

MA'ARAG || מארג

כתב עת ישראלי לפסיכואנליזה

The Israel Annual of Psychoanalysis

כרך ה', 2014
Volume 5, 2014

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המערכת

גבי שפיר

מרכז זיגמונד פרויד לחקר הפסיכואנליזה
האוניברסיטה העברית
החברה הפסיכואנליטית בישראל
י"ר

אבי באומן

מכון הישראלי לפסיכולוגיה יונגיאנית

מרים ברגר

המכון הישראלי לאנליזה קבוצתית

יוסי טריאסט

החברה הפסיכואנליטית בישראל

רפי יונגמן

החברה הישראלית לפסיכולוגיה אנליטית

גבי מן

מכון תל-אביב לפסיכואנליזה בת זמננו

קלאודיה קוגן

האיגוד הישראלי לפסיכולוגית העצמי ולחקר הסובייקטיביות

דבורה ווגנר

רכות מרכז זיגמונד פרויד ומערכת מארג

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התוכנית לפסיכותרפיה פסיכואנליטית

בית הספר לעו"ס, אוניברסיטת בר-אילן

חבר הוועדה הבינלאומית של עורכי כתבי עת פסיכואנליטיים

עריכת הלשון: הרצליה אפרתי

ההפצה: הוצאת מאגנס

ת"ד 39099, ירושלים 9139002, טל' 02-6586659, פקס' 02-5660341

www.magnesspress.co.il

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להוצאת ספרים ע"ש י"ל מאגנס
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מסת"ב 7-816-493-965-978 ISBN

4-817-493-965-978 ISBN BOOK

נדפס בישראל

סדר, לוחות והדפסה: ארט פלוס, ירושלים – דפוס ירוק

תוכן העניינים

אביאל אורן	משחק החלומות, חלומות על משחק; על מרחב החלום בפסיכותרפיה פסיכואנליטית במשחק עם ילדים.....1
עמרי ביכובסקי	מטפיזיקה היא היסטוריה?.....21
גל ונטורה	האם המתה, האלביתי וחרדת המודרניות.....33
דיצה חננאל	הערות על קשר האם-בן בשלב מוקדם של תסביך אדיפוס.....67
שלומית ידלין-גדות	צִירֵי אמת והנפש הרב־שפתית: תאוריה וטכניקה בראי האמת.....87
משה לנדאו	מחשבה, משמעות ואנטי-משמעות: התפתחות המבט האסתטי.....125
גבי (גבריאלה) מן	'קירות גמישים': המסגרת האנליטית כקונטקסט ריפויי.....153
רות נצר	מעבר לטוב הפעיל: על פסיכולוגיה ועל יהדות.....171
יורי סלע	תחושה של משמעות: מבט מחודש על הדילמה הסכיזואידית לאור תפיסתו של דונלד ויניקוט על העצמי האמתי ופנומנולוגיית הגוף של מרלור־פונטי.....213
יוחאי עתריה	טראומה – חור שחור בלב התרבות: המעבר מיחיד לחברה.....239
רועי שופן	מדפי היומן למבטו של האחר: יומנים אישיים והאוטונומיות של העצמי.....271
הוראות למחברים297
המשתתפים303
תקצירים באנגלית	xi.....

משחק החלומות, חלומות על משחק: על מרחב החלום בפסיכותרפיה פסיכואנליטית במשחק עם ילדים

אביאל אורן

במאמר זה אני מבקש ליישם את רעיונותיהם של וילפרד ביון ותומס אוגדן על חלימה ותהליך החלום בפסיכותרפיה פסיכואנליטית במשחק עם ילדים. תאוריית החלימה של ביון ואוגדן כוללת מושגים מורכבים ומופשטים שהם אבני בניין בסיסיות בחיי הנפש, כגון: חלימה, ערות, שינה, מחסום-מגע, סיט, מודע ולא־מודע. שימוש בדוגמאות קליניות מתחום הטיפול במשחק עם ילדים עשוי להבהיר ולהמחיש מושגים מורכבים אלה. בד בבד, תאוריית החלימה הבינוינאנית־אוגדניאנית עשויה לסייע למטפלים בילדים לקבל נקודת מבט נוספת על המתרחש במפגש הטיפולי. המאמר פותח בסקירה קצרה של האופן שבו תופעת החלום מובנת על ידי כותבים פסיכואנליטיים שונים. בהמשך מוצגת סקירה מעמיקה יותר, העוסקת בתפקידו ובחשיבותו של תהליך החלום בחיי הנפש של האדם על פי ביון ואוגדן. במטרה להמחיש ולהבהיר את התאוריה מובאות דוגמאות קליניות מתוך טיפול בילד אשר חווה סיט מתמשך בחיי הערות והשינה כאחד. החלימה המשותפת של הילד המטופל והמטפל שימשה פונקציה מרגיעה ומארגנת עבור הילד, אשר היה מסוגל להירגע ולהניח לנפשו לשקוע לחיי השינה, בזמן שהמטפל נותר ער וחלם את הסיט עד תומו.

זיגמונד פרויד הציע בספרו 'פירוש החלום' (1900 [2008]) תאוריה חדשה שניסתה להסביר את נפש האדם.¹ תאוריה זו עומדת על שתי רגליים: הבנת פשר החלום מחד גיסא, וההמשגה הטופוגרפית של חיי הנפש (מודע, סמוך למודע ולא־מודע) מאידך גיסא. שתי תגליות אלה קשורות זו לזו בקשר הדוק: רק לאחר שצלל למעמקי הערבוביה של תכני חלום גלויים וסמויים, עלה בידו של פרויד להבחין בין מודע

¹ ברצוני להודות מקרב לב ליעל זוהר על הסיוע בהכנתו של מאמר זה.

מטפיזיקה היא היסטוריה?

עמרי ביכובסקי

במאמר זה אדון באספקט מסוים של ההיסטוריה, על בסיס טענתו של ז'אק לאקאן כי 'מטפיזיקה היא היסטוריה' (Lacan [1977] 1981). נקודות המוצא לדיון הן הדרתה של ההיסטוריה מספר האבחנות (American Psychiatric Association 2013), זיקתה למטפיזיקה ושאלת גורל הסובייקט בתקופתנו. נבחנת עמדתו של פרויד בקשר למטפיזיקה, לזיקתה להיסטוריה ולמקומה של ההעברה במערך זה. התפקיד הפאוסטי שנתן פרויד לאנליטיקאי מחייב אותו להביא בחשבון את המטפיזיקה, אך יש לשאול מהי מטפיזיקה זו והיכן היא נמצאת. לאקאן מיקם אותה בפער שבין השימוש במילים ובין המשקל של המשמעות – הפער הזה הוא שדה הפעולה של הפסיכואנליטיקאי, ואילו ההיסטוריה נותנת גישה ייחודית (שכן הסובייקט ההיסטורי פועל 'מחוץ לעצמו'). על בסיס זה אפשר לשאול מהו מקומה של ההיסטוריה כיום. שתי דוגמאות קליניות תאפשרנה להתבונן בשתי גרסאות של הפער שבו מדובר, ולבחון את החשיבות הקלינית והתרבותית של העובדה שההיסטוריה ממקמת את הדובר כסובייקט שסוע (3). בסופו של דבר מכוונת אותנו ההיסטוריה אל הממד של מַעֲבָר – אך לא אל השאלה מה יש שם, מַעֲבָר, אלא אל המַעֲבָר ככזה בהתנסות האנושית. בכך היא קוראת תיגר על כל ידע שאיננו 'מחורר'. כך משמשת ההיסטוריה תזכורת יקרת ערך גם לפסיכואנליטיקאי לכך שאין הוא אדון הידע.

מבוא

זה כלל לא רע לעשות שימוש בהיסטוריה לתכלית מטפיזית; מטפיזיקה היא היסטוריה, אמר לאקאן בבריסל בפברואר 1977 (Lacan [1977] 1981), התרגום שלי). הערה זו עוררה את סקרנותי. מה זאת אומרת שמטפיזיקה היא היסטוריה? באיזו מטפיזיקה מדובר? איפה היא ממוקמת? מה הקשר שלה להיסטוריה? האם ואילו השלכות קליניות יש לכך?

האם המתה, האלבית וחרדת המודרניות

גל ונטורה

במאמר זה נבחנים ייצוגי מות האם באמנות הצרפתית של המחצית הראשונה של המאה התשע־עשרה כביטוי לחוויית האלבית (Das Unheimliche) שנדונה בראשית המאה העשרים בכתביהם של ארנסט ניטש וזיגמונד פרויד. הנחת היסוד שלי היא שנכותן של תאוריות נבחנת דווקא ביצירות שנעשו לפני כתיבתן. לשם כך נדונה אחת היצירות האחרונות שתיארו את הנושא, 'הרעב' מ־1850 של הצייר ה־ראליסט הצרפתי ז'ול ברטון (Breton), שנהרסה במלחמת העולם השנייה וכיום היא מוכרת רק מתצלומים. חרף העובדה שיצירה זו ביטאה הדחקות וחרדות אישיות, אין המאמר מתמקד בלא־מודע האישי של ז'ול ברטון, אלא בלא־מודע על ידי ברטון, כדי לבחון את ההיבט הפסיכו־היסטורי של הדימוי, כראי הלכי רוח חברתיים כלליים בתקופה הנדונה. לשם הבנת היבטיו הפסיכו־היסטוריים המורכבים של הנושא נבחנים מקורות חזותיים וטקסטואליים מגוונים הכוללים יצירות אמנות מן המאה התשע־עשרה לצד המקורות החזותיים שהשפיעו עליהן; טקסטים פילוסופיים והגותיים מן המאות השמונה־עשרה והתשע־עשרה העוסקים בהבניית הביתיות והאמהיות; וטקסטים מתחום הפסיכואנליזה העוסקים באם המתה, שכתבו זיגמונד פרויד, אנדרה גרין, ז'וליה קריסטבה, אמבר גייקובס וברכה אטינגר. באמצעות הדיון בחוויית האינות וההיעדר הנובעים מהאם־המסרבת־למות, ובפרדוקס השִכחה ושובו של המודחק על פי תפיסתו של הסופר הצרפתי בן המאה התשע־עשרה ארנסט רנן, נבחן במאמר הקשר העמוק בין הבניית הביתיות במערב בראשית העידן המודרני, ובין הקונפליקטואליות האלביתית העומדת בלב לבה של המודרניות.

עכשיו האישה מושלמת.

גופה המת

עוטה חיוך של הישגים.

(פלאט (1963) [2002: 93])

הערות על הקשר אס-בן בשלב מוקדם של תסביך אדיפוס

דיצה חננאל

במאמר נדונים רעיונות שהציג אוגדן במאמרו 'על סף תסביך אדיפוס הגברי', ומתוארת דוגמה קלינית. אוגדן תיאר במאמרו את הקושי של הבן בתחילת התסביך האדיפלי להפנות משאלה מינית אל אם שהיא גם אם קדם-אדיפלית, אשר ממנה הוא נפרד. הקושי נוצר בגלל הקשר המוקדם הבלתי מובחן בין הילד לאמו, כפי שמתארים דונלד ויניקוט, וילפרד בין ואחרים. האב מופיע כאובייקט מעברי באמצעות האם, ונוצרת שלישיות המגנה על הבן מפני קרבה מסוכנת אל האם האדיפלית. שלישיות נוספת שאוגדן מתאר מורכבת מן הבן ומשני ההיבטים של האם: אם קדם-אדיפלית ואם אדיפלית. משימתו של הבן היא לחבר את שני ההיבטים באובייקט אחד, כשהקשר ביניהם הוא דיאלקטי. אפשר להסיק שגם שלישיות זו מגינה על הבן, נוסף על ההגנה שמספק האב-בתוך-האם. מייקל דיאמונד הציג, בעקבות אָרְן פסט, מודל של קשר דיאלקטי בין הזדהויות מוקדמות של הבן עם שני ההורים. המודל דומה לזה של אוגדן. הוא מסביר את הפרדה מן האם לא רק עקב תסביך הסירוס, אלא גם בשינוי שחל באובייקט האמהי. הבן נפרד מן הקשר המוקדם עם האם ונוצר קשר עם אם שהיא עתה אובייקט חדש. דוגמה קלינית תומכת ברעיונות שתוארו לעיל. הטיפול ממחיש את חשיבותה של העבודה על שני סוגי העברה לאם, אם קדם-אדיפלית ואם אדיפלית. אפשר להניח שהשלשיות של אב-בתוך-אם נוצרה בטיפול האנליטי של המטפלת באמצעות המסגרת הטיפולית האנליטית. כמו כן, בעקבות הדוגמה הקלינית מוצעת סברה שאב-בתוך-אם הוא תנאי להיווצרות אם אדיפלית.

