one of the five transformations of narcissism that Kohut singled out), and transcending the grip of the personal self into a non-dual state of awareness, a "super-position" of participation in the world, in Kulka's description.

The paper also deals with the way in which the patient's parents' unprocessed and dissociated internal fragments permeated their daughter's psyche. I try to show how the unconscious communications in the shared familial space created and preserved the symptom that in turn became crucial for the maintenance and survival of both the parents' and their symptomatic child's psyche.

In addition, the paper refers to the way in which parallel to the work done with the child, an empathic bond was established with the parents' psyche that helped to expand their psychic capabilities and their ability to feel empathy toward their child's suffering and distress.

Contextuality is an important subject in the paper. I try to show how the symptom and the symptomatic patient can be viewed and conceived differently as my new perspective is held up against the clinical description. Thus, a disturbing and distressing symptom can also be thought of as reflecting deep and primary yearnings, longings and needs, creatively expressed.

**THE RAPE COMPLEX
AND THE FEMININE OEDIPUS COMPLEX**

DITZA HANANEL

The paper discusses the potential contribution of the “rape complex” concept to a theory of the feminine Oedipus complex. The concept was first introduced in the early days of psychoanalysis by Karen Horney and Ernest Jones who assumed that femininity is innate and described a specific kind of female penetration anxiety, a *rape anxiety*, experienced by the oedipal daughter in parallel with her unconscious incestuous wish toward the father. Horney and Jones suggested that rape anxiety is symmetrical to castration anxiety and, deep down, is an anxiety about the loss of sexual desire and the break-down of the sexual self (which Jones referred to as *aphanasis*). The main criticism of these theories is that they presume femininity is innate quite at variance with Freud himself who continued to ponder how the sense of femininity is *created*.

In contemporary times, Jessica Benjamin and Jane Gallop each developed her own ideas about the nature of the feminine Oedipus complex, and there is similarity between their theories. They do not accept that femininity is innate; they both suggest that femininity is created when the daughter turns her desire to the father who must forbid her desire. The prohibition is perceived as a seduction to give up desire altogether. The daughter, who wishes to be her father’s desire, renounces her own desire. Since a vital subject is always a subject of desire, the daughter loses her subjectivity and the relation between the sexes collapses into a ‘mere’ subject-object relationship. Since both of these theorists suggest that the daughter reacts to the father’s prohibition of desire with a desire to lose desire, they did not compare desire to castration anxiety. Although they do not use the concept of rape anxiety as such, they both mention that what they describe as a psychological *process* is similar in its mental effect to rape, and can even lead in extreme cases to actual rape.

My intent is to suggest an integration between these two contradictory meanings of the rape complex, between some kind of innate rape anxiety and the “rape like” desire to lose desire. I begin with Freud and certain discrepancies in his theory. Freud said that it is the perception of the anatomical difference between the sexes which convinces the little boy about the seriousness of the father’s threat, thereby inaugurating the castration complex. In contrast, the little

girl's simple perception of the penis is supposed to explain her envy. I suggest that for the girl, too, it is the perception of the anatomical difference between the sexes that gives meaning to the father's prohibition on her desire. When the girl discovers the anatomical difference between the sexes, she also essentially discovers that she is similar to her mother. Indeed, it is the daughter's perception of her mother that helps to determine her interpretation of the father's prohibition and her reaction to it.

The mother will be perceived in one of two possible ways: the mother either is or is not a subject of desire. The girl, who identifies with the mother, will respond to the father's prohibition of her desire with healthy anxiety if the mother is also subject of desire. She will then, in time, identify with the mother and will refuse the seduction out of fear of losing her overall sense of desire and ultimately her subjectivity. She will prefer to be a subject of desire and not her father's object of desire. On the other hand, if the mother is herself not a subject of desire, the daughter will identify with the mother's *lack of desire*, and will respond with a desire to lose her own capacity *to desire* and, as a life-preserving substitute, opt to remain her father's desire.

Rape anxiety can be thus explained without assuming that femininity is innate. In this case, there is a kind of symmetry between the rape complex and the castration complex. Both the boy and the girl choose to give up a forbidden love object as opposed to the much more dangerous threat of losing their desire and their subjectivity altogether.

A clinical example is presented followed by a discussion of Thomas Ogden's article on the transitional Oedipal relationship in female development. Ogden suggests that the transitional relationship to the mother, made possible by the mother's own good-enough memory of her transitional Oedipal drives and resolutions, mediates the little girl's entry into Oedipal object love. The mother is a libidinal transitional object for the daughter, while the father as a libidinal object is discovered *within* the mother. Thus the father as father-in-mother is first experienced in the context of a two-person relationship. This stage prepares the girl for the discovery of the father as an external object, in more complex, three-person relationships. Ogden, we can say, describes the mother as a subject of desire, seeing this as a crucial condition for a healthy Oedipal process.

In his essay, Ogden describes a clinical example in which the patient discovers the father-in-mother in her female therapist. In the clinical example presented in my paper, the patient did not experience her mother as a subject of desire. As a result, she could not identify with the mother as subject of desire and thus she could not refuse the father's prohibition of her desire. In the transference, the

patient experienced me, her female therapist, as subject of desire. She saw in me the father-in-the-mother, as Ogden described. With this fantasy structure in place, the patient could experience her mother, and me in the transference, as vital and helpful, and this ultimately enabled her to meet the father's externality in a different way, refusing what she perceived as the father's seduction to lose her desire and hence her subjectivity.

