The God of Evil Things

The question of theodicy has preoccupied philosophers and theologians throughout generations. Roughly: If God is moral, how can there be evil in the world? Or: Is the existence of evil not evidence against the existence of a righteous God? This question became the greatest philosophical challenge for the believer, and the main device in the hands of atheists. The question of theodicy also raises a second-order discussion, about the nature of the challenge: Is there a logical contradiction between a moral God and the existence of evil? If not, what sort of tension is this? Can the attributes of God be thought of in a coherent manner? Does the very existence of evil give rise to the challenge, or only the existence of unnecessary evil? The present research addresses Kant’s take on theodicy. It focuses mainly on two Kantian assertions that seem to disaccord with Kant’s theory of freedom: 1. That evil is entrenched in mankind, and 2. That if all-inclusive moral-order is impossible, the moral-law is erroneous. The conclusion, based on close examination of Kant’s argumentation, is that Kant did not exclude theodicy from rational discourse, but rather redefined the challenge enclosed in the question of theodicy.