הקשר שבין אם לבן, המוצג במאמר של אוגדן 'על סף תסביך אדיפוס הגברי' (אוגדן, [1989] 2001א), הוא נושא המאמר. תסביך אדיפוס הוא שם כולל להרבה תהליכים, ואוגדן במאמרו התמקד בפן אחד: מקומה של האם בתחילת תסביך אדיפוס הגברי. בתחילת תסביך אדיפוס הבן מתמודד עם משימה שקשורה לאם והיא הופעתה של

צִירֵי אַמַת וְהַנֶּפֶשׁ הַרַב־שִׁפְתִית: תַּאֲוִרִיהַ וְטַכְנִיקַה בְּרֵאֵי הָאֵמַת

שְׁלוּמִית יִדְלִין-גְּדוֹת

זניחתה של תפיסת 'האמת האחת', תפיסת התאמה למציאות שאותה אימץ פרויד, הובילה למצב של ריבוי אמתות בשיח הפסיכואנליטי ולתחושה שאסכולות פסיכואנליטיות שונות, המעמידות במרכזן מושגי אמת שונים, מנהלות שיח של חירשים. במאמר זה אני מציעה הגדרה מחדש של האמת כעיקרון פסיכולוגי-מנטלי פעיל ומכוון בנפש, ומתארת את האופן שבו המשגה זו מאירה את ריבוי האמתות במרחב התאורטי הפסיכואנליטי. שש תפיסות שונות של אמת מופיעות במרחב הפילוסופי, הפסיכואנליטי ובשפתנו היומיומית. את תפיסות האמת השונות האלה אני מציגה כפרספקטיבות אפיסטמיות פעילות ומכנה אותן 'צירי אמת'. אני מתארת כיצד כל ציר אמת משמש ציר הנחיה לארגון תפיסות, רגש, מחשבה והתנהגות, ומתפקד כציר של פרשנות היוצר תמונות מציאות שונות, שהחפיפה ביניהן חלקית. כל אחד מצירי האמת מעוגן בצרכים רגשיים עמוקים המניעים אותו, מתכוונן תוך התגברות על משברים התפתחותיים ומתקיים במרחב האישי של כל אדם בתצורות שונות ובמגעים שונים עם צירים אחרים, כמוכתב על ידי היסטוריה התפתחותית פרטיקולרית. במאמר נדונה המשגת צירי האמת כמבנים את המרחב הנפשי בהקשר לתפיסת העצמיות המרובה בחשיבה הפסיכואנליטית, כמו גם בהקשר של הבנת תהליכים לא-מודעים בנפש. מזווית זו, הזרמים הפסיכואנליטיים השונים נתפסים כמשקפים את המניפה האפיסטמית המתקיימת בנפש האנושית. ראייה זו מובילה למסקנה שאחד מהיעדים הטיפוליים המרכזיים של התהליך האנליטי כרוך בניסוח, בהבנה ובתנועה בין צירי האמת השונים. בדומה לאופן שבו המרחב הפוטנציאלי מתהווה בדיאלקטיקה שבין מציאות לדמיון, אני מציעה שהדיאלוג בין האמתות השונות מייצר מרחב מעברי ומנסח מתודולוגיה ליצירתו.

* המאמר מבוסס על עבודת דוקטור שנכתבה במסלול פסיכואנליזה ופרשנות בחוג לפרשנות ותרבות באוניברסיטת בראילן בהנחיית פרופ' אבי שגיא וד"ר דורית למברג, ואושרה ב־2014.

מחשבה, משמעות ואנטי-משמעות: התפתחות המבט האסתטי

משה לנדאו

במאמר נדונה התפתחות הממד האסתטי בעבודתם של וילפרד ביון ודונלד מלצר. ממד זה שזור ומובנה ברעיון של O שהוא פרי התפתחות של ביון המאוחר, ומהותי בפיתוח רעיון הקונפליקט האסתטי של מלצר. ביון חידד את ההבדל בין הממד של K (knowledge), הממד של הידיעה הרגשית הניתן לתפיסה החושית והוא בתחום 'הידוע', לבין הממד של O (origin), שבמהותו הוא בלתי ידוע ואינו נתפס בחושים. האחרון מתפתח באמצעות האינטואיציה, ומתגלה בלא הכנה ולעתים קרובות אף בהפתעה. מרכיב מרכזי בממד זה הוא האמת הרגשית המתגלה ברגע נתון ומקבלת משמעות חדשה. דוגמה לכך היא ההתפתחות הפנימית מסימן לסמל. מה שמאפשר התפתחות רגשית זו היא העמדה הפנימית הטיפולית שביון פיתח: ללא זיכרון, ללא תשוקה וללא הבנה, שהיא מרכזית בתהליך הטיפולי. כלומר, הדגש בעמדה זו הוא על ההתפתחות הרגשית מהבלתי ידוע לידוע. זוהי מהותו של הממד האסתטי: ההתפתחות, המפתיעה לעתים, מהאינסופי והלא ידוע לסופי הידוע. אני מצייין את הממד של ההתפתחות העוברית מהפוטנציאל הרגשי לחוויה הרגשית ברגע נתון. אחד הביטויים הבולטים להתפתחות העוברית הוא התפתחות החלום, המעבר האינטואיטיבי מאלמנט ביתא לאלמנט אלפא, מחומרים רגשיים חסרי משמעות לתחילתו של תהליך רגשי בעל משמעות סובייקטיבית. להבנות אלה יש השלכות רבות על התהליך הטיפולי. תהליך זה מדגיש את ההתפתחות הרגשית או את היעדרה, ולא דווקא את החיפוש ההיסטורי אחר סיבותיו. בהיעדרה יש חוסר משמעות או התקפה על המשמעות של K- (התקפה על החיבורים הרגשיים) ברגע נתון. במאמר מתואר תהליך התפתחותי במהלך טיפול שבו מתרחש מעבר מחומרים רגשיים חסרי משמעות – אלמנט ביתא, אובייקט ביזרי – לרגש בעל משמעות. ההתרחשות העוברית נוצרת בנפשו של המחבר ובמפגש אינטנסיבי עם מטופלת.

'קירות גמישים': המסגרת האנליטית כקונטקסט ריפויי

גבי (גבריאלה) מן

בהתייחסויותיו אל המסגרת האנליטית הציג פרויד גישה המקדשת את שמירת הרופא על טובת עצמו. הגישה המוצגת כאן מאירה את ההיבטים הריפוייים של מסגרת אנליטית גמישה אשר מכוונת בעיקר אל צורכי המטופל. ברוחם של דונלד ויניקוט ועמנואל גנט, אני רואה במסגרת הטיפול זירת משחק אינסופית של מטפלים ומטופלים, כר התנסות אשר מאפשר למטפל להישקע במציאות הסובייקטיבית של המטופל, לייצר שדה אנליטי המושתת על הקשבה מדויקת לצרכים הפרטניים של המטופל והתאמה אליהם, וכמו במשחק, לעשות להחייאת צורכי העצמי הפגוע שלו ולשיקומו. במאמר מתואר פרדוקס של צרכים: ככל שיש יותר היענות של המטפל, המטופל יחשוף יותר את צרכיו האמתיים. חשיבה זו עולה בקנה אחד עם הגות פסיכואנליטית המתייחסת להקשבה אמפתית ולרגולציה הודדית בפסיכותרפיה. עמדת הענות כזאת אינה תורמת רק לפריסת תכני הטיפול, כי אם גם משמעותית אף ביחס להתנהלות עם המסגרת. אפשר לראות בטכניקה של 'קירות גמישים' אקט יצירתי והודמנות לחשיפת פוטנציאל של חוויות סובייקטיביות אשר לעתים מודחות (disavowed) וקיימות מחוץ לתודעת המטופל (outside awareness). דוגמאות קליניות אחדות המובאות במאמר מתארות סוגיות ספציפיות של מסגרת טיפולית: ביטולי פגישות, איחורים, עבודה באמצעות סקייפ או בטלפון ועניינים כספיים. אני מדגימה כיצד המטפל יכול לזהות באירועים אלה מסרים משמעותיים, לא גילויי התנגדות לטיפול. אופן ניהול המסגרת נתפס כאקט פרשני, גם אם לא באופן מפורש. גישה זו אינה מעודדת חריגות מגבולות הטיפול כי אם מדייקת במשמעות המקופלת בהם, בכל פעם מחדש. פסיכואנליזה עכשווית זו דוגלת ב'קירות גמישים', וחורגת מהחשיבה המסורתית החותרת לכך שחוקי המסגרת לעולם יהיו ידועים, קבועים ומוגדרים מראש.

המסגרת האנליטית נתפסת כעניין חשוב ומרכזי מראשית ימי הפסיכואנליזה. פרויד האמין שללא מסגרת אנליטית סדורה הטיפול הפסיכואנליטי יעלה על שרטון, ועל

מעבר לטוב הפעיל: על פסיכולוגיה ועל יהדות

רות נצר

הפסיכותרפיה (הפסיכואנליזה, האנליזה היוגיאנית והפסיכותרפיה הדינמית למיניה) עוסקת בקבלת היצרים, בזיהוי אשמות נירוטיות, בצמצום חומרתו של הסופר-אגו המחמיר השיפוטי, בהתמודדות עם אשמה מציאותית, בזיהוי הרע/הצל ובמודעות לקיומו האישי והארכיטיפי. מטרתה היא לצמצם את שליטתם באדם, לווסת את כוחם ולהתמיר אותם לשירות הנפש. טענתי היא שהפסיכותרפיה עוסקת ביסור מרע, אבל פרט לפסיכולוגיה החיובית כמעט אין היא עוסקת בעשה טוב. בניגוד למבט הפוסט-מודרני, המעדיף את היחסי על פני המוחלט, מערער את הוודאות באשר לערכים הנכונים ומטיל ספק בערכים ובמוסר, נשאלת השאלה: היכן נלמד על חשיבות הערכים שמדגישים את מקומו של הטוב הנדיב האלטרואיסטי הפעיל? במאמר אני עומדת על מיעוט התייחסותם של פרויד, קרל יונג ואריק נוימן תלמידו של יונג אל הטוב. כמו כן אני בוחנת את מהות הטוב כארכיטיפ שאינו קשור למהות האהבה והנשיות החומלת המסייעת לזולת, ואת טיבו המולד לעומת הנרכש, את הופעתו בדתות כחסד חילוני ובספרות העולם ובקולנוע. במאמר אני קוראת ללמוד מההדגשה ביהדות בעבר ובהווה על עשיית הטוב ולאמץ את ערכי הטוב הפעיל בפסיכואנליזה ובפסיכותרפיה.

ואני יושב ומקשיב לשקון מהפרטיטורה השניה של באך
ושער אחר שער נפתח ואין שומר גורא מקודמו בפתח
ולאט אני משיל ממני את יצרי הרע ואת אכזריותי האנושית
ותופסת את מקומם מעין חמלה, חמלה על כל הקיים (ריבנר 2013: 74).

הנשמה יוצאת אל הטוב / שאינו דורש כלום / ... הטוב המוחלט הטוב הגמור
... הטוב הבלעדי, / ואין כלום בלעדיו / הטוב האלמותי / הטוב הקיים בי /
לעולם. / הנשמה יוצאת אל הטוב. / הנשמה יוצאת / וטוב / מאד (ווסמן 1988: 102).

* המאמר מוקדש להורי ז"ל שהקדישו את שנותיהם האחרונות לסיוע לזולת.

תחושה של משמעות: מבט מחודש על הדילמה הסכיוואידית לאור תפיסתו של דונלד ויניקוט על העצמי האמתי ופנומנולוגיית הגוף של מרלר-פונטי

יוֹרֵי סלע

מטרתי במאמר היא לבחון את החוויה של להיות 'אמתי' בעולם, להציע מבט חדש על ממדים סכיוואידיים וגבוליים בהוויה האנושית ולהצביע על האופן שבו הגופניות משמשת בסיס לכינון הסובייקטיביות. על בסיס הגותם של הפסיכואנליטיקאי דונלד ויניקוט והפילוסוף מוריס מרלר-פונטי אני בוחן במאמר תשתיות גופניות של הממד ה'לבדי' מול הבין-סובייקטיבי של הקיום, ואת הציר הגופני הפיזיקונקרט, בניגוד לגופניות כבסיס לחוויית המציאותיות האישית. שילוב הגותי זה מאפשר בחינה מחודשת של ההתוויות הדיאגנוסטיות הסכיוואידית והגבולית כמונחות משני עבריו של ציר הנע בין המופשט לקונקרטי. בשדה הפסיכופתולוגיה נעשית השוואה בין ממדים סכיוואידיים לגבוליים בהוויה; בשדה הפסיכודינמי נחקרים היחסים בין עצמיות לאחרות-זרות; בשדה הפילוסופי הפנומנולוגי נבדקים היחסים בין קרבה למרחק, כפי שהם מגולמים בתוך שבין מגע למבט ובין שניהם לבין רפלקציה והסמלה. ההשוואה בין כתביהם של ויניקוט ושל מרלר-פונטי נעשית בהקשר היסטורי תרבותי של רצף אירועים שראשיתו במלחמת העולם השנייה וגלגוליו בתרבות הנגד של שנות השישים. מתוך כך עולות נקודות דמיון רבות בהגותם של השניים: בהבנה של רציפות החוויה הנעה ממגע להסמלה, בתנועתם בין אמפיריציזם לאינטלקטואליזם, בהבנת הפרדוקס המגולם בעצמיות ראשונית הכוללת כבר יחס ראשוני אל העצמי-גוף, ובהתבוננות בשזירות הגופנית כחלק מהשזירות הבין-סובייקטיבית. באופן זה מבררים שני הוגים אלה, איש בדרכו, את הימצאותה המהותית של אחרות בתוך זהות ושל זהות בתוך אחרות, ואת היחס בין sense חושי ל-sense תודעתי. לבסוף אני מצביע על התרומה הפוטנציאלית של הבנת החוויה החושית של 'אי-אמיתיות' במופעיה הסכיוואידיים והגבוליים – המעוגנת בתנועת רצו ושוב בין תחושה למשמעות – לטיפול בפציינטים בעלי אפיונים סכיוואידיים.

טראומה – חור שחור בלב התרבות: המעבר מיחיד לחברה

יוחאי עתריה

טראומה היא אירוע מכונן בחייו של אדם. פרויד, ובעקבותיו חוקרים מובילים, טוענים כי אפשר להתייחס לטראומה ברמת הקבוצה כמו לטראומה ברמת הפרט. במאמר זה אני מבקר גישה זו בהתייחסי למאפיינים שונים בחוויה הטראומטית. אני מציע כאן מודל של טראומה הפועלת כמעין חור שחור בספרה הציבורית ומעוותת את החלל־זמן. הסובייקט הפוסט־טראומטי, כך אני מבקש להראות, משמש סוכן טראומה: גופו מנכיח באופן אלים את הממשי בתוך הסדר הסמלי ומעצב מחדש את הסדר הסמלי, ועם זאת, על מנת להיות מסוגלים לעבור מטראומה של הפרט לטראומה של הקבוצה, עדיין נדרשת עבודה רבה הן אמפירית והן תאורטית. יש אפוא לענות על השאלה הבאה: איך טראומה במישור האישי הופכת להיות טראומה במישור הלאומי. בשלב זה לא ברור על אילו יסודות עומד רעיון הטראומה במישור הלאומי או רעיון הזיכרון הקולקטיבי, אך אין ספק שהן פרויד והן לאקאן, כל אחד בדרכו, מסייעים לנו להבין טוב יותר כיצד חורגת טראומה אישית מהפרט ועוברת לרמת הקבוצה. במובן זה הדין בפרויד ובלאקאן אינו עקר אלא מפרה, ופותח לפנינו שער שדרכו אפשר להתחיל לחשוף את היסודות הטראומטיים של החברה.