The two clinical examples support the claim that the mother as a subject of desire is essential for the Oedipal process. Ogden describes the transitional object relation between mother and daughter which precedes the daughter's identification with the mother as a subject of desire, as my own thesis describes. My patient presumably went through each of these two phases.

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**SEXUALITY AND ITS UNIQUE ROLE
IN CONSTITUTING THE PSYCHOANALYTIC SUBJECT
IN TERMS OF BODY-EGO AND OBJECT-EGO**

JOSEPH TRIEST

This paper examines Freud's *notion of sexuality*, discussing its intricate interrelationship with the *notion of subject and object*, set against the background of the currently changing psychoanalytic conceptions of human being.

The main thesis I present builds upon the long-standing psychoanalytic view that sexuality serves as a vital layer in the establishment of subject and object representations. Specifically, the uniqueness of sexuality for the development of the mind lies in the way it anchors the subject in the body (the body-Ego), on the one hand, and presents it, propels it, toward the object (the object-Ego), on the other hand, creating a triad of 'sexuality/(body-Ego)Subject/Object.' This triad is irreducible, inseparable and unquantifiable; it can only be repeatedly synthesized.

Contemporary theory is very busy with the tension that exists between the opposite and complementary poles that constitute the subject, emphasizing the paradoxical role of the object in the formation of the subject and vice versa and the effects this has on all efforts to comprehend the process of the consolidation of the ego and the formation of a sense of self. Yet in much of this discussion, the role of sexuality has been ignored or understated. In order to fathom the cardinal role of sexuality in Freudian theory in bridging the gap between the opposite-and-complementary poles within the subject, the author discusses seven distinct though interrelated dialectics that are embedded in the definition of sexuality.

In this summary, I will simply list these: (1) The *Psyche-Soma Dialectic*; that is, the manner in which the subject is constituted in the body, and from within the body, and yet is not identical to it. (2) The *Subject-Object Dialectic*; or, the way in which the subject perceives the object as an external counterpart, while relying upon it to form its own selfhood, in a cyclical process of recognition-and-negation. (3) The *Internal-External Dialectic*; referring to the way that sexuality originally emerges from within, or internally, through biological-genetic processes, yet is shaped by the object's mediation. (4) The *Forward-Retroactive Dialectic*, or what I will refer to as the *Deferred Action Dialectic*; a complex dynamic that highlights the fact that sexuality is always rooted in its earliest archaic structures,

and in the pull that they exert, yet is constantly growing or ‘seeking’ outwardly and cannot be only reduced to its archaic structures (i.e., the psychoanalytic notion that full meaning is granted only in retrospect, through the mechanism of deferred action [‘Afterwardness’]). (5) The *Individual-Species Dialectic*; referring to the notion that sexuality serves both individual self-gratification and species survival, sometimes at the expense of the individual’s own well-being or survival. (6) The *Life-Death Dialectic*; the Freudian classic, that problematizes the fact that the realization of sexual desire, through discharge, brings about its very diminishment or ‘death,’ though its mission is ‘to create life.’ Finally, (7) The *Dialectic of Desire*, aimed inherently at the forbidden, unattainable object (the incestuous object), such that behavior or wishes fueled by this dialectic can only be fulfilled partially, and only through substitutes. These 7 dimensions or dialectics combine to give sexuality its singular status, distinguishing it from any other motivational impulsion.

This interpretation of the meaning of sexuality is grounded in a reading of the dialectic definitions of the first subject of analysis – the hysterical woman – presented, more than conceptualized, as one “whose identity is constituted by her unconscious sexuality.” We might say this phraseology ‘traps’ the subject in a theoretical ‘discontent’ since, though quite (at least initially) unconscious of herself, she must turn to the object as her mirror, while, as a subject, she cannot accept any external definition. She is therefore compelled to deny her dependence on the object’s external definition only to at once clamor for its acknowledgment, even that of her independence of it (the Hegelian master-slave paradox, as interpreted by Jessica Benjamin)—launching what quickly becomes an endless cycle. The cyclical motion that becomes established is akin to swinging an imaginary pendulum back and forth (‘Fort-da’), not necessarily repeating but shifting the center of gravity for libidinal cathexis back and forth between the subject and the object. This process of “recognition/negation” (Ogden, 1992) gradually establishes the mutual representations of the subject (self) and the object (other), driven by the force of sexuality.

As a rule, this pattern may be traced through three parallel perspectives: (a) developmental – the emergence of the infant’s consciousness from its relation to the mother in the ‘mother-infant’ dyad; (b) clinical – the way in which the patient’s self-consciousness develops within the analytic process; and (c) theoretical – the emergence of the concepts of subject and object in the meta-psychological reflection on clinical theory.

The paper’s main focus is on this third layer. In light of Hegel, the author suggests that the process of extracting the compressed meanings hidden in the

notion of sexuality also generates the ‘big bang’ which set psychoanalysis on its way as a multiple-model theory, each model positing the object in a different position *vis-a-vis* the subject. ‘Removing’ the object (represented in analytic space by the ‘anonymous,’ ‘neutral,’ ‘abstaining’ analyst, sitting outside the patient’s view, in line with the Freudian model); positing the object as a ‘counterpart’ (as an Archimedean leverage point for attaining separation-individuation in accordance with Heinz Hartmann’s and Margaret S. Mahler’s ego-psychology); ‘incorporation’ and internalization of the object (the subject as constituted by the introjected ‘shadow of the object,’ as in Melanie Klein’s theory); positing the object ‘in between’ (as in Winnicott’s dimension of potential space); ‘dissolving’ the boundaries between subject and object (as per Heinz Kohut’s selfobject); and finally, presenting the object as a ‘subject in itself’ (as championed by the Relational School)—all of these provide the more complex schematic map of psychoanalysis as we know it today.

Although these models are often presented in contrast to their predecessors, and despite inevitable splitting and regression, one must acknowledge that the representations of subject and object, as they are manifest in theoretical reflection, are gradually becoming more multi-dimensional, complex, and ‘whole.’ The conclusion of the paper reviews some of the different conceptions of sexuality in post-Freudian models, tracing their implications, enhancing and enriching as well as threatening to reduce and split our contemporary notions of the human being.

**THE PRE-TRAUMATIC ZIONIST DREAM:
A FREUDIAN STUDY OF BIBLICAL ETYMOLOGICAL
INTERPERTATIONS OF THE NAME 'ZION'**

REFAEL YONATAN LEUS

Psychoanalysis is a culture that is distinguished by its own language as well as by the great importance it assigns to words and their meaning. In his article “The antithetical meaning of the primal words” Freud (1910) clarified his view of linguistic investigation and defined it as a promising path for psychoanalytic research. The etymological method, the search for the true origin of a word, is quite congruent with the overarching principles that guide the analytic technique: a search for the truth by tracing the root of narrative phenomena. The biblical attitude towards names conveys the assumption that a proper name is not, and cannot be, arbitrary but rather is intrinsic. In the Bible, the name is viewed as a manifestation of the inner quality of a place or refers to something essential regarding the character it denotes. This belief is expressed in many attempts of the biblical author, and subsequent rabbinical commentaries, to explain a given name in reference to its derivations and semantic field. In this paper I present the idea that biblical Jerusalem is not simply the name of place, but rather is a concept, and as a concept it ought to be understood as a paradigmatic dream. I explore this idea by studying the derivation of the name ‘Zion’ (*Tziyon*, as pronounced in Hebrew) in the Bible.

Zion is one of Jerusalem’s most frequently used sobriquets in the Bible. The common etiology of Zion is *t’zi’yah* (ציה) which means *desert* or *dry land*. In the Bible the word Zion is commonly mentioned either together with or within the same context as the following terms: *Ha’ra’va*, (חרבה) *She’mam’ma* (שממה), *Hur’ban*, (חורבן) and *Evel* (אבל), which connote wilderness or wasteland, destruction, and mourning, respectively.

My understanding is that the word Zion comprises two layers of meanings, representing a certain quality of ambivalence towards Jerusalem in particular and towards the dream or fantasy it arouses in general. At the conscious level, or the level of the known, Jerusalem/Zion represents the hope for salvation from the limits of reality – a basic character of any dream or fantasy in the Freudian view. On the suppressed level, the word Zion carries a hidden wish for destruction and death – the impulsion that characterizes Thanatos. This suppressed wish is discovered by the semantic associations to destruction and dry land, demonstrating

via “free associations” the deeper and more complex intentions or conflicts of the biblical author.

In light of this insight, another crucial issue concerning the surprising emotional position towards Zion can be explained. In Jewish tradition, the main set of feelings attached to the memory of the destruction of Jerusalem is grief and an intense form of guilt that never fades. In reality, the Romans destroyed the city and its temple, but they did not succeed in destroying the Jews who continued to mourn for it ever since; therefore the root of this guilt cannot be explained in historical reality and should be found elsewhere. I would like to suggest that the tragic guilt in this case originates from inner psychic life, in the form of an unconscious death wish for Jerusalem. Because of the unique role of Zion in Jewish and even in larger Western culture as an exemplar of *the dream*, it is important that we continue to investigate the ambivalence latent within all such national dreams or fantasies, aided by contemporary theoretical perspectives.

It is well-known that the current climate in psychoanalytic thinking generally differs greatly from that of the original form of Freudian certitude; it embraces both the inherent role of paradox (as opposed to speaking in terms of sharply defined dichotomies or polarities) and the inability to know. As well, the attitude towards dreams has changed drastically both in the domain of the clinical use of dreams and their interpretation as well as in the theory of dream formation. Even the elementary definition of what constitutes a dream has undergone dramatic transformation. Freud saw the forbidden wish as the origin of every dream, and the nonsense-like night dreams were explained as a disguise for unconscious and repressed wishes. Freud used the term *fantasy* as a subcategory of this wider term. The analyst’s role in his view was to decipher the repressing censure code in order to discover the underlying truth, to know, and to awaken the sleeping dreamer to a more real life. Bion (1962) addressed dreams much differently and identified dreaming as a private experience rich with awareness and vigilance for subjective experience. Ogden (2010) further broadened our perspectives by underscoring the *dream mode* of thinking as the ability to look at experience from several angles at once, emphasizing the transition from attention to the symbolic content of the dream and its interpretation to the dream process. The ability to dream has been associated with vividness and the struggle to dream has been linked to dread about one’s own emotional death (2003).