¹ אני מבקש להודות לשני המנחים שלי, פרופ' ימימה בן־מנחם ופרופ' יובל נריה. אני מבקש להודות גם לד"ר לעמוס גולדברג על קריאה מעמיקה, הערות מלמדות ביותר והפניות לקריאות נוספות שהבהירו לי עד כמה צר עולמי כעולם נמלה. קוגי יאמאשירו היכה אותי בתדהמה בהערותיו המאלפות. פרופ' חביבה פדיה האירה את עיני בכמה שאלות חשובות ומעוררות מחשבה. מודה כמובן וכרגיל לדוד שמעונוביץ על עריכה סבוכה במיוחד של הטקסט. ועוד תודה לשופטים ולעורכים על הערות שעזרו לי לשפר מאמר זה.

מדפי היומן למבטו של האחר: יומנים אישיים והאוטונומיות של העצמי

רועי שופן

במאמר זה בכונתי לנתח את תופעת הכתיבה ביומנים אישיים בפרספקטיבה רחבה של אוטונומיית הסובייקט והקונפליקט שבין נפרדות לתלות. כתיבת יומנים אישיים נכללת בהגדרה של דיאלוג עצמי וכמעט ולא נחקרה עד כה בפסיכואנליזה. באמצעות ניתוח הכתיבה ביומנים אישיים בכלל, ובזה של לאה גולדברג בפרט, אני מנסה להראות כי הדיאלוג העצמי הוא תופעה חשובה להבנת מושגי העצמי ואוטונומיית הסובייקט וניתוחם. הכתיבה ביומנים אישיים מסייעת להבהיר את מושג העצמי ואת המתח הקיים בתאוריה בין היותו של העצמי מבנה אוטונומי המוגדר מתוך עצמו לבין היותו תלוי קשר והקשר. ההמשגות של ז'אק לאקאן ושל דונלד ויניקוט על הצורך במראה בראשית החיים ושל המתח המובנה מתוך צורך זה על תפקידה של השפה ועל המתח שבין הקיום האובייקטיבי לסובייקטיבי, משמשות להראות כיצד הכתיבה ביומן היא ניסיון של הסובייקט לתת תוקף לעצמו ללא צורך באחר ממש. הוא מנסה לחמוק מן הצורך באחר, ועדיין לתת תוקף לסובייקטיביות כאובייקט.

יומן זה כמו אדם העומד מול המראה ורוצה שהפזזה הזו תישאר לנצח נצחים
(גולדברג 2005: 175).

מבוא

יומנים אישיים הם חלק מהתופעה הנרחבת של דיאלוג עצמי. דיאלוג עצמי הוא אקט של תקשורת, מילולית או כתובה שבמהותו הנו פרטי, כלומר שבו הסובייקט

¹ ברצוני להודות לפרופסור אבי שניא ולד"ר ענר גוברין על הסיוע בכתיבת המאמר.

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Volume 5, 2014

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THE ISRAEL ANNUAL OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

מארג: כתב עת ישראלי לפסיכואנליזה

Volume 5, 2014

Moshe Halevi Spero

Editor-in-Chief

Postgraduate Program of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy

School of Social Work, Bar-Ilan University

Member, International Council of Editors of Psychoanalytic Journals

THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY MAGNES PRESS, JERUSALEM

Distributed by The Hebrew University Magnes Press
P.O. Box 39099, Jerusalem 9139002, Israel, Fax 972-2-5660341, Israel
www.magnespress.co.il

©

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The Hebrew University Magnes Press
Jerusalem 2015

ISBN 978-965-493-816-7
e-BOOK ISBN 978-965-493-817-4
Printed in Israel
at Art Plus Ltd. Press, Jerusalem

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THE ISRAEL ANNUAL OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

Volume 5, 2014

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CONTENTS

THE PLAY OF DREAMS, DREAMS ABOUT PLAY: ON DREAM SPACE IN PSYCHOANALYTIC PLAY THERAPY WITH CHILDREN	
Aviel Oren	1
IS METAPHYSICS HYSTERIA?	
Omri Bichovski	21
THE DEAD MOTHER, THE UNCANNY AND THE ANXIETY OF MODERNITY	
Gal Ventura	33
REMARKS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN MOTHER AND SON IN THE EARLY STAGE OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX	
Ditza Hananel	67
TRUTH AXES AND THE MULTILINGUAL MIND: THEORY AND TECHNIQUE IN THE MIRROR OF TRUTH	
Shlomit Yadlin-Gadot	87
THOUGHT, MEANING AND ANTI-MEANING: DEVELOPMENT OF THE AESTHETIC DIMENSION OF MIND	
Moshe Landau	125
FLEXIBLE WALLS: THE ANALYTIC FRAME (‘SETTING’) AS THE CURATIVE CONTEXT	
Gabi (Gabriela) Mann	153

BEYOND ACTIVE GOODNESS: ON PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY AND JUDAISM	
Ruth Netzer	171
THE SENSE OF SENSE: A REVISED PERSPECTIVE ON THE SCHIZOID DILEMMA IN LIGHT OF WINNICOTT’S CONCEPT OF THE TRUE SELF AND MERLEAU-PONTY’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY	
Yorai Sella	213
TRAUMA AS A BLACK HOLE IN THE HEART OF CULTURE: THE PASSAGE FROM INDIVIDUAL TO SOCIETY	
Yochai Ataria	239
FROM THE PAGES OF A DIARY TO THE GAZE OF THE OTHER: AN ANALYSIS OF LEAH GOLDBERG’S DIARY AND DIARY WRITING AS AN ESSENTIAL PHENOMENON FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF SELF AUTONOMY	
Roey Shopen	271

ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF ESSAYS

**THE PLAY OF DREAMS, DREAMS ABOUT PLAY:
ON DREAM SPACE IN PSYCHOANALYTIC
PLAY THERAPY WITH CHILDREN**

AVIEL OREN

The purpose of this paper is to apply some of the phenomenally important conceptual contributions of Wilfred R. Bion (1897–1979) and Thomas H. Ogden (1947–) regarding dreams, dreaming and the dream process to the technique of psychoanalytic play therapy with children. As my review highlights, Bion’s and Ogden’s theory of dreaming is not simply about the dream *per se*, but also encompasses complex and abstract mental processes that form the basic building blocks of “psychic life,” including dreaming, nightmares, waking, falling sleep, the contact barrier, and other dimensions of the relationship between conscious and unconscious modes of experience. The use of clinical examples from the field of children’s play therapy will help to clarify and visualize these complex concepts. At the same time, the Bion-Ogden theory of dreaming offers psychotherapists of adults as well as children a further perspective on what transpires during the uniquely psychoanalytic psychotherapeutic encounter.

My research begins with a brief review of the dream phenomenon in psychoanalysis. During sleep, according to Freud, unconscious ‘infantile’ wishes disturb sleep and arouse the ego to contend with this disturbance in some manner. A dream is always the manifestation of a compromise that allows infantile, primitive, or, in general, forbidden or dangerous wishes to achieve “delusional satisfaction,” but only once the censor has satisfactorily camouflaged these wishes. In classical theory the belief has been that by using the technique of free association one can locate and undo the censor’s actions and illuminate the hidden or latent contents of the dream.

Our clinical understanding of the dream phenomenon has become increasingly refined and complex with the rise of new psychoanalytical theories. Most developments in this field relate to one of two fundamental dimensions: (a) newer understandings of the overall function of dreams in the life of the psyche, and (b) new approaches to manner by which it is possible and desirable to make use of dreams in the therapeutic encounter. Thus, a number of writers such as Hanna Segal (1918–2011), Heinz Kohut (1913–1981), and Christopher Bollas (1943–) have claimed that beyond the function of maintaining or protecting sleep, dreams also serve as an arena for processing, organising, and transforming

mental contents in a variety of significant ways. From a contemporary point of view, the patient's reporting on dreams during therapeutic sessions is understood as part and parcel of the wider fabric of the transference-countertransference dynamics that color the most significant dimensions of therapy.

Generally speaking, there is a question as to the manner in which dreams might best be made use of in psychoanalysis involving children as patients. The conventional view is that there is a similarity between the processes upon which dreams are based and those that underlay the child's spontaneous play. Therefore, many psychoanalysts such as Melanie Klein (1882–1960), Donald W. Winnicott (1896–1971), and Antonio Ferro (1947–) regard child's play as essentially parallel to the adult dream.

Dreams and dream thoughts occupy a central position in Wilfred R. Bion's theories. The transformation of raw sensations into dream thoughts, and the coupling, union or other combination of the dream elements with each other, are what create *and nourish* the contact barrier (the advanced version of the "stimulus barrier" concept already spoken of in Freud's *Project* [1895(1950)]) that separates and to some degree regulates the relation between the conscious and the unconscious. Borrowing from Bion's concept of the caesura, the dreaming process is what cuts off and differentiates between the conscious and the unconscious, but it is also what makes possible the continuity between them, a continuity that is vital for rich and creative mental life.

Thus, the dream we have while asleep—which is but *one* form of dreaming—is a tangible manifestation, throughout Bion's writing, of an ongoing and uninterrupted process that takes place both in waking life and while sleeping. Bion explains that the dreaming process protects us from psychotic collapse; indeed, the psychotic person cannot dream, therefore he or she is in some sense unable to wake up. According to Bion, a view echoed by Ogden, a patient is 'driven' to seek out psychoanalysis, and attends his therapeutic sessions because he cannot dream his emotional experience. The patient hopes that the therapist's presence and his emotional support will enable him to manage to dream his mental pain.

Following Bion, Ogden defined the therapeutic space as a dream space (of late Ogden implies *primarily* a dream space; in earlier writings his claim was less emphatic) in which there is an encounter between the conscious and the unconscious of the patient and the therapist. The therapist's function therefore is to help the patient "dream himself into existence." Ogden describes two paradigmatic instances in which the dreaming process is harmed: the night terror (*pavor nocturnus*) and the nightmare: the near-stupor of night terrors represents dreams undreamt, whereas nightmares represent dreams that must be cut off prior to completion. A night terror arises from the existence of mental pain consisting of

beta components that are unable to join up and be collected into dream thoughts; a nightmare is a state where the contained (the content of the dream) has flooded and overflowed the container (the ability to dream).

Ogden's thinking is both intrasubjective (in its metaclinical subtlety) and intersubjective in nature. He explains that in the therapeutic encounter there are three potential dreamers: the therapist, the patient and the analytical third, the latter signifying both the therapist and the patient and also neither of them. The therapist's objective is to symbolise verbally the manner in which he himself 'dreams' or imagines (via reverie) the analytical third, and, when appropriate, to communicate to the patient his understandings regarding the unconscious communication taking place between them. Furthermore, Ogden explains that through these dream states the therapist and the patient may share between them various functions and personality parts, e.g. the psychotic and non-psychotic components of personality.

A wide range of dream-type phenomena can be observed during psychoanalytic play psychotherapy with children. In order to better conceptualize the dream theory of Bion and Ogden, I discuss segments of three therapeutic sessions from different stages in the treatment of a 9 year-old boy called Ronen. Ronen was brought to therapy in order to deal with bedwetting. In the first clinical session, no sooner did Ronen arrive than he pretended to go to bed. At the same time, during the course of his 'bed-time' behavior, he managed to lick various objects in a sexual manner and moved his pelvic area. During the second half of the session he became frenetic and aggressive, and spoke about a father who is trying to kill his son. In my discussion of this session I focus on the fact that beyond the manifest content of which Ronen spoke in the session, it seemed that he was in a state of nightmare: unable to sleep and unable to wake up. Or, we might say that his psyche could not find rest, nor be mentally productive, either when asleep or when awake.

The second clinical session that I describe took place after Ronen's 'discovery' of the dollhouse in the room. Ronen began to play with a figure of a young boy and that of a young girl, with the therapist playing the adult person. The relationship between the boy and the girl were characterised by sexuality and seductiveness. The adult figure played by the therapist was instructed to wait for the boy and the girl to go to sleep, and to attack them under cover of darkness. In this case, an inner experience emerged that portrayed the internalised mother failing to protect the boy. In play, the figure of the boy defeated that of the adult. Before the end of that session, Ronen seated the boy on a small wooden toilet, and stated that he needs to 'go.' In my discussion of this session, I focus mainly on the organising function of the play-dreaming process. In this session, as I see it, a nightmare was dreamt to the end and was not cut off halfway through,

and Ronen managed to weave the unconscious drama into a clear and coherent story. The beta components could now be considerably transformed into a dream thought during the day, such that Ronen had less need to peremptorily ‘empty’ or spill out these components directly in the form of urine during the night.

The third clinical session I report demonstrated the way in which the therapist and the patient were able to share various personality elements on a higher level of dream symbolization. During this session Ronen covered himself with a blanket and actually fell asleep. Initially, the therapist experienced increasing anxiety, fearing irrationally that the building’s cleaning-man might suddenly break into the room. Later, the therapist thought about the play which Ronen acted-out during the previous sessions: an adult who breaks in and attacks the boy in his sleep while the mother representation is unable to protect him. This imagined replication enabled the therapist to become calm.

In my discussion of this session, I focus on the manner in which Ronen literally went to sleep leaving the therapist to dream Ronen’s nightmare and transform it into useable dream thoughts once the therapist “awoke.” Finally, Ronen was able to wake up. The cleaning-man represented not only Ronen’s internalised adult person, but also the therapist’s professional superego as modified or augmented by the projective processes in the transference-countertransference. In this sense, the cleaner was an artefact dreamed by the analytical third. In this case one sees the calming function of the dreaming process. Ronen’s recurring nightmare, then, deals with an adult who murders him in his sleep while the mother is absent and not protecting him. In this session, the dreaming process constitutes a calming function arising at first from the therapist’s dual functioning during the session. On the one hand, he was part of the analytical subject dreaming the nightmare; on the other, he bore or activated the function of a protective maternal object that enabled the nightmare to undergo transformation into a tolerable dream.