The *dream of Zion*, too, should be examined with a deeper focus upon these new understandings about the process and experience of dreaming. Investigation of a post-biblical name interpretation of the word Zion enables a post-Freudian perspective that is congruent with some late developments in the psychoanalytic

body of knowledge. Zion can be read as *Tsiyun* (צִיּוֹן) which can be understood as ‘mark’ or ‘sign.’ The name Zion following this interpretation carries heavier weight than that of a specific political-national aspiration or dream or even a more deeply paradigmatic symbolic dream; it contains the full meaning of a sign and the process of signification. The sign or the signifier has no longer an independent existence, it indicates a signified that cannot fully come to be, or that had been lost already.

This interesting interpretation for the name Zion invites further reflection through the prism of Lacan’s theoretical language, in particular through his concept of *desire*, a term that bears close relation with the Freudian concept of wish. The desire is the heart of human existence and the main concern of psychoanalysis. It is essentially unconscious, something that cannot be fully expressed in speech because the unconscious is not knowable. It is what *remains* of the demand for unconditional love from the other after the satisfaction of the basic needs that can be satisfied. Thus, desire is eternal and is basically the passion for the other, for what is not in possession of the subject. It is not so much a reaction or response in relation to the presence of the object but to its absence. The desire of the analyst and the goals of analysis are described in Lacan’s terms as the *desire to wake up*. The analytical process is described as the subject learning to get to know his personal desire and naming it. The process of analysis can in some sense be understood as the process of endless derivation of new names for the subjective and personal Zion. It is thus not a little bit surprising to notice that Lacan used the term “celestial Jerusalem” as a symbol of all that stands in opposition to real corporeal life.

Without adopting a personal ideological stand regarding the historical link between psychoanalysis and Zionism, both as idealized solutions for individual neuroses or in terms of the deeper needs of the Jews to create something that might be viewed as uniquely their own, I draw attention to certain characteristics common to the biblical relation to the word or name Zion and the contemporary historical reality of the Zionist and psychoanalytic movements. The conflicting desires to sustain interest in, and a sense of “living in,” the inner world as well as the external world, the wish to be accepted by others versus the need to exist independently and retain some sense of exclusive doctrine or identity, gain very real expression in the dynamic foment that characterizes the divergent schools of thought of these two movements, as these two doctrines fulfill their original goals and continue to influence the course of human history.

**FROM THE “TOTEMIC FEAST” TO THE
“PEACHES OF ETERNITY:”
FOOD SYMBOLISM FROM THE KITCHEN OF THE SOUL
FROM A JUNGIAN PERSPECTIVE**

RUTH NETZER

Man projects the inchoate materials of the mind into the world, and in this manner a dialogue is created whereby objects in the world (perceived as being in the world) become symbolic of man's inner world. According to Freud's classical view, "symbol" only refers to a select set of specific, conflict-bound elements from the personal *individual* unconscious, while Jung expanded this notion to include a wide group of archetypal contents that originated during the dawn of mentation and continue to be transmitted through what he termed the Collective Unconscious.

Jung distinguishes between "symbol" and "sign." Signs that have a uniform meaning are not symbols. A sign stands for something known, as a word stands in for its referent. Symbols, in his view, are a more powerful kind of index which, in addition to transmitting meanings, always evokes energy and continuously struggles with the gap between the known and the unknowable, noumena and mystery (e.g., for Jung, "Christ," aside from being a sign for an historical individual, is a symbol for an archetype called *Self*). The symbol has multiple meanings in the Jungian approach. For a significant example, *food* appears as a symbolical motif in myth, legend, ritual, religious sacrament, dream, and language in general. Different cultures bestow different foods with national significance, and food items, sometimes individually or as a group, come to serve as collective symbols, helping to unite and establish the social Self.

The way in which the deep soul (or psyche, in classical terms) processes the materials of life, including internal and external realities, tend to be expressed as symbols of food, with a wide spectrum of symbolic and concrete properties (physical structures as well as the processes of preparation, digestion, and absorption) intertwined and presented together. The soul thus expresses itself in the symbolism of food: eating, drinking, tasting, gorging, nibbling, biting, swallowing, digesting, vomiting, spitting. The preparation of food expresses itself as crushing, cutting, melting, heating, consolidating, evaporating, mixing, cooking, baking. All these have, or acquire, the significance of mental processes.

These stages correspond, in large degree, to the alchemical symbolism that seeks to describe the stages undergone by physical matter as it is transformed from raw material to becoming a substance of quality, and as disparate elements gradually agglomerate into a new integrative unity. In the light of these ideas, the present essay refers allegorically to the “kitchen” of the soul, viewed as an unconscious ‘place’ or domain where the soul prepares and cooks its materials. By extension, we might also conceive of a kitchen that is common to the patient and the analytic psychotherapist; a kind of common transference-field of food-like psychological processes, where the intersubjective interpersonal meeting takes place. Taking this idea one step further: the role of the therapist-mother in the kitchen of the soul would be that of a primary maternal transformer-digester-processor object for the patient. Thus, the image (or sense) of cutting food, were this to appear in legend, myth or dream, could symbolize a stage of *sharply distinguished thought*, which is critical to the development of consciousness. Biting might be an expression of aggression; fallen teeth could symbolize mental emasculation, and vomiting and spitting would symbolize the expulsion of negative contents.