In summary, this paper applies the dream conceptions of Bion and Ogden to psychoanalytical psychotherapy in play with children. The significance of this conception is that it endorses a holistic perspective that conceives of everything taking place in the therapeutic session as part of a dreaming process carried out jointly by the therapist and the patient. The paper’s aim is to demonstrate, visualise and clarify the complex concepts of Bion and Ogden, on the one hand, and to offer an additional perspective on psychoanalytic psychotherapy in play with children, on the other hand.

IS METAPHYSICS HYSTERIA?

OMRI BICHOVSKI

“It is not a bad usage to employ hysteria for a metaphysical purpose [*emploi*]; metaphysics is hysteria.” This remark, made by Jacques Lacan (1901–1981) in Brussels in 1977 [1981], draws our attention to the fact that both *hysteria* and *metaphysics* tend nowadays to be excluded from their relevant fields of discourse; and, he showed, the loss is significant. These terms cannot simply be dropped, for they refer to something whose existence must be marked by concepts such as these—for these words to disappear is to eliminate something basic for mental experience! This exclusion has to do with the way the *subject* has become “crushed” between positivistic-mechanistic conceptions, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, overly global (almost mystical) attitudes that emphasize some kind of vague unity of the subject with the world/universe. The Hysteric—that diagnostic/existential entity that Lacan begs us to not discard after Freud troubled so hard to disclose her!—enables access to a certain gap or lack, one which we might rightfully call *metaphysical*, that is essential for substantiating the link between a subject and the world. The ability to facilitate this kind of substantiation has clinical consequences.

Lacan sought to preserve for Hysteria a broader function than that originally conceived as defining a ‘merely’ clinical structure. Hysteria characterizes, for example, one of the Four Discourses established by Lacan (the others are The Discourse of the Master, the University, and the Analyst; four possible formulations of the symbolic network that social bonds can adopt [or mimic]). The Discourse of the Hysteric, speaking summarily, points to symptoms which embody and reveal resistance to the prevailing Master Discourse, and which must ultimately be subverted by the Analyst’s Discourse. The meaning of these discourses, each in its own way, is to highlight four chief ways in which ‘otherness’ embodies or infiltrates our language. More than simply a symptom of a specific oedipal conflict as originally postulated by Freud, Lacan speaks more broadly of the way in which the enterprise of psychoanalysis performs its basic function by *hystericizing* the speech of the analysand—by pointing to the otherness which speaks the patient, as it were, blocking his or her access to an acknowledgement of desire. Lacan goes as far as to state that “what the analyst establishes as analytic experience can be put simply: it is the hystericization of discourse.” Taken as such, Hysteria is a condition for entering analysis.

Moving to my second focus, I note that Freud himself was cautious in applying metaphysics to psychoanalysis or about letting psychoanalysis seem to be a form of metaphysics. Specifically, Freud conceived of his task as turning metaphysics into metapsychology—an endeavor that may have reached its culmination in the critically important *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Yet there was crucial pragmatic value in the original metaphysics which Freud, for whatever reasons, tried to avoid but which, thankfully, he never really could. In a letter to Stefan Zweig (1881–1942) written late in 1932, Freud describes the incident of Josef Breuer’s flight from Anna O. in seemingly *metaphysical* terms: “At this moment he (Breuer) held in his hand the key that would have opened the ‘doors to the Mothers,’ but he let it drop!”—an allusion to the weird experiments described in Goethe’s *Faust*. “The Mothers” refers to the goddesses who reside in a place where there is no time, space, or guiding will; i.e., a metaphysical locus. But Freud was not interested wholly in poetry: this “metaphysical space,” or metaphysically demarcated space, is no less than the ‘space’ or ‘time’ of the transference, and the one who hands the key to the analysis is the hysteric. According to Freud, then, in order to obtain the keys to therapeutic effectiveness, the psychoanalyst has to be “Faustian,” by which Freud meant to transcend a mere empiricist field of research. Transference is the gateway to this transcendence, and the key to the gate lies in the hand of the hysteric.

Lacan seeks to return metaphysics to its proper position and places it in the gap “between the usage of the signifier and the weight of signification.” He argues that in this gap “lies the world,” and that this is the proper field of operation of the psychoanalyst (even when dealing with patients other than hysterics; a claim that can be debated independently). As Lacan reads Freud, the crucial clinical characteristic is not only the fact that words are charged with sexual meaning, but more that they have become *sexuated*—that they have achieved a certain sexual “mass.” During the course of hysteric’s demonstrative acting outside herself (as opposed to the obsessional who “drags the objects into the cage of his narcissism”), she is able to create access to a *beyond*, by which Lacan meant the aforementioned gap between the signified and signifier. It is important to realize that in Lacan’s conception of the gap, metaphysics is weaved within language rather than lying external to it. When reconsidering the famous examples given by Freud (borrowed from Tausk) in his essay “The Unconscious” (1915), Lacan contrasts the schizophrenic who complains that her lover “twisted her eyes,” meant *non-figuratively* as required by the well-known German expression *Augenverdreher*, to the hysteric who, under the same conditions, would “have *in fact* convulsively twisted her eyes,” but retained, on some level, access to symbolic meaning. We can trace in these examples the schizophrenic effort to

close the gap by virtue of the concrete, nonmetaphorical accusation towards her lover, while in the case of hysteria the gap is *preserved* through the signifying process of the conversion symptom.

Thus, two approaches are established towards the aforementioned *beyond*: (1) “beyond” in the sense of what might be called “Non-Plus-Ultra,” or beyond the end of the world, and (2) “beyond” as a concept that signifies—beyond figuratively construed, beyond as a *structural* gap. Two clinical examples are presented in order to illustrate those two modes of *beyond*, highlighting especially the analytic efficacy of the second approach.

In the first example, a childhood memory is presented in which a 5 year-old girl sought to respond to a famous paradox stated by her father—“Can God create a stone He is unable to break?”—as a way to indicate that she was ‘beyond’ the limitations of this paradox...and perhaps beyond the limits of the law laid by her father. This memory evoked its effects within the transference when it served to create a link—ultimately an explanatory link—to a break in the analysis. The second example bears witness to the production of an hysterical symptom, and enables us to trace a moment of hysterization, the inception of hysterization; i.e., the appearance of the *I* who speaks as divided, cleaved, and to mark the place of loss. This process, when exposed, makes way for the unconscious to assume its full role in analysis, to mark the place of desire in relation to the analyst (via transference). Both of these examples, each in its own way, highlight the irreplaceable role of hysteria in analysis and in the discourse of the epoch as well, as the embodiment (em-body-ment) of subjectivity itself by means of the divided subject.

The question is raised, in conclusion, as to the fate of hysteria in an era when it has seemingly been excluded from medical discourse as well as others. From the outset Freud had spotted what might be called “the political dimension of hysteria.” The hysteric—as best described, perhaps, in the famous dream of the “Butcher’s wife” (Freud, 1900 [in discussing hysterical identification and condensation])—defies the analyst precisely as concerns the analyst’s owning of knowledge. The hysterical subject, as contemporary Lacanian analyst Marie-Hélène Brousse (1950–) puts it, wants a “master over whom to reign.” As such, Hysterical Discourse is still—and maybe more than ever—a vital barrier against the complete objectification of human experience, and a precious reminder for psychoanalysts about the limits of their knowledge; a warning against all attempts to occupy the place of the Other (Big Other) of knowledge too recklessly.

**THE DEAD MOTHER, THE UNCANNY,
AND THE ANXIETY OF MODERNITY**

GAL VENTURA

The author's intent in this chapter is to focus on recurrent portrayals of dead mothers—the image of dead mothers—in French art from the first half of the nineteenth century, and to understand this phenomenon as a manifestation of the “uncanny” (*das Unheimliche*), “the opposite of what is familiar.” I will review the initial definition of the uncanny presented by the German psychiatrist Ernst Jentsch (d. 1919) in his essay “On the psychology of the uncanny” (1906)—who emphasized primarily the experience of intellectual uncertainty—and then the deeper psychoanalytic dimensions of this concept as defined by Sigmund Freud in his famous essay by that title (1919), which emphasized castration anxiety (in its various displaced and disguised forms), death, and the repetition compulsion.

One may argue that the theme of the mother's death simply reflects reality, since death at childbirth was, until the beginning of the twentieth century, the leading cause of morbidity for women at the age of fertility. And yet, the depiction of mother's death or matricide in the visual arts coincided with the theme of premature maternal death in the fairy tales recorded in Germany by the Brothers Grimm (Jacob [1785–1863] & Wilhelm [1786–1859]), which were also collected in the first half of the nineteenth century, as well as with the preoccupation with orphanhood in both French and English literature composed at that time (inspired by, among other sources, the German tales). Therefore, the prevalence of the image of the dead mother *specifically* in the first half of the nineteenth century, in art and literature alike, demands an additional explanation—indeed, the very repetition of the theme elicits an inchoate sense of anxiety and sustains an uncanny atmosphere around these works.

For this purpose of this analysis, I have chosen to examine one of the last works of art depicting this subject during the period of time in question: “The Hunger” (1850) by prominent French Realist Jules Adolphe Louis Breton (1827–1906), which was destroyed at some point during the Second World War and is known today solely from photographs.

At the center of the canvas, a man enters a dismal-looking house with an excruciating expression on his face: a young mother lies lifeless on the ground, while a naked baby climbs onto her emaciated chest in a vain attempt to feed on

her exposed breast. However it is not her death alone that elucidates the painting's uncanny atmosphere, but moreso the combination of factors: the cause of death, hunger; the deceased's age, gender and family status; and, finally, the location of the dead body in the spatial setting of the painting. The lack of evidence of injury on the corpse, raising questions regarding the circumstances of the mother's demise, further amplifies the uncanny atmosphere suffusing the painting. All of these dimensions create a sense of a 'bad death'—atrophy, waste, death, and a kind of profound and pervasive morbidity—that poses an imminent threat to society because it lacks any potential for renewal or resurrection.

In my analysis, I focus upon the idea that the inert maternal body, the abject stillness of that which is generally taken as a symbol of vitality and nourishment, becomes horrifyingly symbolic of a double death. The uncanny experience we feel when contemplating this painting and others of this kind is supplemented by unconscious associations to the domestic sphere where such tragedies occur, the tension between religiosity and secularization, and the troubling recurrence of such representations—all coupled with the inherent ambivalence and conflictuality surrounding motherhood in general. "The Hunger" seems to touch upon all of these aspects. Hence, instead of depicting death as a predictable, expected event, the young mother's death becomes a sudden, chaotic, uncanny incident that undermines the existing social order instead of dutifully representing it.

Although there is no doubt that Breton's work also gave expression to the artist's own repressed anxieties, this essay does not concentrate on the unconscious dynamics of Jules Breton as such, preferring to explore and expose the unconscious dynamic created *by* Breton. In this manner, I am able to examine the psycho-historical dimension of the image as a reflection, synchronous or non-synchronous, of the general social stances in the given period. In order to attain an understanding of the complex psycho-historical aspects of the issue, I interweave seemingly diverse textual and visual sources, including artwork executed in the nineteenth century, and place these alongside visual sources depicting the plagues that influenced them. I interpret this imagery by drawing upon the psychoanalytic conceptions of Sigmund Freud, André Green's (1927–2012) notion of the "dead mother," the work of contemporary psychoanalytic feminist theorist Julia Kristeva (1941–), and her concept of the abject, British psychosocial theorist Amber Jacobs (1950–), and artist-psychoanalyst Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger (1948–), and her notion of the matrixial borderspace and related concepts—all of which bear upon the theme of the maternal, maternal death and the symbolic sense of the psychologically dead mother. I also refer to certain philosophical treatises composed during the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries that deal with motherhood and “homeliness” or canniness, the polar counterweight within uncanniness.

The structuralization of the term “homeliness” in France in the eighteenth century, which reached its peak in the nineteenth century, offered an alternative and an answer to the growth spurt within the major European cities and to the increased distinction between the private domain and the public sphere. The modification of the conception of *home* reflected radical change in social, cultural, and economic values, necessitating an emphasis on new concepts of privacy, intimacy, and comfortable domesticity. Not entirely consciously, homeliness was perceived as a feminine accomplishment directly related to the concept of comfort: *home* was to be a tranquil, intimate refuge, a sanctuary offering respite to body and soul. And although, due to the nature of things, women have been undergoing the trials and travails of childbirth since the dawn of civilization, they were now expected to find happiness and fulfillment within the narrow roles and morés that were imposed upon them by the patriarchal bourgeois ideology.

Paradoxically, these various changes created, alongside an increasing sense of maternal-familial (both now identified as a single entity!) warmth, an increased awareness, largely below the level of consciousness, of the threat of its loss, to the extent that the *homely* seems to have militated toward its own demise from the very inception. As the status of the home as a social institution flourished during the nineteenth century—the century of the nuclear family and of parental and romantic love—its vulnerable or dark side was also unveiled. This darker side was manifest, among other things, in the form of domestic violence, as illustrated by the Brothers Grimm; in the rise of Gothic literature that depicted the home as the scene of crime and perversion; and, according to my thesis, in the recurrent visual representations of the dead mother. This romantic, sensual, and sometimes chaotic facet served to negate the supremacy of the home while simultaneously containing it by attempting to representationalize the sense of unease aroused by the home as an at once familiar and strange place, containing and menacing, homely and unhomely.

Finally, by way of discussion of the experience of *nothingness* associated with the dead mother, as well as the paradox of forgetfulness and the return of the repressed—as theorized by the nineteenth-century French linguist and writer Ernest Renan (1823–1892)—the essay examines the profound connection between the structuralization of homeliness in the West at the start of the modern era and the uncanny and inherently conflict-ridden core at the heart of modernity.