Food itself is a material that produces physiological, chemical, emotional and cognitive changes that contribute to the overall quality of the state of consciousness enabled or evoked by social rituals. The digestion of food almost always symbolizes, in proportion to the quality of digestion, the assimilation of new mental contents. In the primitive world, eating animal flesh, representative of the father-god (as Freud initially described in *Totem and Taboo*), makes it psychologically possible (i.e., conceivable) to overcome the seductive/overwhelming power of the father, as well as to assimilate this power. Many myths describe the danger of being swallowed by a large animal—alluding to the idea (or dread) of being swallowed by the primal unconscious, whereas the journey of the archetypal Hero (for Jung, a symbol for the Ego) always necessitates some form of overcoming the devouring aspect of unconsciousness. In the extreme, the threat of being devoured might express an intuitive awareness of the imminent danger of psychosis or that a certain complex is threatening to possess and ‘devour’ the consciousness. This same theme is seen frequently in the narratives or other modes of descriptive recollections of mystical situations.

At root, the relation between swallowing and being swallowed is the same as the relation between progression and regression. Hence, devouring-swallowing imagery, and the processes it symbolizes, can be positive in its essence, such as when it is temporary and when it serves processes of creative change. For example, the image of being temporarily consumed in situations such as falling

in love, trances, or the sense of being enveloped or adhered within mists.

In the essay, some of the contemporary psychoanalytic perceptions regarding eating disorders are reviewed, and the Jungian point of view is added. The perspective of analytical psychology adds to the clinical goals as well as to the sense of developmental purpose or ‘causality’ in the chain of events leading to disease (especially in the area of pathology in familial relationships or in mother-daughter relationships, as well as social pressures stemming from the “skinny” or under-fed model of the female body). In the Jungian approach, eating disorders are understood as an expression of being devoured by the archetype of the terrible mother and a negative mother complex. In reality, this is sometimes a personal mother who is incapable of being a “good enough parent.” In the mind, there is a blending of the real mother and the archetypal, all-consuming mother who operates autonomously, just as the eating disorder itself, as a physical-emotional archetype, operates in a negatively autonomous manner (as a sort of destructive autoimmune mechanism). The terrible mother might merge with a negative Self. In such cases, the Self does not employ its powers of compensation and the soul is dispossessed of its uniting and healing corrective-compensatory aspect. In due course, the powers of death overpower the powers of life. There then follows, generally, some form of fixation during the matriarchal stage whereby the mother’s domination does not allow the father archetype to build the conscious space that creates symbols—and the symbolical significance of food gets lost. In what is now a pre-symbolical territory (or a territory in which poorly-formed-symbols have regressed to a concrete mode), the archetype will be expressed as a physical impulse requiring concrete action. The same would be the case for much of the self-injury seen throughout the various eating disorders.

Sometimes, the situation just described for eating disorders worsens due to over-identification with the father and with male aspects of the soul and the rejection of the motherly-female aspects. This variant generally includes identification with the judgmental male-social aspect that the father symbolizes, being a representative of the values and norms of society and of the superego. In such situations, the female child’s superego aggression towards herself, which is generally sublimated during the normal developmental process at the stage, becomes terrifying, augmented by the self-destruction that has been unleashed by the concretization of the internal kitchen sphere.

At final stages of this article, I highlight the Jungian emphasis on the inflation of the terrible mother archetype that devours the Ego and the power of the primal archetypes that operate within the soul, much farther than the influence of the personal parent, when the real parent fails in his or her role

as mediator between the archetype and reality. During the various stages of development, the significance of food moves from the pleasure principle stage to the reality stage, where gratification is deferred and symbolizing consciousness is strengthened. The withholding of food receives a positive meaning of restraint (“defrayed digestion”), and also becomes evocative of the sense of creation of a higher spiritual state. During the development of collective consciousness, humanity transforms the desire for unending nourishment via concrete maternal food towards the achievement of religious and mystical spiritual desire; from the anxiety-ridden search for spiritual-mental nourishment from the external world towards self-nourishment.

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**THE LINES PLAY THEMSELVES:
READING ‘THE THREE-LEGGED CHICKEN’ BY Y. KENAZ
IN THE LIGHT OF DELEUZE’S AND GUATTARI’S
CONCEPT OF ‘BECOMING’**

SHANI SAMAI

Much of contemporary Israeli literature tends to be read, and interpreted, using classical psychoanalytical tools, according to which the person and his psychological motivations, as these emerge through the theme or structure of a text, are the chief focus. In this context, the *Bildungsroman* genre continues to dominate the field for its unique capacity to allow a glimpse into the process of growing up under different conditions of stress and trauma. In this literary genre, the protagonist is portrayed as a young child or adolescent, taking his or her first steps into the grown-up world, while dealing with oedipal conflicts, gradually entering, with more or less ease, into the social and symbolic order.

Yehoshua Kenaz, initially received with mixed feelings in the Israeli literary circles, is now considered one of the canonical authors of her literature. In this paper I would like to show how select moments of “becoming”—as defined by the combined work of psychoanalytically-influenced French literary theorist and philosopher Gilles Deleuze and militant psychoanalyst Félix Guattari—allow us to re-read Kenaz’s signature essay “The three-legged chicken.” This uncanny, uneasy story belongs to Kenaz’s so-called *Musical Moment: A Collection of Stories* (like music, these stories stay yet expand within the mind long after they have been read), and is commonly read as *bildungsroman* (coming-of-age story). By using the postmodern theory of Deleuze and Guattari in order to extract a new perspective regarding the processes experienced by the protagonist, I am able to highlight a different angle of psychic experience than that heretofore emphasized by the classical psychoanalytic one.

Initially, I demonstrate why Kenaz’s unique style of writing and use of language as well as the literary figure and thematic events in the story invite us to employ the thinking and conceptualizations of Deleuze and Guattari. I also emphasize a style of reading through the concepts of abstract percept and affect, and not as we customarily do through perception and emotion of an allegedly human character. In this sense, Kenaz’s story is not a representation of the external world or of human beings, but an intuitive effort to create a new logic.

Thus, instead of trying to understand the text through our classical intersubjective psychological concepts, we must also allow the text to reveal its own unique logic, its own inherent pathways and dimensions of *becoming*. The percepts and affects that are formed by the literary text are not essentially the experience of *someone*, but rather reflect entities and dynamics that exceed experience. They exist by themselves, independent of any human being; yet insofar as they surround us and capture us, the artist or literary genius (and, in this sense, the clinician) repeatedly seek to articulate them.

The concept of *becoming* is cardinal in Deleuze's and Guattari's theory, being the force of difference and creativity that motivates the movement of phenomenon and events. *Becoming* is also related to the continual change of everything. It is comprised of continually moving particles, changing speeds and directions, moving with the flow of the different forces as it gradually creates new entities, and then deconstructs these. This is generally accomplished by combining the movements of these particles between two things of supposedly different essence: subject-object, or subject-animal, for example.

The quality of *becoming*, as these French theorists conceive of it, is always molecular, as opposed to molar. Although their concept is a vast one and pertains to many aspects of reality, I concentrate here the *becomings* of the character in the literary tale. The molar whole, the relatively steady forms of the structure of a story, exists next to the movements of the molecular particles. *Becomings* are molecular, and thus, although they do not exist purely in the imagination, one cannot expect to see or sense them in the larger, molar form. As the two French writers put it. "Starting from the forms one has, the subject one is, the organs one has, or the functions one fulfills, *becoming* [means] to extract particles between which one establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness that are *closest* to what one is becoming, and through which one becomes. This is the sense in which becoming is the process of desire" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987 [1980], pp.272 [*reference cited in text*]).

I have chosen in this paper to concentrate on two main types or modes of *becomings*: *Becoming/woodworm*, and *becoming/sound-wave*. These two events (alluding to central "metaphors" in the "The three-legged chicken") have always been deemed especially significant throughout all earlier psychoanalytically-based readings of the story, and in terms of dynamic meaning are seen as pertaining to the inevitability of death and the establishment of the self. In turn, I show how Kenaz's writing, and specifically these events, qualify as representations, or expressions, of the process of *becoming*, which embody a critical observation of the classical psychoanalytic interpretation both of the personal and political

aspects of story and its writing. Each dimension of *becoming* has its own rules and dynamics. I will elaborate three main contributions of the concept of *becoming* to psychoanalysis in the domain of (a) time and space dimensions, (b) the nature of the potential human (and nonhuman) relationships, and (c) the difference between symbolic and singular reference.

Becoming/woodworm, the first concept, is an option that allows us a more fuller (and complicated) experience of the symbiosis between human and animal, as opposed to the more customary notions of the mechanisms of *identification*, which require a more classical, modernist, sharp and, hence, ‘reasonable’ separation between the subject and its identification object. This approach also allows movement towards the minority and the politically weak, instead of the more predictable direction toward increasing political power. The past, and memory—again, the classical focus in most schools of psychotherapeutic thought—might thus sometimes be an obstacle for *becoming*. My second construct, *becoming/sound-wave*, highlights the vibrations of all sounds that lead the process of mental experience, not simply the human ear; not only the classically perceived sounds that enable the emergence of the self, but those that might dissolve the self, such as when an amorphous, unintegrated voice takes the lead.

This kind of reading enables literary art to guide us to new directions, different than the customary ones that point toward the ‘reasonable’ human psychological mechanisms by which the self is construed. In addition, this reading of the story sheds light on some new ways of understanding the original concept of *becoming*.

Finally, this approach also opens new options for clinical thinking, experience, and reading. Our therapeutic sensitivity to *becomings* as we “read” our patient and ourselves during the clinical interaction takes us to the edge of our therapeutic senses, and crosses it. These new plateaux spreading out all around challenge our standard modes of thought and the comfort of our familiar safety zones, but also enable refreshed conceptualization and thought as we allow the products of culture themselves, especially literature, to reveal new interpretive directions.