The visual transformation of the ideal mother into an uncanny corpse not only reflected the trauma of the dissolution of the concept of homeliness, but

simultaneously gave expression to a subversive processing mechanism that sought to bring about the final and *necessary* death (or sublation) of the archaic image of the “mother-who-refuses-to-die.” To elucidate this process, I note that matricide has been discussed in the last decades in feminist psychoanalytic theory from two different perspectives. Some thinkers, such as Kristeva, argued that matricide is a biological and psychic necessity, the first step on the way to becoming autonomous. Others theorists, such as French psychoanalyst and linguist Luce Irigaray (1930–), denounce the *necessity* of matricide, despite—or perhaps because of—its acknowledged importance in Western culture. These insights have been challenged in several studies by Amber Jacobs, who contradicts the notion of matricide as a common patriarchal expression of the mother’s non-status, and instead suggests a parallel theory which focuses on the experience of the loss of the mother. The negation of matricide and its conversion into an alternative model was further discussed by Bracha Ettinger, who, coining her theory of the “matrixial dimension,” defined a new non-Oedipal dimension of subjectivity that does not need to displace the other, or require sharp polarities between the maternal and the paternal, in order to take form.

Overall, then, I argue that the concept of matricide is obligatory in order to cope with the image of the dead/alive mother that refuses to die, enabling anticipatory grief and mourning, thereby propelling the concrete mother into the symbolic realm. By turning the ghostlike blank or ‘white’ mourning into image-rich and conceivable ‘black mourning,’ the omnipresent anxiety surrounding mother’s role and the loss of mother, and its effect upon the family structure, can be processed and symbolically annihilated, thus facilitating the consolidation of new life.

**REMARKS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN
MOTHER AND SON IN THE EARLY STAGE
OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX**

DITZA HANANEL

I attempt in my chapter to explore and expand the novel theory suggested by Thomas H. Ogden (1947–) in his seminal paper on the early *transitional* stage of the male Oedipus complex. A clinical example is presented in order to further examine and refine the theory.

In his essay, Ogden criticizes the classical Freudian view that states that during the male Oedipus complex, the complex task for the boy centers upon the need to change his mother with his father as an object of identification: according to Freud, since the boy ultimately does not change his unconscious love object, his relation to his mother as his love object is relatively less complex. Ogden disagrees and thinks that the young boy in fact continues to face a complex problem. The problem for the boy is that the shift in his libidinal cathexis toward (the experience of “falling in love” with) the oedipal mother occurs while he is trying, at almost the same time, to create psychological distance between himself and the pre-oedipal mother. Donald W. Winnicott (1896–1971) and Wilfred R. Bion (1897–1979), among others, explored the early relation between mother and child and describe it as undifferentiated, tending to depict the child as being initially in a state of absolute dependence. These theories support Ogden’s theory about the difficulty the boy has to face in the early stage of the Oedipus complex.

Ogden suggests that to a large degree the solution to these difficulties lies with the mother. If the boy is able (is enabled) to experience his mother as having what Ogden calls the father-in-the-mother within her (which includes the father-*of*-the mother; i.e., *her* oedipal father, hopefully well worked-through and internalized), he can form a transitional relation with this representation of the father-in-the-mother. If the ‘father’ (the representation of the father) can be apprehended as, or if a relationship can be established with ‘him’ as a transitional object *through* the mother’s mentations, a sense or an order of *thirdness* can be formed which protects the boy from the overwhelming oedipal mother and insulates him against, and contains, the anxiety that she might collapse into a frightening psychic experience of the pre-oedipal mother. Ogden further suggests

that in favorable conditions the boy is now enabled to integrate the two aspects of the mother—the oedipal mother and the pre-oedipal mother—into one object. At the same time, in terms of psychological fantasy, the relation between the two aspects now becomes more dialectical, integrative, and less prone to splitting.

In his additional comments, Ogden explains that a male child during this stage of development can suffer from two kinds of anxiety. The first kind of anxiety involves losing himself ‘in’ the pre-oedipal mother as a result of the regressive collapse of the oedipal mother into the pre-oedipal mother. The second kind of anxiety arises when the boy senses that he is being seductively ‘invited into’ a sexual union with the pre-oedipal mother.

I address myself as well to a specific question that has been of special interest to me: Is there anything particular in the little boy’s relation to his mother which might help the boy to resolve the dilemma of separating from his pre-oedipal mother as he edges closer to the wish to be closer to her *as* his oedipal mother (as if to say: “without causing terrifying envy or competition between them, with him feeling torn between them”)? Or are we compelled to say—similar, with revisions, to the classical view—that the solution lies wholly in the quality of relationship that the boy establishes with the father-in-the-mother?

I suggest that the answer to this question can be discerned in Ogden’s paper. Ogden describes the sense of thirdness that is gradually created in the de-conflictualized triangle between the two aspects of the mother and the boy’s increasingly sharpened sense of gender self. I believe that that *this sense of thirdness* itself also protects the boy, in addition to the protection provided by the gradually internalizing image of the father as a transitional object. As the boy successfully integrates the oedipal mother and the pre-oedipal mother into one ‘homogenized’ object, the dialectical relation between the two parts of the mother helps to form a creative tension between a relatively undifferentiated and a relatively differentiated relation to the mother. *The capacity to tolerate this tension prevents the boy from being pulled to either side*, thus protecting him.

Another question that interests me concerns the relation between the two types of thirdness that Ogden describes. Based on the clinical example I offer, I suggest that the representation of the oedipal mother can fully develop only if the father begins to appear as a transitional object already during the stage of interaction within the pre-oedipal mother. Put differently, *one thirdness is a prerequisite to the other*. I feel that although Ogden describes the anxiety that the boy may feel of losing himself within the pre-oedipal mother *as a result of the collapse of the oedipal mother into the pre-oedipal mother*, this, in fact, cannot happen *if we are intended to take the terms he uses strictly!* That is to say, the

concept of an oedipal mother is supposed to be, by definition, a stable structure (otherwise Ogden needs to say that we are referring to a degenerate or pseudo or immature “oedipal” mother); thus, if we use the term strictly, this level of representation, as opposed to not-fully-internalized “oedipal” mothers, cannot collapse into the pre-oedipal mother. In cases where collapse of the allegedly oedipal mother representation is seen, I suspect that we must conclude that the representation, and perhaps the actual mother herself, had not really achieved full oedipal status to begin with.

For example, Ogden describes an (allegedly) oedipal mother image that collapses into the omnivorous ‘pull’ of the pre-oedipal mother when no transitional relation to the father had been formed through her. In my view, the mother Ogden describes *was never* an oedipal mother—again, in the *strict* sense of the term, and why shouldn’t we cling to the strict sense of the term?—because the prerequisite of securing an internalized image of the father-in-the-mother was absent. This type of mother might be sexual but not oedipal (which also helps explain the distinction between *perverse eroticized* maternally-based transferences and neurotic, conflictual maternally-based transferences); and the representation of her would need to be considered a sexual pre-oedipal mother. An *oedipal* mother can develop only if the father appears as a transitional object through the pre-oedipal mother and is sustained as the image of the more mature oedipal mother is secured and stabilized.

I also suggest that as the mother is gradually perceived as a different, autonomous object formed by the dialectical relation between her two precursor dimensions—the pre-oedipal and oedipal mother representation—the boy becomes indeed increasingly able to separate from the pre-oedipal mother, as Freud described. At the same time, the little boy creates a new object representation that is the outgrowth of the integration of the two aspects of the mother, enabling a new relationship with the mother as a new object.

While Ogden explored the subject of the mother as a love object (“object choice”), psychoanalysts Irene Fast (1930–) and Michael J. Diamond (1950–), heavily influenced by Piaget and object-relations theory, explored the possibilities of the boy’s *identification* with the mother. Freud suggested that both boys and girls identify with the mother who is also their first love object, but the boy must ultimately change his object of identification from the mother to the father. Fast proposed a different model for understanding the theoretically and clinically complex aspects of gender development. According to her, both boys and girls identify with early representations of both parents and by a process of differentiation each child establishes its own gender identity. Diamond follows and

refines Fast's ideas and suggests that masculinity is not based on dis-identification with the mother, but on a dialectical relation between early identifications with both parents. While his model deals with the issue of the mother as an object of identification, and Ogden deals with the issue of the mother as an object of love, the two models can be seen as similar in structure insofar as they emphasize a dialectical relation between two aspects.

A clinical example is presented. At a crucial point in the therapeutic developments, the image of the pre-oedipal mother could be experienced in the transference and the patient felt the anxiety of losing himself within the pre-oedipal mother. In my understanding of this development, I suggest that the psychoanalytic setting, which was created by me, the female psychotherapist—and which the patient, in any event, identified as having been created by his female therapist—gradually came to represent the father-in-the-mother. As the father gradually appeared as a transitional object via the psychoanalytic setting it became also possible to further encourage the development of the more mature image of the oedipal mother in the transference. Around this time, the patient developed an erotic transference, and his dreams showed the tendency to unite two aspects of what we interpreted as the dual aspects of mother, pre-oedipal and oedipal.

I believe that these clinical developments support Ogden's theory concerning the early transitional stage of the boy's Oedipus complex. It remains important to research the parallel developments in the case of the little girl, using Ogden's modified theory of that phase of sexual maturation as well.

**TRUTH AXES OF THE MULTILINGUAL MIND:
THEORY AND TECHNIQUE IN THE
MIRROR OF TRUTH**

SHLOMIT YADLIN-GADOT

In the first part of the article I summarize, as best as space allows, the evolution of the concept of truth in Western philosophy and the reflection of that evolution in psychoanalytic thought. I review the issue of the multiplicity of philosophical and psychoanalytic truths by highlighting the difficulties arising from this plurality. At the conceptual level, the inherent contradiction one hears in the conjunction between ‘multiplicity of’ and ‘truth’ will be discussed; at the psychoanalytic level, the problematic nature of the multiplicity of truths is considered the origin of the different psychoanalytical schools. I demonstrate that the estrangement among these schools may explain, at least partly, the attachment of theoreticians to the one-truth tradition. In the second part of the article, I redefine truth as an active principle of the mind, inherent in the structuring of experience and consciousness, rather than as a construct external to the subject. This conceptualization may shed new light on the issue of the multiplicity of truths, as well as on the structural makeup of the psychoanalytic theoretical sphere. The principle I have in mind construes the self as a collection of epistemologies (truth axes) that are constructed around needs and demands in its relation to the idea of multiple selves as discussed in psychoanalytic theory, and in its implications for the understanding of the dialectics of conscious and unconscious processes of the psyche. In the third part of the article, I describe the way this principle functions in terms of developmental needs and challenges, as well as its experiential, perceptual, and cognitive derivatives

Freud, in his early work as a modern scientist, strove to establish psychoanalysis as a technical endeavor and theoretical body of knowledge in search, or, operating according to the standards of scientific truth; namely, truths that corresponding to the realities or conditions of mental life. Following Freud, however, this ‘single, unified truth’ splintered into a multiplicity of truths, as ideal, subjective, intersubjective, coherence and pragmatic ‘truths’ began to appear, respectively, in the work of Heinz Kohut (1913–1981), Donald W. Winnicott (1896–1971), Donna Orange (1946–), Irwin Zvi Hoffman (1945–), Roy Schafer (1922–), and Donald Spence (1926–2007). These different perspectives on

truth—if that any longer remains the proper word!—emerged from experiences in the clinic and presented themselves on the stage of psychoanalytic theoretical discourse. These variegated approaches to the truth of mental and therapeutic reality have virtually fragmented psychoanalytic society into numerous schools advocating varying conceptions of truth, self, and, by extension, the most suitable (truthful?) ways for achieving truth via psychoanalytic treatment.

My discussion begins with a rhetorical question: it might have been expected that, with the loss of the ‘single, unified truth’ model, the whole concept of *a* psychoanalytic truth—the *true* psychoanalytic theory or methodology or form of research—would lose something of its esteemed, traditional standing; that the preoccupation with truth would decline in intensity such that the overvalued status of this issue in the discipline’s agenda could be similarly downgraded. At the same time, it might also have been expected that we would have by now witnessed a coming to terms with the fact that various schools could continue to branch out within psychoanalysis without necessarily being relevant to one another.

And yet this is not how things have played out. Psychoanalytical discourse does not reveal an end to the preoccupation with truth. Nor are there signs that we have achieved a genuinely respected democratic pluralism that might enable more productive approaches to what, in fact, remain bouts of alienation or antagonism among the various schools of thought.

In my essay, I offer a new inquiry into this phenomenon by way of a redefinition of truth, its function, role, and significance for the human mind. I believe that the redefinition I propose has creative and substantial implications for clinical analytic work and psychoanalytic theory.

The search for truth is ingrained in human nature. Humankind needs cohesion and stability, yearns for an order which would allow the establishment of a sense of a comprehensible and stable universe as opposed to a raw experience of reality that would otherwise (and often does) seem like a collection of multiple chaotic phenomena that are unyielding to the human mind, defy synthesis, and remain beyond comprehension. The mind continuously and automatically strives to introduce order over and across this multiplicity. And it tends to achieve a comprehensible and stable universe by a sort of epistemological portraiture, by formulating what it porports is ‘really out there’ by means of our theories of truth.

As my research continues, I identify six conceptions or paradigms of truth—what I term *axes* (plural of axis) of truth—which infiltrate our language, our clinical experience, philosophical theory, and psychoanalytical metatheory. I

show how each one of these conceptions yields a discrete epistemology, the total of which comprises our experience of psychic space.

Each truth axis functions as an organizing principle of perception, emotion, and thought: each axis, passively or actively, selects data and organizes disparate elements, while determining orders of preference and enforcing certain rules of combination. Every organization of this kind produces a distinct image of reality, together with a definable sense of selfhood and other-hood that are most able to reside within that image. These varying images *sometimes* overlap but *often* are incompatible with each other, generating tensions within the psyche. Indeed, the self as a whole could thus be defined as a collection of these discrete and definable organizations and truth axes, whose different states are expressed within and across them, but *also* including areas of overlap that are as yet indefinable, for no known axis of truth is as yet suitable for these mysterious dimensions.