**REGARDING ‘THE NAME OF THE FATHER,’
THE DISCOURSE OF DESIRE, AND DEBT:
A LACANIAN INTERPRETATION OF
THE BIBLICAL STORY OF MIRIAM THE PROPHETESS**

INBAL RAZ BRAKIN

This paper proposes a Lacanian psychoanalytic interpretation of the story of Miriam the prophetess as reflected in the biblical text and in the rabbinic exegetical tradition or *aggada* (collected in the Midrash or Talmud). Similar to most other female figures that appear in the Bible, Miriam is depicted through just general outlines (notwithstanding the famous Song at the Sea named for her) as if she were merely a secondary figure illuminating the central protagonist of the biblical story, her brother Moses. Nevertheless, as we examine the midrashic literature closely we find that many of the rabbinic-aggadic writers attribute a central role to Miriam, both within her own family and with her people, filling out the empty space that we encounter in the classical commentaries. While there has been some effort by modern scholars to understand the figure of Miriam, little or no emphasis has been directed toward a thoroughgoing analysis of the views of the earlier rabbinic sages which would reveal what seems like an ambivalent attitude her, ranging from attraction to near repulsion. This ambivalence seems surprising, at first blush. I will attempt to explain the rabbis’ ambivalent attitude to Miriam by utilizing the concept of the father as it appears in the thought of the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, in particular his lecture on the ‘Name-of-the-Father,’ and applying this concept to the biblical and rabbinic texts. In so doing, I find that the ambivalent rabbinic attitude to Miriam might derive from the fact that, knowingly or not, the rabbinic elaborations gradually revealed that it is Miriam the woman who actually clarifies the role of the father, the direction of desire, and the burden of debt in Jewish culture.

The concept of the Father a central in the philosophy of Lacan since he considers it, in its imaginary and symbolic structures, the lynchpin of mental structure and the foundation for the establishment of a culture and law. Decline of the father figure in Western culture, and the unclear distinction between the “real” father and the role or name of the father, is, in Lacan’s view, the basis for the psychopathologies of modern man. The main “place” of the father, according to Lacan, is not essentially the one occupied by a real or imaginary father, but a

symbolic father, being first and foremost a metaphor or signifier identified as the Name of the Father. In this capacity alone does the paternal structure or signifier play its crucial role as the ultimate limit to *jouissance*, enabling the subject to enter into the Symbolic Order.

In his analysis of the binding of Isaac, for example, Lacan presents the paradoxical character, or double face, of the father: on the one hand, he wishes to enjoy and, on the other hand, he limits *jouissance* and asks only to desire. This duplicity, argues Lacan, is the basis for creating the Law of the Father, and finds its analogy in the theory of the sacrifice and the murder of the father portrayed in Freud's *Totem and Taboo*. Lacan's conclusion is that the murder of the Father has a structural mythical value rather than a real one, enabling a balance between Law and Desire. As well, the validity of the symbolic father's Law requires the myth of actual ancestor sacrifice, i.e., the pure *jouissance* murder. This murder, and the guilty feelings it evokes, become the basis for creating a sense of *debt* by which the neurotic subject is tied forever to the Law. This mythic, symbolic debt can never be repaid, and the duality upon which it based is gradually institutionalized within the superego: this agency will always attempt to limit *jouissance* while secretly preserving a stolen reserve of *jouissance*. Lacan went as far as to argue that the father's duality explains the type of tension that exists between pagan culture, which maintains the tradition of the full *jouissance* of the father, and the Jewish alternative which emphasizes the *desire* of the father.

Using a Lacanian methodology, designed to highlight areas of lack or emptiness within a narrative without rushing to interpret or explain them, I focus upon the absence of the name of Miriam at the beginning of the biblical story, and suggest that this is a deliberate lack designed to point out a major flaw in the father's role that Miriam, using her discourse, as this is augmented by the rabbinic midrash, exposes. In contrast to the discourse of *jouissance* of a real (raw) father, the midrash emphasizes through Miriam the discourse of *desire* of the symbolic father. She thereby elevates the Name-of-the-Father as opposed to the father. Miriam's character, as it is given life through the Midrash, presents Jewish culture as a creatively neurotic solution to the problem of the seductiveness/impossibility of pure *jouissance*, a counterweight to psychosis. The neurotic solution, when creative, embraces doubt and anxiety. In the same vein, when the names of Moses and Miriam finally appear together in the Bible, and her identity as a prophetess is stated, we now have a representation of the repayment of symbolic debt, forever binding Miriam to the Law of the Father. This, in turn, allows the birth of the subject in the symbolic order as a desiring subject. On the 'negative' side of the midrashic portrait, the strange incident

of Miriam's leprosy represents the breakthrough of a forbidden desire, the sin of defamation that always marks any attempt to regress the Word of the Father, his Name, to the pleasures of the realm of the Thing. A similar explanation is offered in order to interpret the perplexing sin of Moses and Aaron and the awful punishment of their being forbidden from entering into the Land.

Overall, then, Miriam is the image of desire, teaching through her discourse the problematic position of the concept of the father in Judaism, and the spectrum of meanings of the concept of desire in psychoanalysis. Her *name* marks the hesitation, doubt, anxiety, and faith which make up the discourse of desire of the symbolic father, and stands in the breach of the 'hole,' the absence of restraint, certainty, and forbidden desire which threaten to carry desire over the edge toward ultimately destructive *jouissance* with the real father. This duality, and the conflict it often expresses and requires, explains the attraction and repulsion aroused by the figure of Miriam in the eyes of the rabbinic sages.