According to this conceptualization, the various states of self need not be perceived as sporadic, infinite, or situational, such as tends to be the accepted position even among postmodern psychoanalytic writers, including the Relational School, who have tried to articulate and assimilate the idea of multiple selves into their psychoanalytic thinking and well-known published works (such as the writings of Philip Bromberg [2009]; Stephen Mitchell [1991], and Alan Rowan [2010]). Upon careful analysis of these writers' works, one discerns that the varying states of the self continue to be conceived as being rooted in a limited number of modalities that are capable of being 'truthfully' formulated and defined.

Instead, I propose that we imagine that basic universal human needs give rise to the different axes. Particular processes of emotional achievement and development are required in order for each to get establishment and each, in turn yet with overlap, brands its logic upon the budding psyche. In each person's psyche, then, these six individual principles of organization function simultaneously and are embodied in distinctive cognitive, experiential, and emotional modes. Their unique configuration is shaped by a singular developmental history which, depending on internal and external circumstances, enhances some axes, inhibits and forecloses others and, in that way, determines their interrelations. Each organizing axis can be either constructively or pathologically biased. But across this spectrum, the logic of any specific axis will be embodied in the particular conception of truth it corresponds to.

This conceptualization of the self and the functioning of the psyche, I think, leads to the conclusion that one of the key therapeutic objectives of psychoanalytic psychotherapy hinges on processing the particular outputs of each

axis and understanding the dynamic movement among them. Insofar as these axes embody the provision for a basic human need, each axis, with its singular logic and dynamic, is regarded as essential and organic to the psyche. In turn, therapeutic activity would be understood as a process of identifying, articulating, and understanding these truths, as well as the tensions that exist among them on the inter- and intrapersonal dimensions. Cohering with the conception of potential space as created by a dialectic between fantasy and reality (Thomas H. Ogden [1993]), I propose that, at the highest level, the dialogue among various truths axes creates transitional space and provides a methodology for its constitution.

An important observation may be drawn from the perspective of this revised conceptualization. We might now say that different psychoanalytic schools focus their attention on one conception of truth and construe it as a constituting psychic principle of both mental structure and logic of treatment. In practice, each school then charts a developmental and therapeutic pathway, and navigates this pathway in a specific way that is compatible with one of the paradigmatic truths. From this perspective one can see that, rather than being in competition with one another, the different schools of psychoanalytic thought create a heterogeneous arc that parallels the epistemic multiplicity of the mind, yet need to meld a bit more harmoniously just as the mind itself seeks an harmonious integration of different forms of truth.

**THOUGHT, MEANING AND ANTI-MEANING:
DEVELOPMENT OF THE
AESTHETIC DIMENSION OF MIND**

MOSHE LANDAU

This essay deals with the aesthetic dimension or element of the mind as discussed in the unique theoretical work of Wilfred Bion (1897–1979) and Donald Meltzer (1922–2004), especially the notion of “aesthetic conflict” developed in 1988 by Meltzer and his stepdaughter, the artist and literary critic Meg Harris-Williams (1951–), which I aim to employ as a prism for examining the way in which their views enhance our understanding of the processes of mental development and psychoanalytic therapy.

Bion developed his notion of ‘O’ in order to create space beyond the inherent limitations in the ‘K’ link as a route to meaning, and in order to expand our awareness of the depths that lie at the foundation of mental development. ‘O’ signifies a psychological or emotional dimension that is unrepresentable and undifferentiated early in life (the “real” in and of itself) but also throughout life. ‘O’ cannot be known, only experienced—which exists to challenge, in a sense, the illusion of emotional certainty at any given moment and to expose the falseness of experience that does not originate from genuine emotional transformation. As is well known, Bion held that ‘O’ comes to the fore when not suppressed by memory, desire, ‘canned’ knowledge, lies or presumptions. Somewhat less well-known is Bion’s belief that the feelings that approximate ‘O’ initially come closer to our perception due to the child’s innate appreciation of the *aesthetic dimension* and through intuition as opposed to the more ‘objective’ or scientific modes of knowledge that Bion had emphasized in his earlier works.

In his own work, heavily influenced by Klein and Bion, Meltzer sought to deepen our understanding of the realm of aesthetic experience by observing infants, through his clinical work with autistic and non-autistic children, and by virtue of his broad acquaintance with English poetry and literature. Repeatedly, and throughout many writings, Meltzer highlights the primary meeting between a child and his mother—often dramatizing the experience, as if speaking for the dazzled infant or child, in beautiful prose—and portrays this as a powerful, unavoidable and psychologically necessary encounter of mutual beauty. In specific, Meltzer demonstrates the idea of a developmentally necessary *aesthetic*

conflict in the child's budding psychic purview as he struggles to balance the mother's facial visibility and her unreachable inner self.

In this paper I argue that the aesthetic process is a process of creation that must first be allowed to incubate in its unknown aspect, as a state of unrepresentable emotional potential, until it develops further to the point where it can be represented by the symbol. One might refer to this complex, complicated, and frightening process as the development of embryonic meaning. That is to say, the aesthetic process or crisis, developmentally speaking and again later in mature artistic endeavors, is an inherently *intimidating* form of turbulence that fights against the subjective tendencies toward emotional certainty at a given moment. This results in different levels of mental pain, some of which the growing infant learns to accommodate; some of which are never fully captured or stabilized. Creativity depends upon this discrepancy—for, as Bion notes, the transformative analytic process as well requires moments of 'catastrophic change.' In fact, in the clinical hour such 'catastrophe' ought to be anticipated when a deeply creative and subversive process of change has been set in motion (unless it is peremptorily blocked by various modes such as attacks on linking, psychic bulwarks or bastions, etc).

I would like to emphasize the experience of discovering that is connected to this change process, the revelation of the '*new something*' that is now discerned, envisioned or imagined by the subject. A developmental example of this is connected to the experience that Meltzer emphasizes: meeting the beauty of the outside world as a replication of the balance between the mother's external beauty and her inferred internal beauty. Another example would be the sense of having suddenly experienced an awareness of new horizons that unfold, as opposed to the paralyzing terror of newness and discovery that had characterized the individual up to that point. This is often seen in magnified form during psychoanalytic psychotherapy. I am referring to an existential struggle where revelation is entwined with catastrophe.

One of the most prominent aspects in this development is the revelation of a new sense of subjectivity and subjective meaning. At its peak, this development becomes a continuous search for attaching aesthetic meaning to a given emotion. This meaning is dependent upon and bound to truthful emotional experience. Another example would be the development of a tolerable and enjoyable link between a symbol and that which it symbolizes, beyond the level of concrete signs.

I try to develop this last point further. Various writers in psychoanalysis, linguistics, and literature have sought to distinguish between the character and

properties of symbols as opposed to sign. Bion (1973–1974) himself describes the “almost religious effect” of observing a Johannes Vermeer (1632–1675) painting of the streets Delft—the viewer can no longer experience the streets of Delft the same way as he did before he saw the art work—in order to emphasize the developmental possibilities that are imposed upon the viewer by the symbolic elements and sign elements of a work of art. More so than a sign, the symbol contains highly condensed ‘meanings’ of truthful emotion that enlighten the viewer, and take us way beyond the ‘certain’ and the obvious. A truly aesthetic symbol contains a *stimulating* element that, on one hand, inspires new thought while, on the other hand, claims no final purpose. Owing to this very potency, aesthetic symbols can also evoke a radical, or chronic, fear of change. The creation dynamic of the symbol will thus always express the subject’s ability to contain internal contradictions and emotional turbulence, and so we must also speak of an aesthetic *process* and not just an aesthetic *product*. The major component of this process is the way it maintains the capacity for development and creative revelation.

The same elements will also hold for the aesthetic process in the developmental dimension of psychoanalytic therapy. In the sense that I use the term, following Bion and Meltzer, the aesthetic dimension is not a matter of happenstance or a gratuitous aspect of therapy, present in some therapies and not in others. Like the dream and the process of dreaming, the aesthetic element is inherent in all analytic work and ought to be sought out and attended to.

Meltzer differentiated between symbol and sign. The sign refers to something, assumed to be solely informational or instructional (such as a ‘Stop!’ sign) and usually of *fixed* (and perhaps also quantitatively minimal) significance. The symbol contains an open dimension that enables future development and interpretation. The use of sign indicates the need to be aware of the present. It is possible to say that in the creation of the symbol there is an attempt to contain unknown components *that are still in the process of being created* and still have an embryonic meaning that may yet allow new points of contact with or experience of ‘O.’

Not surprisingly, the conditions that enable the development of symbols—aside from the negotiation of the schizoid-paranoid↔depressive positions—in both the natural order of development and psychoanalysis, are linked fundamentally to the mental state of “no memory, no desire and no understanding,” a view that was almost canonical for Bion. However, whereas Bion emphasized the experience of embryonic *self-sensation*, I would like to emphasize the embryonic experience of meaning (or proto-meaning), which oftentimes plays a major role

in the evolution of countertransference-type insights and other forms of analytic intuition.

The most prominent example of symbolic-aesthetic development is the evolution of the dream. Bion and his famous supervisee-analysand James S. Grotstein (1931–) refer to the dream as an attempt to convey aspects of ‘O’ that are connected mostly to internal emotional truth, psychic aspects or energies that have not yet been experienced and have not taken their place within the personality. It is possible to refer to the dream as an internal creation that is entangled with the search for an internal truth and which at a given moment acquires a meaning that was not present beforehand. The creation of the dream, and not solely its content, indicates the procedure of the aesthetic aspect, in the sense of never-ending creation that aims to reveal emotional meaning.

In the light of the above, a psychoanalytic perception that relies on these understandings would ask us to emphasize sensations and feelings that yet lack representation. The Bionian emphasis on conditions of “no memory, no desire and no understanding” is intended to enhance the likelihood of expressing such feelings, in a way that is different than the classical emphasis on ‘K,’ though the latter, too, of course includes transformative procedures that can be tracked. The aesthetic deals better than ‘K’ with the evocation (or representation) of existence and meaning that is just emerging from the amorphism, from a primal chaotic fog. The psychoanalyst’s soul and his ability to bear these situations—his ability to be without memory, without desire and without understanding and comprehension—enables the evolution of a spark, a hint, some kind of ‘lead’ that he or she holds until such time as a more complex and pertinent pattern takes form.

Observation of the containing process (Bion, 1962) enables us to observe and understand the creation of thoughts and the emotional conditions that bridge the minds of the mother and infant. The containing process, I believe, holds an emotional truth that enables *emotional meaning*, not only the transformation and internalization of the nameless dread. Any kind of deficiency in the containing process, then, results in what we might refer to as a *negative aesthetic situation*: a situation or dynamic of anti-meaning, difficulties in establishing symbols that truly convey subjective significance, excessive reliance on immediate signs, and the creation of an emotional false world. In the essay, I offer illustrations of this kind of denudation or even sterilization of emotional meaning, masked by a world of emotional lies as uncannily described in the work of Irish novelist and playwright Samuel Beckett (1906–1989), who was in analysis with Bion between 1934–6.

A segment from a long analytic therapy is provided that demonstrates the

processes I have described. The material concerns a woman who experienced a bizarre, nearly tangible feeling of a stone within her abdomen. She approached me during one session so that I would ‘literally’ see this stone. For several weeks I experienced that stone in my head, almost painfully, with no ability to understand this or transform the experience into anything bearing meaning. A few weeks later, the patient brought in a dream in which she discovered a flower growing in between rocks on a mountain; at a somewhat later stage, she dreamed that she is caught in a pit full of excrement, cleaning herself with the help of that same flower. Different than much of our work up to that point, the imagery the patient had now dreamed was profoundly aesthetic, both in its gross or ugly elements as well as in its beautiful ones. Our conversations during this period of work enabled her to now feel less cold and paralyzed.

In my discussion, I explore the mutual sensations and emotions that we underwent, highlighting the maturation of the dream from being merely a set of reported words to the point where it became a dialogue within my head, and gradually a container that enabled emotional meaning, and the ‘removal’ of the concrete-like sensation of a tangible stone. That is, through a process of mutual psychic “pregnancy” an embryonic sense of meaning develops which gradually enables more symbolic dialogue. At some point, the patient actually was motivated to carry a real pregnancy to a much desired fruitful result.

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Ma‘arag: The Israel Annual of Psychoanalysis, 2014, Volume 5 (pp. 125–152).

**FLEXIBLE WALLS:
THE ANALYTIC FRAME ('SETTING')
AS THE CURATIVE CONTEXT**

GABI (GABRIELA) MANN

This paper considers specific modifications in the psychoanalytic frame or setting and struggles with how our understandings of these kinds of modifications might have been regarded according to traditional views and how we might regard them in the light of current views.

Freud regarded the frame as a means to protect the welfare of the analyst, if also ultimately that of the patient. Operating with what seems generally to have been a 'one-person' or unilateral interpretation of the direction of transference, as is well known, Freud emphasized that a steady frame supports the analyst's needs and capacity to analyze. For this reason Freud advocated that the analyst refrain from changing the frame. Though this point of view evidently enabled much good work within the initial context and time, its emphasis resulted in a somewhat sterile comprehension of the analytic frame. Owing to the lack of a viable reconception of the frame, the occasional challenge or disregard for the frame tended to result in major violations of boundaries with no recommendable salutary results.

With time, the next generation of analysts, still mindful of the traditional model, modified Freud's perspective somewhat and emphasized the need to maintain a constant frame in order to better notice the latent ego apparatuses of the patient and thereby deepen the understanding of the more primitive forms of transference. As psychoanalysis continued to evolve, some analysts suggested that the frame could be approached more flexibly in particular cases; for instance, when undertaking the analysis of patients with severe personality disorders and even the psychoses. It was evident that such patients could not work well within the rigid frame as originally construed, derived from the analysis of the neuroses, but might do better within a frame conceived with a more complex sense of the projective processes that take place within the analytic frame.

Eventually various analysts called for a new perspective on the frame. They considered the frame a 'living' component of the analytic field, not as a separate element of the analysis. It is interesting to note that this new perspective came from seemingly opposed theoreticians: Melanie Klein (1882–1960) and the post-Kleinians, on the one hand, and Heniz Kohut (1913–1981), the founder of Self Psychology, on the other hand.

In my paper, I address the issue of the analytic frame from a different perspective. As stated, while for a long time the general consensus has been that the frame is a fixed entity, clearly defined and inherently agreed upon by both analyst and patient—meaning, generally, that the patient had to adjust to the frame—I suggest that the frame has to fit the patient. The underlying belief of this view is that emerging needs can be exposed more easily if adjustments can be allowed, can be enabled within the analytic frame. I do not intend to argue in favor of changeability for its own sake or to suspend the need for a frame. Rather, I am calling for openness in dialogue about the frame, and about what tend to be referred to generally as enactments, so that we might better regard these as *significant communications* of the patient. This attitude could turn the frame into a more vivid dimension within the psychoanalytic process, no longer regarding the frame wholly as “non-process.”

By being open to change in the frame, the analyst essentially adopts an empathic stance that puts his or her own needs on the side, to as great a degree as possible. In the spirit of Donald W. Winnicott (1896–1971), Heinz Kohut, and the late Emmanuel Ghent (1925–2003), the author accepts the view that the analytic frame is an inherent part of the analytic process, part and parcel of a sand box for endless play, a space for creative acts on the part of both the analyst and the patient, a transitional territory for co-creation. Hour by hour, the analyst immerses into the patient’s subjectivity, listens carefully, and enables adjustments of the frame in accordance with emerging needs. Such an attitude contributes to the patient’s ability and motivation to reveal true needs and address them. Derivations from the rigid frame are regarded as opportunities to furnish the analysis with new meaning, and not simply as expediciencies. Such deviations may reflect transference manifestations that usually remain unexposed—in this sense, we gain insight about the patient via such deviations even when we do not accept the wholesale modification of the frame.

I demonstrate how it is possible to apply a state of mind I refer to as “flexible walls” in analytic technique. I suggest that flexible walls do not encourage deviations from the frame. Rather, the possibility of being flexible probably reduces the ‘need’ for resistance and as we work with these moments, enhances the overall capacity to adhere to the frame. Furthermore, a flexible frame intensifies the transference and provides hope for a new beginning for the patient.

A number of clinical examples are presented in order to illustrate specific problems in regard to the frame: cancelations, late arrivals to the session, treatment or supervision via Skype, internet or telephone, and issues regarding money and payment. The analyst needs to approach these circumstances with an open mind so as to be able to explore the particular meaning of each such

event; pre-conceived ideas are set aside, such as the classic notion that these kinds of ‘pressures’ reflect resistance or an attack on the analytic process. In my discussion I demonstrate how each of these events may be used to identify specific underlying communications that usually remain unspoken. I believe that the precise management of these events, suited to the particular patient, may be considered implicit acts of interpretation.

For example, cancelation can be considered a signifier of resistance or it can be regarded as an act of freedom. I maintain that by providing a fair opportunity to cancel sessions in advance, the analyst encourages the patient’s motivation to generally maintain the consistency of sessions, promotes idealization of the analyst, and enhances the experience of personal freedom. Only when a patient seems completely unable to maintain the frame do we need rigid walls. Lateness, for another example, has multiple meanings depending on the character formation of the patient. I describe a clinical situation where being late demonstrated the patient’s need for more mental space and independence.

Turning to more contemporary circumstances, supervision or therapy via Skype or by telephone are becoming more common. Is this a desirable thing? While the issue is a complex one, I describe the reasons for such developments and attempt to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of such types of analytic contact. One interesting point is that communication by Skype, internet, or telephone tends to benefit from what has been called “internet regression,” that is to say, a tendency to expose and share personal experiences with unusual ease. Not sitting in the physical presence of another person provides freedom to entertain various fantasies, such as sexual or rescue fantasies, or to reveal desperate loneliness. It is understandable why such communication becomes very appealing for many people.

Finally, I consider various issues related to money. Despite the inherent difficulties and discomfort associated with this topic, money issues have to be dealt with as these may derive from narcissistic needs, transference problems, repetition, or other issues. From the perspective of flexible walls, I regard the sphere of money as one that can be nurtured to the point where it becomes a transitional space that is transformative at different periods of the analysis, illuminating who is devoted to whom, who feels submissive to whom, who is dependent upon whom, and who is holding the responsibility for what. All these dynamics tend to be implicit but need to be disclosed.

**BEYOND ACTIVE GOODNESS:
ON PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY
AND JUDAISM**

RUTH NETZER

The article addresses a specific aspect of the moral value of goodness which I refer to as “altruistic active goodness,” in the ideological and ontological sense, as it might be applied to the field of psychology in general and the fields of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in particular. I conceive of the main importance of “active goodness” as inhering in the capacity for *plentiful, generous action*—action beyond sheer merit, perhaps—and in my essay I emphasize it as a central element in the mental health of the individual, an essential component of the process of individuation and social self-actualization, and as a crucial aspect of the psychotherapeutic process.

In an attempt to locate and describe “goodness” in the mental life of the individual, I undertake a comparative review which begins by noting how little attention or scope, primarily in the psychological literature, is given to the very existence of the various types of altruistic “goodness” and forms of “doing good,” as compared to the great scope dedicated to “evil.” As it turns out, psychotherapy generally deals with accepting impulses, identifying neurotic guilt, decreasing the severity of the judgmental and *austere* superego, considering more appropriate ways for dealing with realistic guilt, and identifying the evil\shadow dimensions of personality. In terms of a psychotherapeutic program, we tend to focus upon developing heightened awareness of the personal and archetypal influence of evil (or the opposite of goodness) in order to decrease its control over humankind, regulate its power, and transform the shadow elements so that they serve the mind. But at this rate, as I argue in my chapter, psychotherapy—all types of psychoanalysis, Jungian analysis, and dynamic psychotherapy—essentially limit themselves by primarily “avoiding evil” and, with few exceptions (such as some of the earlier models of humanistic, positivistic psychology, which have been deemed incomplete or naïve in other respects), failing to deal with “doing good.” In contrast to the prevailing postmodern viewpoint that prefers the relative to the absolute, undermines certainty regarding true values, and questions values and morals, the article argues for the importance of values that emphasize the place of altruistic active goodness.

I begin my investigation with the crucial observation that there is a relative absence of “goodness,” including the analysis of goodness, in the theories of Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961), and Eric Neumann (1905–1960). Their writings intensively confront the forces of evil and shadow, quite understandably in the ‘shadow’ and wake of the Second World War, but do not discuss “goodness” per se. Freud, who based his theory on the assumption that man is evil (or at least impulse-ridden) from birth, describes goodness as a mechanism of defense against evil or as a position of appeasement, and expressed little to no faith in its authentic existence or practicality. In the Jungian approach, goodness is considered to be an archetype, and yet it has been almost completely abandoned in professional discourse. At best, the topic comes up in the margins of the discussion of morality.

The question of the origin of goodness is examined and confirmed with findings from animal studies (Franciscus De Waal [1948 –] and others) and infant studies. In addition, I examine the old cultural association between woman and doing good, which for a long period of time diminished the value of doing good as a consequence. Recent psychoanalytic ‘recognition’ (Emelia Perroni, Andrew Gurevich, and others) of the motherly nature of the soul, associated with therapeutic empathy as a mental function beyond gender (i.e., the mother archetype that exists in the mind of every person), is also examined. A comparative study between men and women that verifies the differences between them in this account, according to the required tasks, is also examined.

The role of doing good in philosophy (the Stoics [early 3rd Century BC–500 CE]), Confucius [551 BC–479 BC], Emanuel Levinas [1906–1995], and others), religion (Buddhism, Christianity, and Judaism), in modern secular life (such as the concept of secular grace), and in some examples from literature and cinema, is reviewed. I then try to demonstrate the role of goodness in psychoanalysis in the writings of the last few decades through schools such as Relational psychoanalysis and Self Psychology that have placed much less ambivalent emphasis on active, authentic, empathic, and compassionate relationships. The views of several contemporary authors who share these views are considered, such as Donna Orange, Ofra Eshel, Claudia Kogan, and Stuart Pizer.

Finally, I examine the specific value of actively doing good as this had begun to be understood by positive psychology. In particular, Heinz Kohut’s (1913–1981) views are mentioned since he placed a special emphasis on the value of goodness, and the moral-ideological aspect of man that exists in and of itself. The role of goodness as the root of man’s nature is expanded and emphasized, particularly in Judaism, including the relevant philosophical expositions by

Levinas. Levinas and Kohut, both Jewish, suggest doing good as a response to the evils unleashed by the Second World War.

My plea is that we be willing to draw from Jewish ideological sources that comprise a great deal of our collective subconscious as well as our collective self. I also ask that psychoanalysis and psychotherapy express a greater willingness to learn from the moral-religious position often expressed in literature, a position that is not satisfied with confessing and accepting evil/the shadow, controlling it and transforming it, but is much more willing to provide the possibilities of repentance, atonement, forgiveness, and repair (“*tikun*”), to atone for evil by doing humane good. However, in addition to doing good as a means to atonement and correcting evil, there is also a need for awareness and education towards doing altruistic good in society, as a way to realize the core of the soul and also as an expression of the active hope that is at the basis of psychotherapy. The article emphasizes the need for psychoanalytic psychotherapy to deviate from the principle of neutrality and veer closer toward implementing goodness in psychotherapy itself, both in the domain of the therapist’s overall generosity towards the patient as well as in terms of a message regarding the value of actually doing altruistic good.

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Ma‘arag: The Israel Annual of Psychoanalysis, 2014, Volume 5 (pp. 171–211).

**THE SENSE OF SENSE:
A REVISED PERSPECTIVE ON THE SCHIZOID DILEMMA
IN LIGHT OF WINNICOTT'S CONCEPT OF THE TRUE SELF
AND MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHENOMENOLOGY
OF THE BODY**

YORAI SELLA

In his posthumously published book of essays *Home is Where We Start From* (1986) British psychoanalyst Donald W. Winnicott (1896–1971) charts out the particular ‘life-work’ of individuals struggling with psychiatric illnesses and moves on to describe schizoid patients whose life work needs to be the establishment of a sense of *feeling real*. As clinical experience testifies repeatedly, this is no easy task for the schizoid or for many other contemporary persons. In Winnicott’s description, the phenomenology leading to the formulation of *feeling real* is compounded from the sensual experience of environmental provision which forms the substrate for subjective experience at large.

As we identify the underpinnings and presuppositions of a perceptual phenomenology leading to the formation of subjectivity, we find that Winnicott’s theory dovetails with French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1908–1961) phenomenology of perception, specifically, the latter’s notions of the body, “interweaving” and the “flesh.” By “flesh” (*la chair*), which Merleau-Ponty appropriated from Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1905–1980) original use of the term, he meant “the mysterious tissue or matrix that underlies and gives rise to both the perceiver and the perceived as interdependent aspects of its spontaneous activity,” and he identified this elemental matrix with the interdependent web of earthly life. His theories reflect a cultural milieu in which, if I may so nest the concepts that seem crucial to me, Michel Foucault’s (1926–1984) *The Order of Things* (1966) could be seen as a reflection of novel relationships between *Language and Mind* (1972) (A. Noam Chomsky [1928–]), and *Perception and Mind: The Phenomenology of Perception* (1945) and ‘Eye and mind’ (1961), as highlighted finally by Merleau-Ponty. These cultural strains are echoed, often without direct reference to their source in phenomenology in general and in Merleau-Ponty’s work in specific, in psychoanalytic theories that reflect the realistic basis of essential aspects of interpersonal relationships, such as the formulations of Anna Freud (1895–1982), John Bowlby (1907–1990), and Winnicott, during and following the Second World War. Within this cultural milieu the formerly

strained and sharply split relationship between intrapsychic and intersychic aspects of psychoanalytical formulation could be recast, leading to a reevaluation of the relationship between empiricism and intellectualism, corporality and foundational-substantiality, reference and referents.

By incorporating “sense” (the more traditional sense of *thought*) and “sensuality” (or, perhaps, fleshy experience, the roots of our sense of body, generally *pre-reflective*), both Winnicott’s and Merleau-Ponty’s theories, in differing ways and sharpness of focus, prove invaluable for describing and assessing patients who experience themselves, other selves and their entire environment as being “unreal,” which is often the fulcrum for the diagnosis of schizoid or borderline personality disorder. Additionally, by carefully pointing out the intricate relationship between divergent aspects of perception—touch, kinesthesia and vision—in the formation of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, both theorists help us to comprehend the psychological line that exists between the potential collapse into dissociated discourse that tends to characterize schizoid discourse or non-mentalised corporality typical of borderline discourse. These polar positions are reflected in both psychiatric nosology and psychodynamic descriptions. Schizoid patients are referred to as “cold,” “distant,” and “out of touch,” whereas borderline patients tend to be involved in mind-bending splitting and even physical confrontations.

Based on the phenomenological premise of perceptual intentionality and unavoidable involvement-in-the-world, Merleau-Ponty suggested that “immersed perception” is itself constituent of selfhood, manifest in the here-and-now non-representational realm of its extended scope, rather than in the relatively later, cognitively-derived representational aspects. Concurrently, Merleau-Ponty’s theory enriches the concept of mirroring in the sense that Winnicott used the term (1967), in delineating the discrete aspects of touch and sight-vision in the formation of the mental attributes of alterity and of subjectivity. Taking Edmund Husserl’s (1859–1938) view of the body as a focal point, Merleau-Ponty challenged Husserl’s insistence on the perfect reversibility of the sense of touch, and, by induction, sight. Instead, Merleau-Ponty maintains that a measure of alterity always permeates mirroring-reflection, and, by induction, infuses all sensual relationships, and thus alterity confers an element of intersubjectivity upon touch itself. Perception (visual and otherwise) thus fulfills a triune role: it is at once physically enlightening, metaphorically enlightening, and constitutive of an intermediate zone wherein metaphor concurrently embraces significance and sens[e]-uality. Reflexivity and the power of reflection are thus bound to both “seeing” and to the experience of being seen.