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**A TWISTED MOTHER-SON COALITION
LEADING TO PERVERSE NARCISSISTIC
SELF-CONFIGURATION**

MICHAEL SHOSHANI AND BATYA SHOSHANI

In an essay devoted to theory and clinical reportage, we demonstrate a ‘perverse psychic formation’ as this was explored in the six-year analysis of Avi (a pseudonym), a ‘difficult to reach’ patient who exhibited a narcissistic-perverse character formation. At the core of the paper are four detailed conversations with Avi (one from the third year of the therapy; the other three, consecutive sessions taken from its fifth year), featuring the unique pathology as well as the gradual changes in the patient. We highlight, as openly as we considered appropriate, the difficulties the analyst faces in struggling with this patient, many of which we believe are endemic to analytic work with perverse patients in general.

Avi is a tall, handsome, 30-odd year old man, highly intelligent and holding academic degrees in two esteemed fields. He sought therapy unwillingly, urged by his wife, whom he was constantly thinking of divorcing. He also wanted to change careers, feeling that everything he owned or accomplished was worthless. During his childhood, Avi formed an overly intimate relationship with his mother, through which he had essentially taken the place of his father, who was a source of disappointment and shame for both of them. As a patient, Avi was often misleading, keen on controlling the situation and the setting, and ridiculing any intervention as he saw fit, thus forming a kind of sado-masochistic dynamic with the therapist, constantly invoking issues of subjugation, control, and humiliation.

Of the many topics mentioned in the clinical material, several subjects seemed to us to have emerged as central to the successful development of the analysis: Avi’s tendency to ridicule others as both a child and an adult, his feelings of helplessness and smallness *vis-a-vis* his analyst, and the early and suffocating childhood alliance with his mother, i.e., the coalition she formed with him against his father. Avi related some very difficult memories, revealing that ever since he was a boy he was sexually excited by watching others being humiliated. He also talked about a recurring episode with his mother, who suffered from a medical condition: he had to clean the sores on her back, in a recurrent ritual that he experienced as both sexual and exploitive. This over-intimate relationship

with his mother made him believe he was a grown up, causing him to develop grandiose fantasies about himself and his ability to rescue his mother. These patterns were later reiterated in a relationship he had in his mid-twenties: an affair with a woman 20 years older than him, who cast him in the role of savior.

One of the cardinal elements in Avi's perverse-narcissistic character formation was a dysfunctional primal scene fantasy. The authors understand the primal scene not only as a fantasy, but as a metaphoric narrative matrix which emblemizes the narcissistic blow inherent in growing up. In Avi's case, we are dealing with a strong, dominant mother and a weak father who is cast aside. The mother, disappointed by her husband, mocking and resenting him, turns to her son for solace and compensation. The absence of the father-husband as a functional and safe "third factor" is manifested in the creation of a pathological mother-son coalition, which both drives the father away and encourages the son to believe that he is just as good, 'big,' and smart as his father.

Throughout his life, Avi remained overly attached to this pre-oedipal, omnipotent mother, incapable of altering this relationship pattern and unable to introduce a third party. The absence of the father precluded any shift in identification from the mother to the father. This led to a split in Avi's experience, which was demonstrated in many of his stormy transference reactions: on the one hand, he saw himself as something grandiose and inflated, on the other hand, he felt terribly empty and worthless. Sentenced to being 'big' since childhood, Avi never had the chance to actually develop and grow up, keeping aspects of his child-self locked up and frozen. We construe the blown-up aspect of his experience as a false self, representing dead parts of the self, while his feeling of being worthless, 'good for nothing' and not caring about 'getting run over by a truck,' expressed the more authentic parts of his true self.

In addition, the absence of a father leads the patient to invent an omnipotent, tyrannical father inside himself. With no functional external father, and no internalized father to identify with, with no one to impose the incest barrier, the fantasy of the primal scene becomes a nightmare. The great anxiety here is not necessarily related to castration but to the fear of utterly losing one's self, of having one's identity revoked and dissolved into the omnivorous, overbearing self of the mother.

Unable to identify with either his father or his mother, Avi created a world in which everything is upside down: small means big, repellant means attractive, male means female, and so forth. Avi was unable to deal with the narcissistic blow of relinquishing his omnipotent over-inclusiveness and acknowledging such differences. He therefore had to create an entire array of defense mechanisms,

culminating in a narcissistic-perverse self formation. Through this pseudo-structure, Avi as a child was able to efface any sign of discrepancy between what he had and what he wanted, maintaining an illusion of self-sufficiency, refusing to be human. In this sense, perversion could be seen as an intensification of narcissism. In addition, Avi's feelings of shame and guilt for dethroning his father, in real life as well as in fantasy, became a practically insurmountable obstacle in his attempt to resolve the oedipal complex and form his own identity.

In therapy, the analyst was gradually able to disentangle himself from the web of control, from the sado-masochistic straightjacket into which Avi had 'placed' him through projective identification and certain powerfully disorganizing transference enactments. The analyst worked hard to focus his curative efforts on the attempt to reach out to Avi's extremely vulnerable authentic child-self that lay hidden behind Avi's grandiose and omnipotent exterior. The key goals of this curative attempt were to dismantle the patient's illusion of self-sufficiency and to allow him to escape the omnipotent prison of symbiosis with his mother.

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