To this correlation, Winnicott added the requirement that perception be a “holding” one: in an anxious mother’s eyes the infant will discover complete and total otherness-alterity, rather than a validating gaze which simultaneously holds and returns his own. This potentially pathogenic mode of interaction may lead to a premature retreat from perceptual interaction into a schizoid, intellectualized, non-spontaneous (“false”) one, with one’s body objectified by one’s own head-bound gaze. In order to further some kind of helpful re-personalization, it thus would be implied that the psychoanalytic technique of the “use of the object,” as Winnicott put it, include a mirroring function and perhaps even the use of the analyst’s own body as a potential kinesthetic and tactile substrate for creating and discovering “the real.”

Winnicott’s position is discussed, and I note that it is in contradistinction to Jacques Lacan’s (1901–1981) mirroring function (1931, 1936), a theory that Winnicott had read and claimed influenced his own very different ideas, which emphasizes the creation of a division between the “real” and the symbolical spheres, and ultimately between child and mother, language and the self-that-is-spoken. Merleau-Ponty’s and Winnicott’s formulations may be described as complementary: Merleau-Ponty laying the ground for a phenomenological—as opposed to structuralistic—theory of psychosomatic interactive reality, while Winnicott delineates its developmental underpinnings and its methodological-technical implications and potential clinical implementation. I suggest that this dual configuration may prove a valuable aid in the conceptualization and treatment of individuals diagnosed as schizoid or displaying schizoid features.

**TRAUMA AS A BLACK HOLE IN THE HEART OF CULTURE:
THE PASSAGE FROM INDIVIDUAL TO SOCIETY**

YOCHAI ATARIA

There is no question that trauma is a life-altering event. Yet a difficult question regarding the link between trauma and culture is whether the shift from the psyche of the individual to the “spiritual life of a people” that Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) felt could take place, and, on some level, *needed* to take place, is actually feasible? In *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), Freud argued that the national trauma of the murder of Moses, according to Freud’s semi-mythical narrative, continues to be repeated within the disposition to guilt neuroses among individual Jewish people, and this serves as his model for the general relationship between individual oedipal trauma and group trauma, and the need for the limits of culture. I seek to problematize the issue of whether, and through what channel, trauma could possibly take place on the level of society.

Interestingly, despite the difficulties that plague this conceptualization, and of which Freud was apparently aware, he nevertheless maintained that it is possible to make a comparison between the individual and the social group in this respect. Freud and other major thinkers and scholars since, including Dominick La Capra (1939–) and Shoshana Felman (1942–), have not refrained from taking the leap from individual to mass psychology, a leap that according to Freud is “bold, but inevitable” (*supra*, 1939, p. 161). Despite the fact that this assumption has not been specifically proven, it appears to be the working hypothesis accepted by the many who so naturally draw a link between trauma and culture, and the concept of transgenerational transmission of trauma.

Thus it seems that the contemporary discourse on trauma almost always begins on the second floor, whereas in fact it lacks foundation. In my analysis, I offer a preliminary re-reading of this matter in order to facilitate a more critical analysis of the infinite number of written texts linking trauma and culture. To be specific, I examine what, if anything, within traumatic experience transforms it into an experience that can be discussed not only on the individual plane but also on a mass level (groups of people, communities, entire nations).

As a first stage, I present the concept of trauma amidst a discussion of Jacques Lacan’s (1901–1981) notion of The Real. Essentially, by accepting Lacan’s approach, trauma is nothing other than an unprepared for, inassimilable,

non-symbolically filtered encounter with the Real. This definition is a recurring theme throughout my article. I then seek to demonstrate that in a deeper sense trauma is an event that is psychologically cut-off from the dimensions of time and space—in fact, it takes place *nowhere* and at *no-time* and thus cannot be plotted (or situated) geographically on any map or chronologically on any axis of time. In this light, the story or narrative, or that which remains of the trauma—often incorrectly taken to mean ‘testimony’—is almost always cut off from the “facts;” the map, as it were, is quite separated from the actual terrain.

In turn, the inability to locate trauma within time or space lends to eruptions of the “Real” into the “Symbolic” dimension, and thus into the public sphere. One of the ways in which this occurs is through the body of the trauma victim. Trauma is burned onto or into the body. In this sense, the body constitutes a continuation of the “Real,” carrying the trauma, often quite literally if not on a very concretely figurative level, and the body’s very presence in the public domain—now construed as just as inassimilable as the ordinary trauma itself—distorts and tears apart the Symbolic Order. This is true of the scarred victims of the nuclear bombings or Holocaust survivors with numbers tattooed on their arms. Like a veritable Mark of Cain, these cases and others similar to these violently introduce the Real into the public sphere.

Following this, I examine an additional aspect of the notion of trauma on a mass level: the lack of first person bodily-egocentric perspective during trauma. I believe that this well-known dimension of trauma theory, which has defied full explanation, is a critical point for discerning historical processes on a wider scale. Specifically, I claim that this dimension characterized much of the traumatic descriptions from the First World War which then erupted again during the Second World War, especially in the form of the concentration camps.* This can be explained in the following manner. The First World War was characterized by static, motionless fighting, forcing the soldiers to detach from reality in order to survive (fight or flight were both impossible) and thus many soldiers lost perspective on the world “from the inside” of their own bodies. The result was a form of psychic numbness. This process did not end on the battlefield. Rather, upon return to their nominal homes, which now seemed the strangest place on earth, the sense of detachment lingered, and soldiers felt depleted of feelings and

* *Ed. Comment* [MHS]: Compare the author’s fascinating analysis with Wilfred Bion’s (1897–1979) efforts to come to terms with his traumatic experiences as a tank commander during the First World War, for which he found it necessary to invent an ingenious form of dialogue among fragments of body and self taking place in different phases of time (contrast the style of his trilogy *A Memoire of the Future* (1975, 1977, 1979) and the subsequent *The Long Weekend: 1897–1919, Part of a Life* (1982).

lacking all former internal perspective from within the body-self. In turn, this phenomenon directly influenced the soldier's close family as well as reaching wider circles, especially since the number of those affected was so great, through various identification mechanisms (among other means). This process occurred in Germany following the First World War. The collapse of internal first-personal (bodily-egocentric) perspective during the war developed in an unconscious way into the design and intent of the concentration camps of the Second World War, enclosures which by their very nature negated the internal perspective and the possibility of seeing the "other."

Dissociation during trauma has further ramifications, including the splitting of the victim's personality. While one personality remains "apparently normal," denying and repressing the trauma, the other is frozen, on a bodily level, in the moment of the trauma. This leads to an impossible internal battle which can result in suicide (e.g., Nick in the movie "The Deer Hunter") or in the violent presence of the trauma in the public sphere (e.g., Travis in the movie "Taxi Driver"). I examine this issue through a discussion of several movies from the Vietnam War and post-Vietnam era.

A further characteristic of the traumatic experience stems from the fact that it is an encounter with the *desert of the Real*. An experience of this kind lies not only outside the realm of language but, in fact, rejects the very notion of "Language" and in this sense the entire Symbolic order. Since the Law of the Father as a function has collapsed, the posttraumatic subject completely detaches from language and the law. As a result, the victim is unable to account for his or her experiences or recount "what really happened" during the trauma (the so-called testimony crisis). Therefore, it appears completely impossible for the posttraumatic subject to testify concerning the traumatic event (consider, for example, Ka-Tsetnik's [Yehiel Dinur-Feiner (1909–2001)] collapse during Eichmann Trial). This detachment between the subjective experience, on the one hand, and the objective description of the traumatic event, on the other hand, creates fundamental rifts, and the trauma thus becomes a *black hole* – something Real which tears up the Symbolic order, and may even bring about collapse. Without the Symbolic, differentiation becomes nearly impossible (and thus Ka-Tsetnik felt he could suddenly not distinguish between himself and Eichmann),

The establishment, the Law, finds it difficult to embrace the traumatized subject for the very reason that he cannot suit himself to the Symbolic order, and he is thus forced towards the extremes of denial or mystification. In this article, I argue that this is a significant characteristic of the manner in which trauma is processed on the national level. In the case of the State of Israel we note

that during the early years of the country's existence the pain and tribulations of Holocaust survivors were often treated with denial and their history 'position' was not readily accepted. Only later, largely following the Eichmann Trial (1961), could a significant shift in attitude be noticed, though at this point the Holocaust underwent a process of mystification largely because the trauma seemed still not entirely assimilable, and to some degree the mystified narrative serves as an anchor for the existence of Israeli society until today.

Finally, I hypothesize that the posttraumatic subject him- or herself becomes a 'black hole' within the Symbolic order and as such he or she completely distorts time and space. In particular, the *body* of the trauma victim becomes the black hole which erupts into the Symbolic order; in other words, the trauma is absorbed into the body of the victim and becomes a black hole at the heart of the public sphere. I bear in mind throughout my study the view of Greek social philosopher and psychoanalyst Cornelius Castoriadis (1922–1997) that it is a mistake to address the individual and society separately: the individual is a carrier of the law, completely saturated with the social norms into which he or she was born, and as such he also has the capability of changing society. In the end, despite various attempts to shed light on the relationship between individual trauma and national trauma, it remains unclear how "trauma on the national level" is to be characterized and constituted, how a nation undergoes trauma, and how this finds expression in posttraumatic symptoms which develop years later.

**FROM THE PAGES OF A DIARY
TO THE GAZE OF THE OTHER:
AN ANALYSIS OF LEAH GOLDBERG'S DIARY
AND DIARY WRITING AS AN ESSENTIAL PHENOMENON
FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF SELF AUTONOMY**

ROEY SHOPEN

In the past few years the concept of the self has become the center of colorful disputes in psychoanalytic theory. Many theorists have attempted to define the concept, and the failure to do so in a way that is resoundingly satisfactory underscores the difficulty of finding a suitable viewpoint for this task.

Most conceptualizations to the term 'self' can be placed in one of two general categories. The first views the self as an autonomic, monadic structure, with an actual nucleus that develops from within its own germinal structure. The second view emphasizes a dynamic intersubjective process, to which is attributed an array of identifications of the self and of significant others in her life. According to both of these perceptions, however, the self is an illusion founded on the need for stability and continuity.

These two types of existence, the autonomous individual, on the one hand, and the context-dependent intersubjective individual, on the other hand, describe two opposite forms of self-becoming. One depicts the self as becoming-out-of-itself; the second self is depicted as becoming-from-and-into-relations. Despite the vast difference between these two definitions and perceptions, they both include self-consciousness or the human ability to perceive him - or herself in terms that include a distinction between the intrapersonal and interpersonal aspects, which create the wider experience of self stability and continuity. Self-consciousness—consciousness that sees *itself* as the object—develops gradually and is conditioned upon several factors. The central factor is the individual's ability to maintain a dialogue with him or herself, or *self dialogue*. As a matter of fact, we currently believe that it is rather impossible to describe the self as a singular or monadic structure, because the self, unlike other mental structures, is language-dependent and as such it is a structure that naturally requires a speaker and a listener. Without these elements, it is inconceivable to have a self, since self-consciousness, as consciousness that looks and speaks to itself as an object, is the foundation for distinguishing between what is self and what is not self; what is internal to the self and what is external.

My focus in this essay is a form of *self-dialogue* in which the subject is both addressor and addressee, and which takes expression through a very specific kind of material, objective written character. My examination puts the act of reflection in the center rather than depicting it as a product. I argue that through the kind of reflection that is conducted via writing, the subject manages to validate his or her consciousness as if it was a physical object, and is thus able to validate the experience of self without needing another actual person.

Despite the widespread nature of these phenomena at the respective developmental stages in which they appear—self-talk is found in about 70% of all children; around 30% of adolescents write diaries—and despite the fact that self-talk aloud, or written self-dialogue, is almost always a manifestation of emotional difficulty and distress, these phenomena have until now hardly been studied in the framework of psychoanalysis. Such investigation as can be located regarding self-talking or self-writing has focused mostly upon the *contents* of the dialogue rather than on the situation itself and its significance as a way of evaluating the quality of autonomy of the self. Diary writing, to be more specific, has been investigated chiefly with respect to their contents, the testimony they provide, and the emotional regulation mechanisms they facilitate. However, focusing on the speech or writing dimension as such would gather all of the aforementioned phenomena under a single conceptual umbrella and better enable us to understand their interaction in the wider context of the formation of self and subjectivity. The study of the phenomenon of self-dialogue regards it as essential for understanding the development of a sense of intrasubjective and interpersonal space and the maintenance of a creative level of tension between them.

In this article I focus on the diaries of Leah Goldberg (1911–1970), Israeli poet, playwright and translator. I illustrate how diary writing can be an attempt to create a mirror that provides validation for the self without the need for an actual other. I will also show how the two functions of language, the expression of feelings and the symbolizing of the objective world, work together and sometimes disjointly, in the process of diary writing.

Speech and writing play a critical role in this route to self development because, analogous to the role of visual self-reflection in the mirror, they provide the objective sensory or physical expression of the existence of consciousness; indeed, speech and writing may be said to *awaken* consciousness. Every attempt to understand self-dialogue must include an analysis of the specific kind of structure through which consciousness watches itself, as it were, as part of speaker-listener relations, and then ‘objectifies’ this experience by creating an auditory or visual product of this act.

By analyzing self-dialogue from developmental, psychoanalytic, and philosophical points of view, I show that this phenomenon is an important component en route to understand the concepts 'self' and the autonomy of the subject and its meaning. This is also part of an extensive developmental process that occurs in early childhood and adolescence in pace, generally, with the central conflicts between dependency and individuality. During those phases, the subject may attempt to validate herself, without needing an actual other, by giving external objective physical expression to the existence of consciousness in the form of a voice or in writing. However, my analysis of Goldberg's diaries suggests that writing a personal diary may help in the short term as a means for self-preservation in times of crisis or hardship, similarly to other actions the mind can adopt when in desperate need for recognition by another. In the long term, the action of writing—to oneself or for others—cannot fully maintain this truly intersubjective need, and the longing for a significant relationship with an actual other persists. In the case of Leah Goldberg, other than her living with her aging mother for the entirety of the poet's life, this need, on the deepest level, seems to have remained unrequited.

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Ma'arag: The Israel Annual of Psychoanalysis, 2014, Volume 5 (pp. 271–296).

